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INTRODUCTION

Qutbuddīn Aḥmad Walīullāh, popularly known as *Shāh Walīullāh ibn 'Abdur-Raḥīm al-Dihlavī* was born on 4th of *Shawwāl* A.H. 1114., 21st of February A.C. 1703.

At the age of five he went to an elementary school. At seven he finished the reading of the Qurān and started the study of Persian literature and Arabic grammar. By the fifteenth year of his life he completed the course of studies that constituted the curriculum of higher studies in his times, covering courses in Logic, Philosophy, Astronomy, Medicine, Mathematics, Law, Jurisprudence, the Sciences of Traditions and Exegesis. He then started his career as teacher at Madresah Raḥīmia, the institution founded by, and named after his father *Shāh 'Abdur-Raḥīm al-Dihlavī*, who was one of his teachers.

Shāh 'Abdur-Rahīm[1] was a profound scholar in his time and was one of the most brilliant pupils of the eminent philosopher *Mirza Muhammad Zāhid Hirawī.*[2] In the

1. *Shāh 'Abdur-Raḥīm*, son of *Shaikh Wajīh ud-Dīn*, was born in 1054/1644 and died in 1131/1719. He was survived by his sons, *Shāh Walīullāh*, *Shāh Ahlullāh* and *Shāh Habibullāh*, of whom Walīullāh was the eldest. (Ḥasan al-Ma'ṣūmi—Islamic Culture, Hyderabad Dn., 1947).
2. Mirza Muḥammad Zāhid Hirawī. Died in A.H. 1111.

esoteric realm *Shāh 'Abdur-Raḥīm* occupied a very high position, as is clear from the account given of him by Walīullāh in his work *Anfās al-'Ārifīn.*

In planning the course of his son's education, *Shāh 'Abdur-Raḥīm* not only took care of his intellectual development and religious learning, but gave particular attention to his spiritual advancement and initiated him into esoteric training and discipline. Thus, besides learning the external sciences, Shāh Walīullāh acquired mastery over esoteric knowledge and rose to spiritual standing. After two years as a teacher, Shāh Walīullāh received permission from his father while he was on his death bed to initiate others and to instruct and guide them in the path of spiritual life. In the year 1131/1719, at the age of seventeen, he succeeded to his father's position both in the Madresah and in the khānqāh.

In 1143/1731 he went to Ḥijāz[1] and, during his fourteen months stay there, further studied the sciences of religion, the traditions and *fiqh* (jurisprudence and law) with such distinguished scholars as *Abū Ṭāhir al-Kurdī al-Madanī*,[2] *Wafd Allāh al-Makkī* and *Tāj ad-Dīn al-Qālī*.[3] At this time he also came in contact with

1. *Juz'al-Laṭīf*, P. 173. *L.* 10-16. J.A.S.B. 1912.
2. His name is *Abū Ṭāhir Muḥammad Ibn Ibrāhīm al-Kurdī*. Died in A.H. 1145. A.D. 1732. Ibid. 166.
3. Introduction to *Qaul al-Jamīl*, Walīullāh Academy Publication, Lahore; *Anfās al-'Ārifīn*, P. 192.

people from most parts of the Muslim world and obtained first hand information from them about their countries.[1]

Being now in possession of the deep knowledge and understanding that are the essential marks of the *Mujaddid* (the one who presents or re-states the law in a form which, remaining in conformity with its original basis, is suitable to new conditions arising from the changes of time),[2] Walīullāh asserted his claim as a *Mujaddid* of his Age.[3] On account of the strength of his spiritual capacities he also claimed to have been in direct spiritual communion with the Prophet and thereby gained immediate *Ma'rifa* (knowledge and guidance) and various privileges from the Prophet, which emboldened him to assume the surname of '*Uwaisī*' and also the title of *Waṣī* (one who comprehends the validity of religion and law not only on a rational and intellectual basis, but also upon a spiritual foundation and who has recourse to the spirit of the Prophet for guidance and instruction).[4]

On his return to Delhi in 1145/1733, he resumed his former duties and devoted much of his time to the writing of numerous works till his death on the 19th of

1. *Kalimāt Ṭayyibāt*. Vide Islamic Culture Hyd. 1947. P. 345.
2. Taf-I, P. 40.
3. Taf-I, P. 40.
4. *Fuyūḍh al-Ḥaramain*, P. 44. Taf-I, P. 40. Taf-II, pp. 248-250.

Muharram, A.H. 1176, 10th August, A.C. 1762.[1] During his days, the Mughal Empire was gradually decaying. He witnessed the reign of not less than ten emperors and saw rapid changes in the conditions of Indian society as the new forces and circumstances challenged the old organisations. He was not only concerned with what was happening in India. What he had learnt in Ḥijāz about the other countries had created a deep impression on his mind and he was not unaware of happenings in other parts of the world.[2] European traders had been frequenting India since the days of the Emperor Akbar, especially after the inception of the East India Company, which was well established during his life time.[3]

Walīullāh's knowledge, based upon his learning, experience and personal contacts, and aided by his deep insight and spiritual perception, is reflected in his various works, on the Qurān, Hadith, fiqh, philosophy, history, politics, etc. The list of nineteen works which are given by Brockelmann[4] needs to be supplemented by no less than twenty other books on metaphysics, Tasawwuf, philosophy of religion, etc., mentioned by his various biographers.[5]

1. Islamic Culture, Hyd. 1947, P. 345.
2. Ibid.
3. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th Ed. East India Company.
4. Brockelmann, Gesch. Vol. 2, P. 418. Sup. Vol. 2, pp. 614, 1012.
5. Moulvi *Raḥīm Bakhsh, Ḥayāt-i-Walī* (*Urdu*). *Abū-Yaḥya-Tarājim Ulama-i-Ḥadīth Hind*, P. 42.

According to his own statement, it was only a fraction of his knowledge and cognition that he was able to express in his works.[1] He believed that he was the *Fātiḥ*, the *Inaugurator* of a new era or one whose arrival coincides with a new scientific age and who holds the key to mysteries of the coming era.[2] In the introduction of *Hujjat Allah al-Bāligha*, he speaks about his vision of the future wherein he sees the world gleaming with divine light, reflections of which falling in the West. He asserts that he has been inspired to write to offer solution to the new problems that would appear in consequence of those reflections from the West to the East and to disclose the methods meeting the demands that would be made on account of advancement of science and new discoveries as a result of reflections of the new light.[3] As he saw, no one else before him had been able to systematise the higher ethics and esoteric sciences approved for this epoch and the ways of the spiritual path, according to the principles that are intelligible to the common mind.[4] It was he who for the

1. Huj-II, P. 204. *L.* 6-9.
2. *Juz'al-Laṭīf*, J. A. S. B. 1912, P. 174. *L.* 4-5. Taf-II, P. 133. Taf-I, P. 77. Before him, according to Walīullāh, was the epoch of which the *Fātiḥ* was *Ibn al-'Arabī*.
3. Huj-I, P. 3. *L.* 22-25. *Furqān*, ShāhWalīullāh Number, P. 204.
4. *Juz'al-Laṭīf*, J.A.S.B. 1912. P. 174. *L.* 12-14.

first time had been able to formulate principles upon which could be understood the grades of progress, and perfection of human dispositions and the varieties of human dispositions in Humanity as one organic whole,[1] as well as the principles of the systems that govern the various metaphysical universes, and their relation with the universe of matter.[2]

So far as ethics in the ordinary sense of the term (*Ḥikmah al-'Amaliyya*) and the Philosophy of Religion (*Asrār wa Maṣāliḥ al-Aḥkām*) are concerned, he claims that no one else has expounded them on more solid foundations than he has done,[3] and that his outlook in these sciences is wider and more comprehensive than that of his predecessors.[4]

According to his method, reason is not made to compromise with tradition, as was the method of al-Ghazzālī.[5] He claims that his method is based upon the concept of harmony not only between reason (*'Aql*) and tradition, but also between these two and the intuition or inner perception. He, therefore, asserts that his ideas are supported

1. Ibid. *L.* 18-19.
2. Ibid. *L.* 17.
3. Ibid. *L.* 5-11.
4. Ibid. *L.* 20-21. *Shibli* says that no one before Walīullāh has written on the aspects of the philosophy of religion that Walīullāh has expounded in his works. *Al-Kalam*, *Ma'ārif* Publication, India, A.H. 1341.
5. *Cf. al-Ghazzālī's al-Iqtiṣād*, on Eschatology.

by reason, by intuition, wherein lies the criteria of the inner recesses of the human mind and sound healthy tastes (*Azwāq al-Salima*). They are also supported at the same time by *Naql* tradition, teachings of the Qurān, and teachings of prophets, and by other outstanding personalities, and by the history of human societies.[1]

How far Walīullāh's claims are justified cannot be judged unless a thorough study of the contents of his works and his teachings is made. But one thing is certain, that out of the resources of his wide knowledge and profound understanding, he anticipated Rousseau and the nineteenth century sociologists and preceded them in producing a synthesis and correlation of biology, psychology, sociology and ethics. To what extent his ideas tally with those of these later writers is a different question. Apart from his position in the history of Muslim thought, a study of his system therefore may not be without interest even for the modern student of sociology and ethics.

So far, very little work has been done on this extraordinary author. Very few scholars have made any careful study of his works and grasped the principles of his thought.

During the lifetime of Walīullāh there were only four or five persons, who, from amongst the vast circle

1. Taf-I, P. 83; *L.* 8, P. 82.

of his pupils, were known to have a grasp of his system.[1] The most learned amongst them was Shaikh *Muhammad 'Āshiq*,[2] who was entrusted by Walīullāh with the task of preparing the manuscript copies of his works and also was fully authorised by him to teach his sciences.[3] Whether he wrote any work of his own on exposition of Walīullāh's thought is not known.

After the death of Walīullāh, his sons[4] were the chief exponents of his thought. His second son Shāh *Rafī' ud-Dīn's* small book *Takmīl al-Azhān* and scattered comments in other writings constitute the first steps towards a written exposition of Walīullāh's ideas. This book and the comments, however, are concerned with metaphysical problems and some question of higher ethics. The first of the four chapters of the book deals with the peculiarities of Walīullāh's Logic and the last chapter is on the Principles of Synthesis of Diversity of Views.[5]

1. 'Ubaidallāh al-Sindhī, *Siyāsī Taḥrīk (Urdu)*, pp. 63, 173. The names of these pupils were *Shaikh Muḥammad 'Āshiq, Jamāl ud-Dīn Shah, Muḥammad Amīn Kashmīrī, Shāh Nūr Allāh* and *Shāh Sa'īd Brelvī*.
2. He was also Walīullāh's cousin on his mother's side.
3. Taf-I, pp. 125-126; Huj-I. P. 4. *L.* 6-7.
4. The names of his sons were *Shāh 'Abd al-'Azīz, Shāh Rafī'ud-Dīn; Shāh 'Abd al-Qādir* and *Shāh 'Abd al-Ghanī*, Furqān, Walīullāh Number, 227.
5. *Vide Takmīl al-Azhān* by *Shāh Rafī'ud-Dīn. Ms. Pīr Jhandō* Library, Sind.

Later, his grandson *Muḥammad Ismā'īl*[1] *ibn 'Abd-al-Ghanī ibn Walīullāh* wrote his treatise *'Abaqāt* on Walīullāh's concepts of Monism (*Waḥdat al-Wujūd*) and emanation (*Tajallī*), in which he also gives a synthesis of the ideas of two other thinkers and Muslim leaders *Ibn al-'Arabī* and *Aḥmad Sarhindī*.[2] In the later part of the nineteenth century *Muḥammad Qāsim*,[3] the founder of the Deoband Madresah (A.D. 1866) was in his time the greatest exponent of Walīullāh's thought. He has left a number of treatises in Urdu, dealing mainly with purely theological questions current in his time. His works bear definite marks of Walīullāh's ideas of which he gives prolific elaborations at times.[4]

Though valuable from a scholarly point of view, none of the works mentioned above meets the demands of the modern mind. It was not till recently that in the personality of *'Allāmah 'Ubaidallāh al-Sindhī*, an exponent of Walīullāh's thought in modern times was found. He

1. He died on 16th May, 1831 at the age of 53. His *'Abaqāt* was published in Karachi.
2. *Muhyi'd-Dīn Ibn al-'Arabī* (A.D. 1165-1240) and *Imām Rabbānī-Aḥmad Sarhindī* (A.D. 1563-1624).
3. *Maulānā Muḥammad Qāsim Nanotavī*, born in A.H. 1248 and died in A.H. 1297 (A.D. 1880).
4. *Vide* his *Ḥujjat al-Islām* in Urdu which deals with a part of the practical theology. His other works are *Qibla Numa, Āb-i-Ḥayāt, Taqrīr Dilpazīr*, etc. On Monistic cosmogony read his commentary *Sharaḥ Ḥadīth Abī Razīn*. Pub. *Bait al-Ḥikmat*, Delhi.

studied Walīullāh's philosophy with the great traditionist (*muḥaddith*) *Shaikh al-Hind, Maḥmūd Ḥasan,*[1] the jurist (*faqīh*) *Rashīd Aḥmad Gangōhī*[2] and others. Unfortunately he has not left many written works on Walīullāh. His book *Philosophy of Walīullāh*[3] is the product of his thorough study of Walīullāh's works, but is more useful to specialists than to the general readers. It gives in Urdu a concise and comprehensive exposition of Walīullāh's ideas mainly on the problems that are studied by those who specialise in the sciences of exegesis, traditions, jurisprudence and code of Muslim law. To modern readers, the estimate of Walīullāh's philosophy of religion given in his '*Afkār*' (Views)[4] and his historical survey of the people who belonged to Walīullāh's tradition, given in his work on the history of *Ḥizb-i-Walīullāh,*[5] are the most useful introductions to Walīullāh's thought and personality.

1. He was a pupil of *Maulāna Muḥammad Qāsim* and was the Principal of the Deoband Madresah when 'Ubaidallāh Sindhī studied under him. He was born in A.D. 1851 and died in A.D. 1920.
2. Born in A.D. 1827, and died in A.D. 1906 (A.H. 1323).
3. Vide *Shāh Walīullāh aur Unka Falsafa*, an elaboration of his original article in the Journal *Furqān*, 1940, published by Sind Sāgar Academy, Lahore, 1944.
4. Vide *Maulāna 'Ubaidallāh Sindhī aur unke Afkār*. His Views etc., an exposition by Prof. *Muḥammad Sarwar of Jāmi'a Millia* Delhi, Pub. 1945, Lahore.
5. *See* his *Shāh Walīullāh aur Unkī Siyāsī Taḥrīk*. Pub. 1945, Lahore.

So far as I know, no one else has dealt with the aspects of Walīullāh's thought discussed in this work. Before defining the subject matter of this treatise, it would be useful to give a general idea of the style of writing found in Walīullāh's works.

Walīullāh was a voluminous writer as is evident from the list of his works. In the study of his writings, however, the modern reader experiences considerable difficulty in understanding the general sense of his arguments. The first problem, which confronts the student is to acquire, from a careful study of his more important works, some comprehension of his whole system of thought in its general lines. No single work of his presents his complete system, yet without some previous knowledge of the system, it would scarcely be possible to grasp the full import of his expressions. His philosophical theories and sociological conceptions were far ahead of his times. He was, therefore, obliged to use many terms in much wider sense than that in which they are usually understood[1] in addition to the terms that seem to be of his own coinage[2] and the

1. Examples: *e.g.* the terms like '*Aql, Fiṭrah*, and those terms that connote the instincts and emotions like *Shajā'ah*, *Samāḥah*, etc.
2. Examples: *e.g.* the terms like *Irtifāq, Tadallī, al-Malakiyya al-'Āliya, al-Malakiyya al-Sāfila, al-Insān al-Ilāhī*, etc.

expressions that are used by him in peculiar sense of his own.[1]

Besides the difficulty offered to the modern reader by Walīullāh's terminology, there is still another and greater difficulty caused by Walīullāh's process of thought, to which the modern mind has become almost alien. Many of his expressions seem to be the product of intuition rather than of reasoned thought. This is perhaps because of the fact that the source of his prolific knowledge, as he himself claims and as it is supported by biographical notes about his methods of working,[2] lies in his faculty of high intuition and far reaching inner perception (*ma'rifa*). If this is so, the knowledge thus received, when transferred into the region of the ordinary reason and of concrete expression, is bound to be subtle and difficult to comprehend, not only because that it defies any attempt to express it fully in words, but also because its very process is different from that to which the modern mind is accustomed. It is always the case with those who claim to be inspired and to derive their knowledge from

1. Examples: *e.g.* the expressions in which the terms like these are used: *Fiṭrah, Raḥmān, Rāi al-Kullī, Diyāna, Rafāhiyya, Malakiyya, 'Adāla, al-Birr wal-I<u>th</u>m, al-Ḥaqq wal-Bāṭil, Manāt uqdat al-Ṣūra, A<u>kh</u>lāq, Malakāt, Iḥsān*, etc.
2. *See* (1) Biographical note in this introduction. (2) <u>Sh</u>āh 'Abdal-'Azīz, *Malfūẓāt*, 40, Cf. Journal *Furqan*, Walīullāh Number, 223.

higher intuition and inner perception, that the thought of the unseen and of what scientifically may be called the unknowable comes to them first. They proceed, thereafter, in their process of thinking, to the seen and the knowable. This is in contrast to the process of thought of the modern mind. It is comparatively easier for the modern reader to comprehend the argument which proceeds from the seen to the unseen and from the known to the unknown, as it conforms to his way of thinking. Walīullāh's method of argument, on the other hand, more often resembles to that of inspired persons than that of scientific writers of modern times. Thus to the modern reader the sequence of his argument in those passages where metaphysical ideas about the higher universes stand in the forefront, and in which prominence is given to the account of the advanced stages of the life of the human soul, is baffling.

From the study of his works, it is clear that his ambition to cover a vast field hindered him from enlarging on specific topics and from entering into precise details. His style, therefore, both in Arabic and in Persian, is terse, suggestive, and epigramic and not elaborate and extensive.

Besides the topics with which his books are mainly concerned, one finds in his works a large quantity of material relating to other topics which are dealt with

by him indirectly. The range of subjects that could be discussed in the light of the material available in his works is thus very wide, covering, as they do, those topics that are directly related to the Philosophy of Religion as well as those that come under the head of the social sciences. It is, therefore, not possible to make a thorough study of his works except in sections and with specific points of view.

For this dissertation Walīullāh's principles of ethics and practical theology have been chosen. Ethics occupy a very important position in the system of his thought, as his ethics are an essential basis of his philosophy of religion. What is meant by the term ethics in this dissertation is discussed fully in Chapters 5 and 6. Here it may be noted that Walīullāh's outlook in ethics covers the whole humanity, and as such, his ethical system mainly consists of principles of ethical conduct conducive both to the inner state of the virtuous mind and to the general welfare of the individual and of society and of humanity at large. Thus his ethical principles have a close relation with psychology and sociology. To understand Walīullāh's concept of virtue and especially of the Seven Virtues, some knowledge of his psychological principles is essential. Similarly, knowledge of his sociology is needed in order to understand the background of the discussions on social

custom and principles of ethics. For this reason, his psychology and sociology have both been dealt with in this dissertation, briefly, in separate chapters. For discussion of his ethical system, in its fullest development, it is desirable that an account of his system of metaphysics should be included. But this would involve a disproportionate elaboration of this dissertation and therefore, details of the corresponding metaphysical basis of his ethics have been excluded except for passing references and brief explanatory remarks. The metaphysical background, necessary to the exposition of Walīullāh's thought, is taken here for granted and references to that effect are made wherever necessary, without attempting to discuss the nature of his metaphysical ideas in the light of his system of thought.

It may be pointed out that it is only with one branch of Walīullāh's ethics, namely the details of his *Ordinary ethics*, that this dissertation is mainly concerned. So far as Advanced or Higher ethics are concerned, no detailed discussions have been given. This has been done partly, because it is necessary, in order to avoid confusion, that Higher ethics should be treated separately from Ordinary ethics, in accordance with Walīullāh's own view that the two branches of ethics are separate and that by mixing them up

together great confusion and misunderstanding is caused.[1] There is the further reason that the treatment of Walīullāh's Higher ethics involves a more detailed treatment of his psychology and necessitates introduction of his metaphysics, which would make the task of exposition of his ethics much more difficult than in the present circumstances.

It remains to define more precisely what is meant by Ordinary ethics in this work. By Ordinary ethics is meant the Practical ethics that are useful for the greatest mass of humanity and are at any period necessary for the good behaviour of a good man and a good citizen in the ordinary refined sense of the terms. By Higher ethics, on the other hand, we mean those that deal with saintship and stages beyond it.

Similarly, Practical theology is that system of beliefs which is useful and practicable for the majority of ordinary human beings that constitute the great mass of humanity. The account of the knowledge and consciousness about God attained by highly gifted and extraordinary human individuals has been excluded from this work. Similarly the problems of the pure theology of Walīullāh which is entirely different from the traditional scholastic theology, and discussions on

1. Taf-I, P. 112. *L.* 13-15.

metaphysical problems have been avoided as far as possible. The main purpose in introducing his theology alongside his ethics is to point out the peculiarities by which his system is distinguished from other traditional Muslim systems, not only in ethics but also in theology.

This dissertation is a product of the writer's constructive study of Walīullāh's works enumerated below, and has been written in the light of Walīullāh's whole system of thought as the writer has been able to reconstruct from his study of a wide range of Walīullāh's writings.

So far as Principles of ethics and theology are concerned, the bulk of the material is available in Walīullāh's two important works *Hujjat Allāh al-Bāligha* and *al-Budūr al-Bāzigha*, though his other works are also not lacking in material on these subjects. This dissertation has, therefore, been mainly based upon the contents of these two works, although the material available in other works has also been used wherever necessary.

The ultimate object of this work is, as will appear, to prepare the ground work for future studies of Walīullāh's higher ethics and philosophy of religion in particular, and his system of thought in general. Original thought cannot be expected in a review of

an author's ideas as given in his works and an exposition thereof. The writer of this book has however endeavoured to interpret and present the ideas in a language and form intelligible to the modern mind. The source of every idea attributed to Walīullāh has been traced in his works and appropriate references have been given in the foot-notes.

In order to avoid excessive elaboration, relevant ideas of some interest have been included in the foot-notes and some necessary details that could not be so given in foot-notes have been discussed in the additional notes appended to each chapter.

The names of the works of Walīullāh that have been studied and from which most of the material utilized has been drawn are given below:—

1. *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bāligha*, Volumes 1 & 2, Cairo, A.H. 1352.
2. *Al-Budūr al-Bāzigha*, Majlis 'Ilmī, Dabhel (Surat, India), Publication No. 17, A. H. 1354.
3. *Al-Tafhīmāt al-Ilāhiyya*, Vols. 1 & 2, Majlis 'Ilmī, Dabhel (Surat), Publication No. 18, A.H. 1355.
4. *Al-Khair al-Kathīr*, Majlis 'Ilmī, Dabhel (Surat), Publication No. 16, A.H. 1354.
5. *Izālat al-Khafa*, Volumes 1 & 2, Breli (India), A.H. 1286 (A.D. 1869).

6. *Saṭa'āt*, Bait al-Ḥikmat Khadda (Karachi) Publication.
7. *Hama'āt*, Bait al-Ḥikmat Lahore Publication, A.D. 1944.
8. *Alṭāf al-Quds*, Delhi, A. H. 1305 (A.D. 1888), E. Edwards, Catalogue of Persian Books, British Museum.
9. *Al-Qaul al-Jamil*, Walīullāh Academy Lahore Publication.
10. *Hawāmi'*, Mujtabāī Publication, Delhi, A.H. 1350.
11. *Al-Juz' al-Laṭīf fi-Tarjamat al-'Abd al-Dha'if*, Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, Bengal, 1912, (Indian Institute, Oxford).
12. *'Iqd al-Jīd fi-Aḥkām al-Ijtihād wāl-Taqlīd.*
13. *Al-Inṣāf fi-Bayān Sabab al-Ikhtilāf*, Cairo, A.H. 1327, A.D. 1909, (Griffith Institute, Ashmolean Library, Oxford).
14. *Fauz al-Kabīr*, Aḥmadi Press, Hugli (Calcutta), A. H. 1249, A.D. 1833.
15. *Anfās al-'Ārifīn*, Aḥmadī Printing Press, Delhi, A. H. 1315, A.D. 1897.
16. *Risālah-i-Dānishmandī.*
17. *Waṣiyat Nāmah*, Nawalkishor, Lucknow, A.H. 1291, A.D. 1873, Arberry Cat. of Persian Books, India Office Library, London.

PART I

SHAH WALIULLAH'S PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS

CHAPTER I

PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

Introduction

The relation between disposition and conduct resembles almost that of cause and effect. No writer on ethics can, therefore, dispense with psychology. Walīullāh is no exception to this rule. He has evolved psychology from animal to man—man capable of forming conceptions, ratiocinating and generalising. He has gone far beyond cognition to detachment, intuition and ecstacy. But as the subject under consideration is ethics as ordinarily understood, it would not be desirable to introduce "higher ethics" into this analysis. In psychology too, the discussion will mainly be confined to as much of it as is essential to understand his "seven virtues" and the basis of social traditions and customs that come into being in the four sociological stages, which he calls *Irtifāqāt*.

Walīullāh is, it may be said, a thorough-going *Interactionist* in psychology, as we find him *Utilitarian* in ethics. But, as in ethics, so in psychology his hypostasis is only temporary, owing to the idea of continuity in evolution standing in the background. The idea of continuous change, the flow of progress, and emergence of new values entirely different from

their basis is never out of his mind. In his psychology, his interactionism works till mind becomes a master in its own house, and can dispense with sense-perception and all that *Physiological Psychology* implies. There his hypostasis, adopted for convenience comes to an end.

Starting with the sensation of touch diffused throughout the organism, later the *External Senses*, and their localisation, he conceives the formation of specific centres of (and localities that are invested with) faculties of physical, cognitive and conative activities.[1] He considers the liver the storehouse of activities for physical wellbeing, the brain for cognition and execution of conations and the heart as the chief organ of will. This *Triad* works till the state emerges when the *Astral Body* (*Nasma*)[2] becomes independent and is able to exist on its own.[3] Before such a state is attained during the physical lifetime of the human being, his physical body serves the same purpose to his Astral Body as does the cocoon for the butterfly, *i.e.* a casket (*ghilāf*)[4].

1. *See* Additional Note in Appendix. This Triad will be called *Basic Triad*. Its constituents are *'Aql*, *Qalb* and *Nafs* or *Ṭabī'at*.
2. *Nasma*. Taf-II, P. 181. *L*. 2-4. *See* "Animal disposition", below, cf. *'Abaqāt*. P. 126.
3. *See* the stages and grades of dispositions, below.
4. Taf-I, P. 171. *L*. 5.

The basis of ethical conduct lies in what Walīullāh calls *fiṭrah*[1] or so to speak the specific human disposition, in its effort to distinguish itself from that of animal. It would therefore be interesting to study a brief account of Walīullāh's animal psychology first.

ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY

According to Walīullāhian metaphysics, an animal is the product of various earlier forms (*Ṣuwar*) each of which is distinguished by peculiar characteristics.[2] Animal, as it exists in this world, manifests characteristics of inorganic matter and those of the vegetative form in addition to those characteristics which are found in animals exclusively.

Animal Disposition

Animal gains consciousness through the sense-perception. The organs, of what Walīullāh calls *al-Ḥiss al-Zāhir* the external sense, and of what he calls *al-Ḥiss al-Bāṭin* the inner sense or perception and conation, as well as the feelings of pleasure and pain and some other lower characteristics of mind, help animal to acquire this consciousness.[3] In fact, he believes that animal is distinguished from species of a lower order by the

1. *See* note on *fiṭrah* in Introduction to Part II of this book. Also see Huj-I, pp. 166-67.
2. Budur, pp. 16-17.
3. Budur, p. 21, *ll*. 9-11. The centre of sense-perception is the brain. The faculty of sense-perception and inner perception is also called *'Aql* or *Intelligence*.

possession of *Nasamah* or the etherial *Astral Body* or the psychic self that has five external senses and the five internal senses.[1] The *Nasamah* is also the source of faculties of sense-perception and of conation and will, as well as of feelings that create urges for the fulfilment of biological needs.

One peculiarity that distinguishes the animal disposition from the human disposition is that in it is present a dominant *Physio-biological* factor *Nafs* or *Ṭabī'ah,* to which the two other constituents of the *Triad* namely *Intelligence* (*'Aql*) and the *Volitional Faculty* (*Qalb*) are in absolute subservience.[2] In human dispositions on the other hand the influence of human *Intelligence* (*'Aql*) or *Intellect* is the dominant factor.[3] This will become clear as we proceed.

1. Budur, p. 33, *l.* 5. cf. *'Abaqāt*, p. 114.
2. Huj-II, p. 90, *l.* 17.
3. Huj-II, p. 90, *l.* 15. Huj-I, p. 21, *l.* 21. The terms *'Aql* (*Intelligence*) and *Idrāk* (*Comprehension*) have a wide significance ranging from the lowest forms of intelligence and perception found in animals to the highest form of intuition, inner perception, inspiration and revelation. Hence *Rationality* and *Intellect,* which are specific marks of man and which, according to Walīullāh, develop and emerge out of the *'Aql* or *Intelligence* common to man and animal, are only a part of the significance of *'Aql* or *Idrāk*. Man has a capacity for various grades of higher intelligence which emerge one after the other in highly progressive and superior dispositions possessed by extraordinary human beings. So far as ordinary human beings are concerned, their intelligence does not make much progress beyond rationality and intellect. The other stages of their progress take place after their physical death. Budur, p. 31, *ll.* 15-19; p. 32, *ll.* 1-3; p. 99, *ll.* 2-5. Huj-I, p. 22, *ll.* 18, 20, 23. And also see chapt. on Eschatology in Part-II of this book.

From the general account of the characteristics that Walīullāh assigns to each of the constituents of the *Triad*, it is clear that in addition to conation and volition, the mind (*Qalb*) has several different kinds of psychic feelings of attachment, aversion, pleasure and pain.[1] The dominant interaction of *Nafs or* the physio-biological urges of hunger, sex, physical safety, etc., upon the subservient mind (*Qalb*) with all its characteristics and upon the intelligence (*'Aql*) with its faculties of sense and perception, gives rise to the psychic characteristics of the animal disposition and its feelings. Owing to their comparative simplicity and crudeness in comparison with those of the human mind,[2] those psychic characteristics and feelings of the animal disposition may be called by us *Instincts.*

Characteristics of Animal Disposition

In order to review the characteristics of the animal disposition, Walīullāh analyses the behaviour of a full-fledged, well-developed and healthy male animal and points out that it displays instincts of anger, courage, revenge, feelings of self-sufficiency, desire for supremacy, attachment for females of its own species, wooing and jealousy.[3] About animals in general, Walīullāh

1. Budur, pp. 33-38.
2. Cf. Budur, p. 30. See discussion on Human Disposition, below.
3. Budur, p. 29. last para; p. 30. *ll.* 1-10.

states that they show signs of what may be called love, humility, fear, grief, a tendency of association with members of the same species, parental care for young ones,[1] etc.

From his idea of the human disposition and its characteristics it could be concluded that in the case of animal the qualities enumerated above are simpler. They lack the refinement and modification produced under the influence of intellect and developed in the human disposition.[2] The difference between the psychic characteristics of the animal disposition understood as simple qualities and crude and undeveloped forms of what we call *Instincts*, and those of the human disposition, conceived as refined, more complex and developed forms of what we call *Emotions* and *Sentiments*, seems to be obvious to the mind of Walīullāh; though he does not attempt to differentiate between animal instincts and human emotions and sentiments in his terminology. For example, he calls the quality of courage both in animal and in the human being by the same term, *Shajā'ah* (bravery). But from his account of the human virtue of bravery it is clear that it differs widely from that of animal in refinement and development.[3]

1. Budur, p. 97, *ll.* 2-3; p. 116, *ll.* 7, 13-17. Also Huj-I, p. 21, last 2 lines; p. 22, *ll.* 1-5; p. 36, *ll.* 22-25. See how birds train their young ones.
2. Budur, p. 30, *ll.* 9-10.
3. *See* the account of the virtue of *Shajā'ah*, in chap. II

It would, therefore, not be contrary to his ideas, if a complex quality like 'courage' in animal is called the instinct of pugnacity, to which he sometimes refers as *Ghadab* (anger). The same may be called the instinct of self-assertion and the instinct of repulsion, *Tīh wal-Iṭrāḥ*[1], from a different point of view. Similarly, out of the other characteristics mentioned above, the characteristics of attachment between members of different sexes of a species, may be called sex instinct, and the tendency towards association between members of the same species may be called gregarious instinct.[2] Thus other instincts, such as the parental instinct, the instincts of mating, fear, submission, etc., may correspondingly be conceived in relation with the relevant characteristics of the animal disposition.

As the idea of continuous change and development or *evolution*[3] is always the basis of his discussion, it supports the propriety of conceiving the qualities of the animal disposition as instincts, to distinguish them from their more developed and complex forms in the human disposition. The same point of view also helps us in

1. Budur, p. 35, *l.* 19. Huj-I, p. 50, *ll.* 24-25.
2. Budur, p. 97 *ll.* 1-3. Huj-II, p. 39, *l.* 1.
3. Huj-I, p. 22, *ll.* 26-27. Budur, p. 93, *l.* 11; p. 19, *ll.* 4-6; p. 96, *ll.* 15-17; p. 115, *l.* 5.

understanding Walīullāh's ideas of the *Seven Virtues*. It will be seen that they are nothing but developed and complex forms of qualities originating in several instincts of the animal disposition.[1]

Animal Behaviour

Being dominated by its Physio-biological Faculty (*Nafs*), animal in its external behaviour invariably acts to satisfy its instincts and the urges of its biological needs, for food, drink, sex[2] etc. The satisfaction of one's individual needs and personal urges arising out of what may be called instincts and physical needs, is ranked by Walīullāh in the category of *Individual Ends* (*Rai al-Juz'ī*)[3]. The behaviour of animal is, therefore, according to him, always directed to individual ends. The urge of the immediate and the momentary purpose of satisfying one's needs, the lack of consciousness of remote and the ultimate ends or purposes and the absence of objectives of wider import are the characteristics

1. Budur, p. 93, *l.* 11.
2. Huj-I, p. 16, *ll.* 22-23. Huj-II, p. 90, *l.* 17.
3. Huj-I, p. 49, *ll.* 22-23; p. 81, *ll.* 11-14. Budur, p. 28, *l.* 13; p. 151, *l.* 18. *Rai al-Juz'ī* is the antonym of *Rai al-Kullī*. In order to gain an idea of the full significance of the term it is necessary to refer to the additional note on *Rai al-Kulli*, and also to the discussion on Individual Ends, Universal Ends in chap. II on Seven Virtues.

displayed in the behaviour of animal.[1] Even what it learns is hardly beyond what serves to satisfy its individual needs. This it learns, being driven by necessity.[2]

HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY

Instincts and Impulses in the Human Disposition

Animal possesses its specific *Triad* constituted by what Walīullāh calls *'Aql*, *Qalb* and *Ṭabī'ah*. This triad, which may be called the *Basic Triad*,[3] is present in man as well. It forms the basis of his specific disposition which develops[4] out of it. Likewise, the instincts and impulses of animal are also present in man, being characteristics of this *basic triad*. Both, animal and human being, according to Walīullāh, possess what may be called *Psychical States*, which he calls *Malakāt*.[5] They correspond to, or, are embodied in their respective instincts and impulses, the only difference being that the "psychical states" of animal are simple and those in man grow more and more complex under the influence of his deeper perception, conception and ratiocination. The Seven Virtues, that will be

1. Budur, p. 28, *ll.* 15-17.
2. Budur, p. 29, *ll.* 1-13.
3. Huj-II, p. 90, *l.* 17.
4. Budur, p. 19, *l.* 5; p. 143, *ll.* 13-14.
Budur, p. 145, *l.* 8; p. 38, *ll.* 2, 10; also pp. 155-160.

discussed later on, are also traced back by him, on the same principle, to the primary instincts and impulses present, both in animal and man. On the same basis most of the human emotions and sentiments could be traced back to the same source.

The complexity of human emotions, sentiments and virtues rises under the refining and modifying[1] influence of the specific human intelligence and intellect (*'Aql*) of which three *emergent* qualities stand out and distinguish the intelligence of man from that of animal.

Triad of Qualities of Intellect[2]

In the course of evolution, pure conception (*Tawahhum*) and deliberation (*Taṣarruf*) and other qualities[3] of intelligence common to man and animal, give rise, in the case of man, to his specific quality of generalisation and produce the characteristic of universality, which is displayed in what Walīullāh calls as *Rai al-Kullī*[4] (*Universal Purpose*) which plays a most important part in his ethics, as it will be seen later on, and forms a new motive for human behaviour. It also creates a demand for

1. *See* additional note no. 3 on Modification of Instincts.

2. *See* additional note no. 2 on Triad of Qualities of Intellect.

Budur, p. 33, *ll.* 8-9.

See additional note no. 2. Also see Budur, p. 23, *ll.* 12-17.

Self Perfection (*Takammul*[1]) and a new emotion—the *Aesthetic Quality* which he calls *Ẓarāfah*[2], which is displayed in general human behaviour and more strongly in human modes of adornment and embellishment (*Zīnat* and *Tajammul*) and the appreciation of Beauty. Thus this Triad of qualities of the specific human disposition emerges out of the Basic Triad, and the psychical states or emotions and sentiments and other psychic characteristics[3] developed under the influence and interaction of the two triads become specific marks of the human disposition.

Three Grades and Stages in Psychic Disposition

Here it is necessary to write a few words about the variety of dispositions to enable us to appreciate Walīullāh's ethical system. Out of the several classifications of psychic dispositions that he makes,[4] one classification seems to be based upon the relation between the physical and psychical factors and their strength and dominance.[5] According to this, psychical dispositions could be

1. *See* additional note No. 2 D. *See* also Budur, p. 29. *l.* 2.
2. *See* additional note No. 2 C. *See* also Huj-I, p. 38, *ll.* 17-18.
3. *See* additional note No. 4, on Characteristics of Human Disposition.
4. *See* Budur, pp. 155-175, concerning the classifications of human beings, on the basis of the nature of their dispositions, and the classifications of *Sābiqūn*, *Aṣhāb al-Yamīn*, and *Anbiyā*, etc.
5. Budur, pp. 145-149. *See* also Huj-I, p. 33, *ll.* 16, 23-24.

divided under three heads which, in our terminology, we may translate as *Physiological*, *Physico-Psychological* and *Psychical*, the first of which may be identified with what he calls *Nasamah*, the *Astral Body* or *Psychic Disposition*, the second with *Nāim al-Ṭaba'*, the *Slumbering Psychic Disposition*, and the third with *Yaqẓān al-Ṭaba'*, the *Wakeful Psychic Disposition*, respectively.

Representing the disposition created by the *Basic Triad*, which is present in animal as well, *Nasamah, the Psychic Disposition, as such*, has peculiarities displaying those impulses in it which immediately move the organs of the body towards the satisfaction of their aims, without appreciably modifying and controlling intermediate activity on the part of the intelligence[1] (or intellect). The *Slumbering Dispositions* are more developed and modified by the faculty of intelligence than the mere *Nasamah* or psychic dispositions; but their images and ratiocination are limited to their external experience. To a great extent they lack the power of forming pure conceptions or images beyond the immediate

1. *See* additional note No. 4 on modification of the instincts. This disposition in the case of man in modified and developed under the influence of his specific *Triad* of Qualities, cf. Budur, p. 21; Huj-I, p. 35, *l.* 25.

experiences of the senses.[1] Their knowledge also, like that of animals, belongs to the category of what Walīullāh calls *'Ulūm al-Nasamiyya*,[2] (*Pragmatical Knowledge*). In comparison with Wakeful Dispositions, the Slumbering Dispositions belong to the category of *Dull Disposition.*[3]

The *Wakeful Dispositions* are much more developed, stronger and more highly modified dispositions than Slumbering Dispositions. They are capable of forming perceptual images without the aid of sense perception and of assuming external forms of behaviour, poses and postures[4] (*Maẓānn*). They are *Introvert*[5] and capable of wider generalisations and of efforts towards universal ends. They can comprehend the essence and universal ideas underlying the particulars, and seek to know and understand the how and why of things. They possess the capacity of perceiving *Unity in Multiplicity.*[6] Their pains and pleasures are also derived from these mental states, in contradistinction to the other two types whose pain and pleasure depends upon one form or the other of external activity, of objects of physical

1. Budur, p. 146, last line. *See* also p. 147.
2. Budur, p. 148, *l.* 9; p. 99, *l.* 3; p. 123, *l.* 4; p. 186, *ll.* 1, 4-5; p. 184.
3. Budur, pp. 146-147.
4. Budur, pp. 156-157.
5. Budur, p. 156, *ll.* 10-11.
6. Budur, p. 147, *ll.* 14-17.

need and of images or psychical states directly related to the same.[1]

The Slumbering Disposition lacks these qualities. It loses itself in the manifoldness of things. It cannot find its way out of multiplicity to unity and is more or less dominated by its environment (*Maghlūb Ḥālihī*).[2] The Wakeful Disposition on the other hand seeks the significance (*Ma'nā*) of objects and the spirit that they represent and the principles that they illustrate.[3]

According to Walīullāh, the bulk of humanity belongs to the slumbering types of disposition.[4] They are either subconscious or self-conscious.[5] They need effective *Regulation* and *Discipline*[6], in contrast to those who possess wakeful dispositions, who, on the contrary, thrive more in *Liberty*.[7] The slumbering dispositions need overt activity, form and ceremony, while the wakeful ones do not, so much, need either form or overt activity for their growth and progress.[8] These two types of disposition also form their motives differently. The

1. Budur, p. 144, *ll.* 2, 4. Huj-I, p. 31, *l.* 8; p. 33, last line.
2. Budur, p. 146, last line.
3. Budur, p. 148, *l.* 17; p. 147, *ll.* 7-18.
4. Budur, p. 149, *l.* 3.
5. Huj-I, p. 35, *ll.* 24-27.
6. Huj-I, p. 30, *ll.* 8-10.
7. Huj-I, p. 27, *ll.* 15-16.
8. Huj-I, p. 52, *ll.* 15-17, 2-3; p. 57, *ll.* 15-17.

dominant motives (*Falak al-Himmah*) in the former are generally connected with physical and worldly needs, whereas the dominant motives in the latter transcend these and are generally related to those of mind and spirit.[1] The *basis of ordinary* ethics is the conduct *natural* to the normal state of the former, whereas the *basis of higher* ethics is the conduct *natural* to states of emergence of higher and transcendental qualities which are characteristics of the wakeful dispositions exclusively. The dispositions of *Superior* human beings (*e.g.* Prophets and *Sābiqūn*) are wakeful dispositions.

Interactionism

Walīullāh is an *Interactionist*. A few words may be written, here, regarding his argument. According to him, there exists a link between psychic, physiological and physical states. It is through this link that the Mind or psychic disposition controls external forms of behaviour.[2]

It is remarkable how, from an observation of the external features of men and animals, their inner mind can be read.[3] It is generally the case that the emotions of anger and self-assertion are found accompanied

1. Budur, pp. 145-147.
2. Budur, p. 46, *ll.* 11-12; p. 45, *ll.* 11-12. *See* discussion on the two virtues of expression, chap. 2.
3. Budur, p. 122, *l.* 13.

concomitantly with stiff neck, stern face, extended muscles, whereas when the emotion of reverence, awe or humility rules, the head is bowed, the body droops and the muscles are contracted.[1] These observations point towards the relation of mind and its psychical state to external behaviour, and show how mind stamps itself on the body.[2]

Walīullāh points out that in the case of normal human beings their physical states also impress their minds and mould their dispositions.[3] As a matter of fact, at a certain stage, when the psychic disposition is not advanced, the physical states have a great hold upon the psychical states.[4] So much so that a strong body builds a strong mind and a weak body results in weakness of mind.[5] In this case, the external facts that affect the physical body (*e.g.* food, illness, age, etc.), affect the psychic disposition through their influence on the body.[6] Where as, in advanced and strong psychic dispositions (*Mizāj al-Ḥadīd*) a similar influence of mind over body is outstanding.[7] In their case such an expression as "the sound mind, the sound body" becomes more appropriate.

1. Budur, p. 116, *ll.* 16-18.
2. Huj-I, p. 55. *l.* 29.
3. Huj-I, p. 56, *ll.* 2, 7; p. 29, *l.* 22; p. 28, *ll.* 4-5.
4. Cf. wakeful and slumbering dispositions discussed above.
5. Huj-I, p. 28, *l.* 2-3.
6. Huj-I, p. 27. *ll.* 24-25; p. 28. *l.* 18.
7. Budur, p. 93. *ll.* 9-17.

In either of the two cases it is clear that mind and body interact upon each other in varying degrees of strength and influence, even to the extent of illness of body and mental derangement,[1] until the psychic disposition is liberated from the corporeal body either by physical death or by psychic development, attaining an equivalent state of liberty called by Walīullāh *Maut al-Ikhtiyār*[2] (*Voluntary Death*).

Development of the Disposition

Walīullāh's theory of the development of normal dispositions is based on the idea of interactionism. He asserts that every *Conscious* and *Deliberate* act or activity (*i.e.* external behaviour) *develops* or in a sense, reconstitutes the mind.[3] It is not that the *Motive* only, causes the action but every *Action Strengthens* the motive for the next action.[4] Strong motives represent strong corresponding psychical states. These constitute consciousness of mind which produces *Efficient* action and more *Driving Consciousness.* This, in turn contributes to the greater development and strength of disposition while on the other hand the stronger disposition increases in its efficiency in action in the same

1. Huj-I, p. 32, *l.* 20.
2. Huj-I, p. 31, *l.* 24; p. 69, *l.* 4. cf. *Qaul al-Jamil*, p. 87.
3. Huj-I, p. 29, *ll.* 1-4; p. 28, *l.* 23.
4. Huj-I, p. 28, *l.* 15. Also *see Falak al-Himmah*, the sphere of personality built by the dominant motives. Budur, p. 145, *l.* 18-19.

ratio. Thus by *repetition* and *practice* the strength of the disposition and efficiency of its action increase more and more.[1] Likewise every deficiency in the strength of consciousness and force of impulsive conation deprives the conation (or will) of vitality proportionately. Neglect or lack of practice adds to the deficiency and loss of vitality.[2]

In the same way, interaction takes place inside the *Basic Triad* and also between the *Triad* of the *Qualities* and the *Basic Triad.* Conation and cognition seem to be correlated and interact upon each other, adding to or detracting from the strength of each other.[3]

The *superiority* or *distinction* of man over animal lies in the fact that in case of man, in the inner interaction the influence of the *Triad of Qualities* is dominant. In other words, *the influence of intelligence* and *intellect is dominant in man's disposition*, which checks the impulses or instincts, examines them and contributes to deliberation in action, instead of *Immediate* action and reaction caused by the instincts through sensory and motor apparatus.[4]

1. Huj-I, p. 28, *l.* 22; p. 52, *l.* 2; p. 55, *ll.* 28-29; p. 16, *ll.* 2,7.
2. Huj-I, p. 29, *ll.* 24-25. Budur, p. 49, *l.* 5.
3. Budur, pp. 34-37; p. 34, *ll.* 11-16.
4. *See* the previous discussion on the difference between the human and animal dispositions. *See* also the *Triad* of the Qualities in additional note No. 2; and Modification of Instincts in additional note No. 4. Also *see* additional note No. 1 and additional note No. 3.

This *Deliberate* and *Conscious* activity, according to Walīullāh, is vital in developing latent traits of the disposition. It brings out its potentialities[1] to constitute a well-developed personality, which he calls *Ṣūrat al-Shakhṣiyya.*[2] This being appropriate and natural, *ethical conduct*, therefore, corresponds to that conduct which contributes to the *natural* development and in which this rational interference between impulse and action is dominant.[3]

For further detail regarding the vital relation of conscious activity and external forms of behaviour to the very constitution of the psychic dispositions, it would be useful to study Walīullāh's discussion concerning what he calls *Luṣūq al-'Amāl* (Adherence of Actions), in which he says "Indeed the product of the actions that man performs consciously and with deliberate purpose... although basically inspired by its original source (the human soul and its Triads), returns to the disposition, adheres to it and adds to its substance and expands it."[4]

Here in passing, a less significant fact may be mentioned only to show what a close relationship according to Walīullāh exists between all the parts of the individual and his disposition. He says that if anyone intends to

1. Huj-I, p. 29, *l.* 2.
2. Budur, p. 20, *l.* 19; p. 21, *l.* 15. Huj-I, p. 29, *ll.* 8-9.
3. Huj-II, p. 89, *l.* 19. Huj-I, p. 21, *l.* 21. Also *see* discussion on the essence of the seven virtues.
4. Huj-I, p. 28, *ll.* 15-17.

attain a psychical trait that appears to be absent in him because of the lack of the corresponding 'instinct', he should acquire it by what he calls *Tadbīr al-'Ilmī* (mental and external assumption). This is done by creating its external form and mental constitution with the aid of knowing and imitating the ways and modes of behaviour of those persons in whom those psychical traits or virtues are prominent. Thus the same would gradually come into existence in the disposition which lacks them.[1] The idea of "Assume virtue if thou hast it not" is substantiated in this way by Walīullāh's principles of interactionism.

Diversity of Dispositions[2]

Mention has been made of the existence of specific seats in the physiological organism of the body in which the two *Triads* of the psychical faculties are localised according to Walīullāh. It has also been shown that the Triads interact upon each other, with the result that a considerable amount of interaction takes place between the body and the mind.

The difference of quality, strength and ratio in which they act and interact upon each other causes a diversity of dispositions, not only in animal and primitive

1. Huj-I, p. 30, *ll.* 2-3; p. 55, *ll.* 11-13. See *Tadbīr al-'Ilmī*, Huj-I, p. 96, *ll.* 19-26.
2. *See* additional note No. 6, on Diversity of Human dispositions.

man, but also in the advanced human beings as well.[1] As the mind grows, the psychic Triads become more and more complex, in interaction and in constitution, and result in infinite variations.[2]

By analysing Walīullāh's views regarding varieties of disposition one arrives at the following results :—

(*a*) A sound and strong *Basic Triad* is essential for the existence of a sound and strong disposition.[3]

(*b*) Cohesion and co-ordination (*Ittiṣāl* and *Takāthuf*) between various parts of the disposition or between its physical parts and psychic Triads makes for a harmonious and superior disposition and personality.[4]

(*c*) Those dispositions of human beings, which are dominated by intelligence and intellect and its qualities are *superior* to those dispositions which are dominated by physical and physio-biological natures, as it is in the case of animal, in which impulse leads to action, and motive is unenlightened by anything but individual ends and egoism.[5]

1. Budur, p. 29, *ll.* 4-9.
2. Budur, p. 91, *l.* 9. Huj-I, p. 26, *l.* 23.
3. Budur, p. 93, *ll.* 10-14. Huj-I, p. 22, *l.* 10; p. 27, *l.* 8.
4. Budur, p. 29, *ll.* 4-9.
5. *See* the Specific Human Disposition, above, and Influence of the Triad of Qualities in additional note No. 2.

Duality in the Human Disposition[1]

Walīullāh advises the study of the animal character in order to detect animal instincts or characteristics that persist in human nature, and which, according to him, subsist in what he calls *Ḥaywānīyyah* or *Bahīmiyyah* (the Animal Aspect of the human disposition).[2] At the same time, he insists that a *strong* animal aspect of disposition is *essential* for *efficient* action and external behaviour. The higher psychic aspect of the human disposition, which is the *specific* mark of human being as distinguished from animal, is symbolically called by him *Malakiyyah*,[3] (the *Angelic Aspect*) of the human disposition. This normally possesses the characteristics of what he calls *Raī al-Kullī*, the quality of a wide and large purpose, *Ẓarāfah*, aesthetic quality and *Takammul*, the urge for self perfection.[4] In extraordinary cases, in which there is a high level of the *Angelic Aspect*, (*Malakiyyah al-ʻĀliya*), it displays *Superior Qualities* and rare states of *Transcendence*.[5] The *angelic aspect* of a high grade (*ʻĀliya*), when it governs a strong *animal aspect* or body, produces highly successful action and a strong and superior personality.[6]

1. *See* additional note No. 7.
2. Budur, p. 29, last para; Huj-I, p. 26, *ll.* 11-15; *Hama'āt* pp. 51-57.
3. Huj-I, p. 26, *l.* 7.
4. Huj-I, p. 26, *l.* 20.
5. Huj-I, p. 26, *ll.* 8-9.
6. Huj-I, p. 27, *ll.* 7, 12.

Only those individuals achieve the highest success who combine both these aspects in *Harmony* (*Iṣṭilāḥ*)[1].

In those dispositions in which these two aspects are not in a state of harmony and co-ordination but are in a state of *Conflict*, (*Tajādhub*), the more assertive and strong governs the general behaviour. If the *Angelic aspect* is strong and the '*Animal aspect*' (the body) cannot respond, the human higher nature develops independently, and attains a state of fuller consciousness and knowledge without successful action to follow the knowledge that it has attained.[2] If, however, the *animal aspect* is strong and subdues the *angelic aspect*, once more the animal and primitive impulses become active.[3]

It should be noted that, according to Walīullāh's classification of dispositions, based upon the relationship between these two aspects, a *strong animal aspect* under the control of a strong and *high grade angelic aspect* would create a disposition most suitable for leadership and for the tasks of organisations on large scale,[4] while the angelic aspect without assistance from a strong animal aspect (or so to speak, without physical strength and capacities) might lead to retirement and sainthood.[5]

1. Huj-I, p. 27, *l.* 12.
2. Huj-I, p. 27, *ll.* 5, 6, 16.
3. Huj-I, p. 27, *ll.* 14-15.
4. Huj-I, p. 27, *ll.* 7, 11.
5. Huj-I, p. 27, *l.* 6.

The animal aspect, is, by itself, at its best good for manual[1] work and at its worst a source of danger to society.[2]

Walīullāh's treatment of the varieties of disposition is so elaborate that it would require a special volume to describe fully all the types he mentions.[3] It is, however, necessary to point out the salient marks of the types of dispositions which may be called *Perverted*[4] dispositions.

In contrast to normal human dispositions in which the intelligence (*'Aql*) or angelic aspect dominates the animal aspect,[5] the peculiarity of a perverted disposition is that in it its mental capacity or angelic aspect, is yet *subservient* to the animal aspect and submissive to its individual ends.[6] Such people are wont to do harm to society, consciously and deliberately, in order to attain their selfish individual ends.

1. Huj-I, p. 27, *l.* 8.
2. Huj-I, p. 77, *l.* 5; p. 81, *l.* 10. Also *see* Estimate of character of Human Disposition, additional note No. 7.
3. See Classification of Dispositions in additional notes Nos. 6-8.
4. *See* Perverted Dispositions in additional note No. 8.
5. The *Triad* of the qualities of Intellect is the mark of the angelic aspect of the human specific nature. Hence the dominance of the intellect or intelligence indicates the dominance of the Angelic aspect in the disposition.
6. The animal behaves for individual ends and is incapable of universal ends (*Rai al-Kulli*). (*See* Animal Behaviour above). Forcing the use of one's knowledge and faculty of consciousness to serve individual ends and selfish motives is equivalent to making the angelic aspect subservient to the animal aspect which is perversion of disposition and *Insilākh* of the sound *Fiṭrah*. Huj-I, p. 81, *l.* 19.

Guarding society against such perverts, therefore, becomes the duty of the state and the police.[1] The stronger both these aspects are in their disposition, the greater becomes the danger of such individuals to society.[2] Thus on the same basis one could metaphorically say that only an angel could become a Satan.[3]

The pathology of human disposition occupies a considerable space in Walīullāh's psychological exposition; but is too complex a subject to be pursued here.[4]

Impediments

The *natural* development of the human disposition is based upon a *natural* relation between the two aspects according to which the intelligence (*'Aql*) or the angelic aspect should *govern* the animal aspect.[5] But at times the strength of the animal aspect turns out to be an *impediment* (*Ḥijāb*) to the natural progress and development of the individual. This kind of impediment is called by Walīullāh *Ḥijāb al-Ṭaba'*, (the Physio-biological Impediment).[6]

1. Huj-I, p. 86, *l.* 24. Budur, p. 71, *ll.* 13-18. *See* also Sociological Background, Chap. III.
2. Budur, p. 157, *l.* 8. *See* Definition of *Kāfir*, Huj-I, p. 49, *l.* 23; p. 50, *l.* 2.
3. Cf. Budur, p. 179. *l.* 16.
4. *See* additional note No. 8 on Pathology of Human Dispositions.
5. Huj-I, p. 50, *l.* 29. Budur, p. 113, *l.* 19; p. 115, *ll.* 10-11; p. 192, *ll.* 9-10—Development; p. 115, *l.* 6.
6. Budur, p. 114, *ll.* 1-10; p. 192, *ll.* 10-16. Huj-I, p. 56, *ll.* 21-27.

In addition to this innate Impediment, there are two other Impediments that also hinder natural progress and development. These are:-

(*a*) *Ḥijāb al-Rasm,*[1] the Impediment of Custom and Form. This hinders the progress of an ordinary individual when it has outlived its usefulness and becomes an impediment; just as in the case of advanced individuals, customs and forms, that are still useful for ordinary individuals, may become obstacles in the way of their progress.

(*b*) *Ḥijāb Sū'al-Ma'rifah,*[2] the Impediment of wrong Instructions and understanding and False Guidance, is the third Impediment that comes in the way of natural development of disposition.

These impediments create discord, not only in the inner nature of individuals but indirectly affect society as well. They become directly and indirectly subjects for ethical analysis, especially the *higher ethics* which aims at *liberating* the mind from the three Impediments.

1. Huj-I, p. 57, *l.* 1. Budur, p. 192, *ll.* 17-19; p. 192, *ll.* 1-2. Also *see* "Custom" in Chapt. IV.
2. Huj-I, p. 23, *ll.* 10, 13-25; p. 57, *l.* 11. It signifies wrong instruction creating a wrong attitude to life in general including a wrong instruction and false conception about God. The implications of wrong instruction about God have been discussed in Theology. *See* Ma'rifat—Theology.

Pleasure and Pain

The original source of pleasure or pain, according to Walīullāh, lies in the satisfaction or thwarting of an impulse.[1] In the natural way the impulses exist to guard the interests of the individual, or, to put it more precisely the interests of one or the other of the two aspects, the animal aspect and the angelic aspect. Since they lack this duality, the pleasures and pains of animals are few and well guided, their pleasure being embodied in something that benefits the animal organism and satisfies its instincts and impulses, and their pain being that which thwarts its well being and its immediate impulses.[2]

When the nature of the disposition grows so complex as it is in the case of man, and the conflict between the dual aspects comes into being and discord between psychic impulses and motives and intellect becomes predominant, the classification of pleasure and pain is not so simple.

When there is a conflict between the animal and angelic aspects and pain arises from thwarting the physio-biological impulses (*Ṭabī'ah*), it is not easy to decide whether the pain is beneficial so far as the individual is concerned.[3] A similar case arises with pleasure derived through the satisfaction of physio-biological

1. Huj-I, p. 20, *ll.* 17-18.
2. *See* the Behaviour of Animal and the Animal Disposition in Chap. I.
3. Huj-I, p. 52, *ll.* 21-22, 26.

urges in spite of the inner conflict within the disposition.[1] Thus the nature of human pleasure and pain is much more complex than that in the case of animals. Not only that, human pleasure and pain is more lasting and durable as well.[2]

The mind retains impressions of past experience of pleasure and pain whether they are physical or mental. These become a prolific source of future associated pains and pleasures, creating complex forms of consciousness and memories of failure, of repression, of self reproach and recrimination, and in the case of pleasure, of happy memories, self-satisfaction and contentment.[3] A vast field lies here for speculation not only for a psychologist or a pathologist but also for a student of eschatology.[4]

The complexes that Walīullāh conceives are not only caused by the thwarting and repressing of the appetites of the body. They are also caused by the impulses of the sex and other ordinary animal urges, as well as by

1. Huj-I, p. 31, *ll.* 11-12. The physical pleasure and the gratification of an animal urge may at times be in conformity with tendencies of the angelic aspect allowed by law and natural course of human conduct. In this case it would be not a source of pain to the angelic aspect because of the absence of acute conflict between the two aspects and the presence of the state of the natural harmony between the two aspects.
2. Budur, p. 151, *l.* 17.
3. Budur, p. 151, *ll.* 10-16.
4. *See* Walīullāh's classification of people, with a view of their experiences in the life after death. Budur, pp. 154-155. Huj-I, pp. 115-117.

the discomfitures of mind and other impediments,[1] chiefly through the impediment and opposition caused by the uncontrolled animal aspect, or by the animal organism and its unmodified and unchecked pleasures.[2] He, on the contrary, thinks that the lasting and durable source of pain is mainly that in which the development and advance of the angelic aspect is thwarted.[3] The associations of that pain endure, according to him, even after death. As this argument is more concerned with supernormal psychology and eschatology than with ethics and normal psychology, it need not be discussed here.

The Effect of Pain

Here attention may be drawn to the effect and uses of pain. Pain has, according to Walīullāh, a subduing and weakening effect.[4] The pain caused to the angelic aspect by the subjection of the intellect to the pleasures of dominant animal aspects is harmful. But a certain amount of pain caused to the animal aspect has a useful and beneficial effect, since by curbing its power and reducing its strength, it thus frees the angelic aspect from the painful effects of animal pleasures and dominance.[5]

1. Huj-I, p. 30, *ll.* 20-21; p. 32, *ll.* 19-20.
2. Huj-I, p. 34, *ll.* 5,6; p. 77, *ll.* 5-6; p. 74, *ll.* 19-20.
3. Huj-I, p. 51, *ll.* 12-13.
4. Huj-I, p. 31, *ll.* 25-26; p. 29, *l.* 25.
5. Huj-I, p. 57, *ll.* 14-17; p. 58, *ll.* 6-7; p. 79, *ll.* 16-17.

The effect of illness of the body, of physical hardships, and discomforts experienced during the physical existence of man is similar.[1] It is on the basis of this effect that the institutions of fasting, austerities and self-denial have been introduced in order to serve as aids to liberation of the angelic aspect from the clutches of the animal aspect.[2] The details relating to this belong to *higher* ethics, *higher* or *supernormal* psychology and *eschatology*.

Happiness

According to Walīullāh, Happiness, *Sa'ādah*, is the general state of those dispositions which attain their *natural* growth and development (*Kamāl*) and of which no aspect is distorted or curbed with unnatural suppression or thwarting of its impulses.[3] The tendencies and urges of the *dual* aspect of the disposition work in a *normal and natural way* and no grave harm is done or permanent pain is caused to either the angelic aspect or the animal aspect.[4]

Walīullāh, however, discourages the methods of the ascetics who believe that the only possible way of liberating the angelic aspect is by suppressing and curbing and by getting rid, as much as possible, of the animal aspect of

1. Huj-I, p. 31, *l.* 10; p. 77, *ll.* 6-7.
2. Huj-I, p. 74, 75. *Asrār al-Ṣaum.*
3. Huj-I, p. 50, *l.* 16; p. 51, *l.* 6.
4. Huj-I, p. 51, *ll.* 7-8, 10-11.

the human disposition.[1] According to him, the *Basic Triad* or the *animal aspect* (physio-biological nature) is *innate* in human disposition. An unnatural suppression of its impulses does greater harm than good in the case of human beings with the exception of extremely rare instances.[2] The most beneficial condition to the natural progress conducive to the *Real Happiness* (*Sa'ādah al-Ḥaqīqiyya*) is that state of disposition in which the animal aspect or physio-biological nature is not suppressed by unnatural and harmfully painful[3] methods. The animal aspect is subdued and made submissive to the angelic aspect in a way that its urges and impulses are either guided and directed by the angelic aspect enlightened and sublimated, or, are satisfied without thwarting the tendencies of the angelic aspect and subjecting it to discomfiture and defeat.[4]

A further discussion of this subject would eventually lead us to the *Superior* qualities of the human nature and their cultivation and development, which topics also belong to *supernormal* psychology and *higher ethics*.

1. Huj-I, p. 32, *ll.* 22-26.
2. Huj-I, p. 53, *ll.* 4, 9.
3. Huj-I, p. 57, *l.* 18.
4. Huj-I, p. 26, *l.* 20.

CHAPTER II
THE SEVEN VIRTUES

Introduction

The seven virtues are marks of well developed and sound normal human dispositions as distinguished from animal dispositions.[1] The virtues are called by Walīullāh *Akhlāq al-Fāḍila*, the *Psychic Characteristics*[2] of *Excellence*, because of the fact that these characteristics mark the *superiority* of human disposition over, and its *distinction* from the animal disposition as such.[3]

The specific marks of human disposition taking the forms of complex sentiments, emotions and distinct human impulses, develop under the influence of the *Triad of qualities* which impart to them the characteristics of universality of purpose, aesthetic tendency, development and perfection, manifested in the various forms of sentiments and emotions of the disposition. The specific qualitie of human disposition developed as such are displayed inhuman behaviour. This may be called virtuous behaviour, in proportion to its efficiency to manifest

1. Budur, p. 91, *ll.* 6, 7, 15; p. 29, *ll.* 7-9, 11.
2. Budur, p. 38, *ll.* 10,14. The term *Akhlāq* signifies the stable and strongly subsisting psychic states (*Malakāt*). Hence *Akhlāq* are psychic characteristics of the mind. Cf. Budur, p. 38, *l.* 10.
3. Budur, p. 45, *l.* 12; p. 51, *ll.* 9-10.

the virtues which are otherwise, according to Walīullāh precisely *psychic* characteristics.[1] The specific marks mentioned above, when exhibited in virtuous behaviour, show, according to Walīullāh, the praiseworthy traits of "greatness of soul, broadness of mind, largeness of heart and soundness of disposition."[2] These traits are marks of universality and extensiveness of purpose (*Rai al-Kulli*) which serve as differentia and criteria of human behaviour, as distinguished from that of animal. On the same basis it may be said that *every mark that distinguishes man from animal* and points towards his development and perfection, and to his excellence and superiority over animal, may be considered *virtuous.*[3] Every other mark that points towards a *lack or deficiency* of these characteristics may likewise be called *vicious.*

External behaviour by itself can neither be virtuous nor vicious, unless its source lies in the psychic disposition and springs from it. According to Walīullāh, therefore, two *Similar* forms of behaviour could be different from each other, one being *vicious* and the other virtuous, owing to their corresponding psychic sources.[4]

1. Budur, p. 38, *l.* 1.
2. Budur, p. 31, *l.* 9.
3. Budur, p. 30, *ll.* 8-19.
4. Budur, p. 31, *ll.* 1-5.

Virtue as Variable and Evolutionary

Though the essence of virtue lies in its being a mark of distinction and superiority of human disposition over animal disposition and in producing its concomitant behaviour, in its essence, virtue is not *absolute*, in the case of individual human beings. It is *relative*. It varies with the extent and strength of distinction and superiority acquired by each disposition over and above the specific :mal disposition.[1] As the disposition evolves, so do its corresponding psychic states and specific marks and virtues.[2]

It should be noted, however, that in the case of an advanced disposition the level and standard of its virtues is different from that of dispositions which are not so advanced.[3] Even in the case of the same disposition its standards and levels of virtues may vary with its evolution and development.[4] Any behaviour that falls short of its standard becomes vicious in its case because of its being concomitant with a standard which is comparatively nearer to the animal disposition. To put

1. Budur, p. 91, *l.* 6; p. 53, *ll.* 2-3.
2. *See* Development of the Disposition in Chap. I.
3. *See* the classifications of *Aṣḥāb al-Yamīn Al-Sābiqun* etc. Budur, pp. 158-163. Huj-I, p. 30, *l.* 6.
4. Budur, p. 115, *ll.* 5-9. Huj-II, p. 67, *ll.* 4-5.

it more precisely it is comparatively less distinct from the animal disposition and less superior than the present state of its disposition. On the principle of interactionism such inappropriate and inadequate behaviour may eventually lead to the gradual declension of the disposition from its high level. It may bring it nearer and nearer to its corresponding lack of virtues.[1]

Therefore, it may be asserted that the normal virtuous behaviour, being too low, may prove vicious in the case of that disposition which has attained a state of sublimity and transcendence.[2] The standards of virtues and vices of normal dispositions are different from the standards of those which are virtually superior or · supernormal dispositions.[3] Having *ordinary ethics* as subject matter of this work it would be desirable to mainly confine our discussion to *normal* dispositions and their virtues, leaving the *higher types* of dispositions to be discussed in relation to *higher ethics*, in a separate treatise.

The Number of Virtues

The normal human disposition, as it evolves out of its animal basis through the process of inner interaction

1. Huj-I, p. 28, *l.* 4. Also *see* Interactionism in chap. I
2. Budur, p. 31, *ll.* 15-19. *See Iḥsān*, Budur, p. 112. Also *see* Impediments and account of *Sābiqūn* in chap. I, and Budur, p. 160, *ll.* 12-14.
3. *See* the Grades of Dispositions in additional notes nos. 5-8.

of the *Triad of qualities* upon the *Basic Triad*, develops highly complex specific characteristics which are composites of various complex sentiments and emotions.[1] These *highly complex psychic characteristics* are divided by Walīullāh into seven main psychical aspects which he calls the *Seven Virtues*. As these virtues are the product of the interaction of the Triad of qualities of Intellect mainly upon the Basic Triad, their *main source* lies in the animal aspect and in *instincts* and crude impulses of the disposition.[2] The character of universality and largeness of purpose and extensiveness of ends implied in the practice of each virtue arises out of the tendency of Universality of purpose of the Intellect (*Rai al-Kullī*). The quality of development and completeness of each virtue, and the division and extension of virtue into varieties of subsidiaries, with subtle shades of distinctions, complexity and refinement, are assigned to the influence of the remaining two qualities

1. *See* Interactionism and Development of Sentiments and Emotions in the human disposition, in chap. 1.
2. Budur, p. 30, *ll*. 8-19. The main source of the seven virtues lies in the instincts which are innate in the Basic Triad (*'Aql, Qalb, Ṭabī'āh*). The Triad of Qualities (*Rai al-Kullī, Ẓarāfah, Takammul*) transforms the instincts into the virtues. Without the presence of the instincts and interaction of the two Triads, none of the seven virtues could come into existence.

of Intellect, the urge for perfection (*Takammul*), and the aesthetic quality (*Ẓarāfah*), respectively.[1]

In addition to the Seven Virtues, there are other *Four Virtues*[2] that mark the disposition in the state of *Real* happiness (*Sa'ādah*). They represent stages of higher types of disposition. Their development presupposes the soundness of the normal disposition leading to cultivation and advancement of seven virtues and normal tendencies which is implied in the significance of the virtue of *'Adālah* (propriety of general *Social* and *Personal* behaviour). The remaining three virtues represent the stages of *Sublimation* (*Samāḥah*), *Transcendence* (*Ṭahārah*) and *Humility* (*Ikhbāt*) a state of the mind with a high level of realisation. The discussion of these *four virtues* falls outside the scope of the present work.[3] It comes within the scope of *supernormal psychology* and *higher ethics*.

Innate Virtues

Along with the *Basic Triad*, the seven virtues are innate in sound dispositions. The actual strength and essence of each virtue varies with the strength and soundness of each disposition. There are infinite varieties of dispositions, and they vary from each other in their qualities and characteristics. Similarly they

1. *See* the additional note No. 2 on Triad of Qualities.
2. *See* additional note No. 5.
3. Huj-I, pp. 53-55. Huj-II, pp. 67-69.

also vary in the strength and essence of their virtues accordingly.[1] This point has been discussed in detail in the preceding chapter. Here it is to be pointed out that the *source* of each of the *seven* virtues lies in the primitive disposition developed from the *Basic Triad* or so to say in the instincts, in the *animal aspect* of the disposition of man.[2] If the corresponding instinct or faculty, in which a virtue has its base or source, is weak, such a disposition is bound to be weak or lacking in the corresponding virtue.[3] If its corresponding instinct or faculty is strong in the disposition, the corresponding virtue in such a disposition is bound to be strong and outstanding.[4] The question remains whether it is possible to develop a virtue if the innate disposition is lacking in its corresponding instinct or faculty.

Are the Virtues Attainable?

If the innate disposition of a person lacks a corresponding instinct for and potentiality of a virtue, that virtue cannot be attained by the person, however much he may try to acquire it.[5] For an instance, if a person lacks the sex urge, for him the virtue of chastity does

1. See Diversity of Dispositions, Additional note.
2. Budur, p 93, *l.* 11.
3. Budur, p. 49, *ll.* 5. 7; p. 93, *ll.* 9-13. Huj-I, p. 52, *ll.* 1-2
4. Budur. p. 91, *l.* 10. Huj-I, p. 52, *ll.* 4-6.
5. Huj-I, p. 52, last line; p. 53, first line. Budur. p. 49, *ll.* 5, 7-8. *Hama'āt*. Huj-I, p. 51, *ll.* 17-18.
6. Huj-I, p. 51, *l.* 1.

not exist.[6] Similarly, other persons may lack the virtues of bravery, of wisdom, etc., owing to the defect or lack of the corresponding faculties or instincts in their dispositions.[1] Hence such persons will always remain deficient in so far as those particular virtues are concerned. The deficiency can be compensated for, either by developing other virtues for which they possess faculties or by attaining a state of *transcendence* if they come to get that level by the grace of God.[2] The transcendental state of the disposition raises and sublimates the disposition far above the level of the seven virtues which are directly related to the primitive animal disposition. Thus with sublimity, deficiencies of dispositions are compensated.

This is the case with those dispositions which lack potentialities of particular virtues. It is different in the cases where these potentialities or instincts, the basic elements of virtues, are present, but they do not display their corresponding virtues in external behaviour, owing to weakness caused not on account of an innate deficiency in the disposition, but due to want of practice and exercise of those virtues or due to some external causes of that kind.[3]

1. Budur, p. 164, *ll.* 1-3.
2. Budur, p. 49, *ll.* 8-9.
3. Budur, p. 49, *ll.* 5-7.

Potential Virtues can be Developed and Deficiencies Improved

According to the principles of development of the psychical disposition, virtues that are potential can be made active and developed by practice and by exercise.[1] If the virtue is actually present in a developed form, but lacks completeness or refinement, its deficiencies can be improved by a similar process. Here it will be better to give the substance of a passage from Walīullāh's book *Ḥujjat Allah*:[2] "Not only in Bravery but in all virtues, human individuals vary from each other. Amongst them are some who are without particular virtues and there is no hope that they can ever attain them, due to an inherent defect in their innate disposition and obstacles in their way. An impotent person who is without sex instinct or one who has a weak heart is bound to lack the virtue of courage and manliness at all times. Among them there are some others who, though they are without actual possession of particular virtues, there is yet a hope for them to acquire those virtues provided they strive to develop them by repeated practices and by adopting various forms and modes that lead to their development. They create a *mental* state by reminding themselves of the actions of those who are noted for those particular

1. *See* Development of the Disposition in Chap. I.
2. Huj-I, p. 51, last line; p. 52, *ll*. 1-16.

virtues. Thus they exhort the mind to wake up and to adopt those ways which would eventually lead to the emergence of the virtues from potentiality into actuality. It should be noted that the majority of human beings belong to this category. They can, with more or less strenuous effort, develop virtues that are generally latent in them.[1]

"Amongst them are those who are in actual possession of one particular virtue or more virtues and the essence of those virtues is present in them; but they are lacking in completeness and perfection. Hence though their innate faculties have strong tendencies towards the behaviour conforming to those virtues, yet they are held back by the force of impeding circumstances. But if favourable circumstances present themselves, they make quick progress and improve the defects and adopt the most suitable behaviour almost as instantaneously as sulphur catches fire when it comes into contact with fire.[2]

"Among them are those in whom particular virtues are actual even in their innate dispositions and they possess them in sound and complete form, so much so that they spontaneously put forth a conforming behaviour from which no force and impediment can keep them away. Though such people adopt the requisite behaviour

1. Huj-I, p. 52, *l*. 13.
2. Huj-I, p. 52, *l*. 5.

naturally, yet they are not, much in need of its adoption for development and self-perfection in those particular virtues. They are already sound and perfect in them. People with wakeful dispositions, as we know, are in possession of absolute psychical states which do not depend upon external representation for their development.[1]

"People who do not need patterns to follow, or exhortations to take to virtuous behaviour, are the real *leaders*[2] of people. They are models to others in those particular virtues. Their behaviour in that respect forms standard (*Dastūr*) for those who have not yet risen to the level of those virtues.[3] Other people in order to make up their own deficiencies should adopt them as models and assume virtues.[4] This will help them to attain the utmost development of their particular virtues possible according to their innate potentialities."[5]

In his book al-Budūr al-Bazigha, Walīullāh has expressed the same idea very briefly thus:—

"Those who show a lack of some of the seven virtues are either those whose innate dispositions are sound and complete, but whose deficiency is due to the impediment caused by the absence of practice in

1. Huj-I, p. 52, *l.* 15. For wakeful dispositions *see* chap. I
2. These leaders are sages and prophets.
3. Huj-I, p. 52, *l.* 17.
4. Huj-I, p. 56, *l.* 2. *Talabbus.*
5. Huj-I, pp. 51-52.

the presumed forms (*Maẓānn*) of external conduct. Some again are those whose innate dispositions are defective owing to inherent deficiencies in the substratum of their persons. The former can be helped by close observance of the patterns of those who are in possession of virtues in full bloom, whereas the latter can have no hope so far as those particular virtues are concerned. They can make up their loss only by developing some higher qualities that may be substitutes for what they do not possess."[1]

Do External Factors Affect or Contribute to the Development of Virtues?

There are certain external factors that influence the innate psychical disposition by affecting the constituents of the *Basic Triad.*[2] The same is true of virtues which subsist in the psychical disposition. The external factors that influence and affect the psychical disposition and through which they react upon the virtues are food, drink, health, physique, strength, age, illness, organic order, social and physical environments, habits and training.[3] To these one may add some metaphysical influences of

1. Budūr. p. 49, *ll.* 4-9.
2. By Basic Triad is meant the body (*Ṭabī'ah*) and the mind (*'Aql* and *Qalb*). The body is affected by food, age, illness, whereas the mind is affected by the mental training and development of sentiments in a particular way. These influencing factors may take the form of the three impediments (*Ḥujub*). *See* development of disposition and impediments in chap. I.
3. Huj-I, p. 28, *ll.* 1-5; p. 26, *ll.* 11-15.

which the origin lies in the metaphysical essence of man belonging to the universe of forms or ideas (*'Ālam al-Mithāl*) and to the universe of the souls (*'Ālam al-Arwāḥ*) or in the metaphysical scheme that affects the life of the individual, the scheme for which Walīullāh uses the term *Bakht*, the Scheme of Luck.[1]

According to this it is generally found that the strength of a particular virtue goes with the general condition of manifest and external factors. Sometimes it may not be so, because of the influence of hidden and metaphysical causes and the innate state of a disposition.[2]

It is usually the case that a fair estimate of a particular virtue in a man could be made from the estimate of his physique, general state of his health and other environmental circumstances.[3] A well-built man with a broad chest, for example, is generally a man of courage and broad-mindedness and self-confidence whereas one who has a narrow and flat chest is generally found to be a coward and fickle minded.[4] This ordinarily is found to be correct yet because of certain hidden or metaphysical causes it may not always be true. Sometimes

1. Budur, p. 93, *ll.* 4-8; p. 27, *ll.* 7-8. Taf-I, p. 175. *l.* 13; cf Interactionism. *See* additional note No. 2 on *Qadar* in part II; also see Huj-i, pp. 13-27; 'Abaqāt, pp. 163-171.
2. *See* the discussion on *Qadar*, Huj-I, pp. 12-13; p. 17, *ll.* 22-24.
3. Budur, p. 91, *ll.* 4-7.
4. Budur, p. 93, *ll.* 12-13.

one may come across a person with a weak and defective physique possessing strength of courage which is disproportionate to the state of his physical constitution and to the manifest external factors.[1]

According to Walīullāh a virtue is called *Extensive* (*Sābigh*) if its extent and strength are in proportion to the external factors and the state of a person's health and physique, whereas, it is *Intensive* (*Ḥadīd*) if it is greater in extent and strength than it ought to be in the proportion to these factors.[2]

In the case of the former the strength of the virtue varies with variations in the external causes whereas in the case of the latter it is not affected so much by such variations. Hence the external factors should not be ignored especially in the case of the former.[3]

The Importance of the Seven Virtues in Relation to Society

As the basis of *proper* development of the seven virtues lies in the sound disposition, the behaviour of those who possess *sound* dispositions sets a standard for those who lack such a disposition.[4] The existence of a healthy and sound society depends upon the existence of a majority of such people in the society who are in

1. Budur, p. 93, *ll.* 15-16.
2. Budur, p. 93, *ll.* 9-10.
3. *See* above.
4. Budur, p. 29, *l.* 10.

possession of such sound virtuous dispositions. As it is not practically possible that all the members of a society should have perfect and the soundest possible dispositions, a society can attain only an approximate soundness of health in proportion to the number of people of sound dispositions in the society and the quality of their dispositions.[1]

Each virtue contributes to the building up and welfare and solidarity of society. For the creation of goodwill and friendship between the members of a society the virtue of *magnanimity* is essential.[2]

According to Walīullāh the head of a family must be a person with the virtue of *Samt as-Ṣāliḥ*.[3] The leader of the people should possess the seven virtues, along with a considerable number of the subsidiaries of the virtue of *wisdom* and those of other virtues.[4]

In the institution of defence for which war (*Jihād*) sometimes becomes a necessity, *bravery* becomes the most essential virtue.[5] Towards lasting amiable relations between husband and wife and to the building of the family the virtue of *chastity* makes a great contribution.[6] Similarly,

1. Budur, p. 48, *ll.* 18-19; p. 49, *ll.* 2-3; p. 95, *l.* 2; p. 132.
2. Budur, p. 83, *ll.* 12-14.
3. Budur, p. 91, *l.* 17. *Tashabuh al-Akhlāq*. *See* account of this virtue below.
4. Budur, p. 91, *ll.* 14-15. See *Izālat al-Khafā*-1, p. 264.
5. Budur, p. 70, *l.* 1; p. 72, *l.* 5.
6. Huj-I, p. 81, *ll.* 10-16.

other virtues have each a social purpose that they serve, the significance of which cannot remain hidden from those who are observant.[1]

WISDOM (ḤIKMAH)

"Wisdom (*Ḥikmah*) is the virtue of Intelligence. It manifests itself by mental acuteness and brilliancy in acquiring, preserving, as well as in putting to practical uses, the knowledge that is gathered from sense-perception, ratiocination or the knowledge derived from the divine light—intuition and revelation, bequeathed to humanity as a basis of what is called the law of Religion."[2]

According to this definition, the virtue of wisdom has two essential ingredients, (*a*) Capacity for the acquisition of knowledge, at least of pragmatical, if not of a higher type of knowledge,[3] and (*b*) Acuteness,

1. The importance of the seven virtues is emphasised by Walīullāh in the conduct of the four departments of the social life. The customs and modes of domestic and personal conducts of life are not only based upon the seven virtues, but are also meant to preserve and promote the same. This idea is not only clear from the definitions of domestic and personal conducts, but from the general study of Walīullāh's Sociology (*Irtifāqāt*), as well. *See* chapters IV-VI.
2. Budur, p. 38, *ll.* 16-18.
3. By Pragmatical knowledge is meant here that knowledge which is acquired through sense-perception and the intuition or inner perception which is characteristic of ordinary human beings. This kind of knowledge comes under the category of '*Ulūm al-Nasamiyya* and is called '*Ilm al-Badihī*, and '*Ilm al-Naẓarī*, Intuitive and immediate knowledge and Rational knowledge. The higher category of inner perception, the source of revelation and the law of religion belongs to the higher Intelligence and the superior qualities ('*Aql al-Mithālī* or '*Aql al-Jabrūtī*) and is called here by Walīullāh *Nūr al-Ilāhī*, the divine light. Cf. Budur, p. 31, *ll.* 15-19.

dexterity and brilliancy in the use of knowledge and its application.[1] Any person who is lacking in any of the two ingredients, wants in the virtue of wisdom to that extent.

To illustrate this clearly, characteristics of the following persons who are lacking in the virtue of wisdom may be noted—the person who lacks the capacity of understanding fine shades of meaning;[2] the person who is unable to apply his knowledge and is unable to differentiate between the right and useful, the wrong and the harmful thing;[3] , the person who lacks the capacity of comprehension and is baffled by complex calculations;[4] the person who lacks foresight (*Ḥadas*) and is unable to reach a decision or conclusion from his present knowledge and the premises that are available to him;[5] the person who has a sluggish and inactive mind which evades thinking, or who, in spite of its brilliance, avoids the trouble of searching for deeper ideas;[6] and the person who lacks a good memory and is unable to recollect ideas

1. This idea is clear not only from Walīullāh's account of the virtue of wisdom, but also from his words *Hiyāzat, Ikhtizān* and *I'māl* found in the context in *Budur*.
2. Budur, p. 38, *l.* 19.
3. Budur, p. 39, *ll.* 5-6.
4. Budur, p. 39, *ll.* 11-13.
5. Budur, p. 39, *ll.* 15-16.
6. Budur, p. 39, *ll.* 17-19.

accurately or misapplies them and misses the links in his deliberation.[1]

Those who possess the virtue of wisdom do not suffer from the weaknesses enumerated above.[2] They display the characteristics of *Faṭānat* (prudence and sagacity), *Baṣārat* (perspicacity and clear sight), *Tafahhum* (power of understanding), *Iḥṣā'* (comprehension of calculations), *Idrāk* (intelligence), *Zakāwat* (sagacity), and *Ḥadas* (foresight). All these characteristics indicate alertness of the mind (*Tayaqquẓ*) and its acute or accurate faculty of recording facts, of preserving them in the memory and making proper use of them.[3]

Those who lack the virtue of wisdom display contrary characteristics which may be termed imprudence, foolishness, stupidity, mental sluggishness (*Jumūd*),[4] staleness and dullness, along with inattention, heedlessness and forgetfulness.

In order to elucidate the idea of this virtue further, it would be relevant, to quote from the book *al-Budūr al-Bāzigha* in which Walīullāh gives a further explanation of what he means by the virtue of wisdom. He says: "Wisdom consists neither in the knowledge of high and subtle philosophical theories which is the

1. Budur, p. 40, *ll.* 1-4.
2. Budur, p. 40, *ll.* 5-6.
3. Budur, p. 39, *ll.* 3, 7, 12, 13, 16, 19.
4. Budur, p. 39, *l.* 17.

speciality of philosophers, nor in the knowledge of what is the speciality of *Sūfis* and mystics acquired through the deep faculty of intuition and inspiration arising out of the light that develops in their minds or in their souls. But wisdom is the faculty with which people possessed of sound dispositions are guided in their life, enlightened in their knowledge and experience naturally related to the astral body (*Nasamah*), the psychic disposition, which is the source of Pragmatical Knowledge."[1]

"Wisdom is a psychic state or an attitude that pervades the mind. It is more than purely theoretical knowledge of things. It has nothing to do with the faculty of raising far-fetched issues and subtleties that have no practical use."[2] It is not at all essential to possess scientific knowledge to gain the virtue of wisdom. "At times you may come across a nomad who, in spite of the fact that he knows nothing of what ordinary civilized people know and make use of, in their general dealings, yet possesses the virtue of wisdom."[3]

Wisdom is not confined to faculty of tackling with dexterity only particular tasks, but is the general state of the mind possessed of a sort of wide awareness and capacity to apply whatever knowledge there may be to one's

1. Budur, p. 40, *ll.* 7-10.
2. Budur, p. 40, *ll.* 14-15.
3. Budur, p. 40, *l.* 11.

environment correctly with the self-confidence born of conviction.[1]

If the characteristics of the virtue of wisdom are analysed, it would become clear that, though it is mainly the virtue of *Intelligence*, yet for its effective display and strength it depends to a certain extent upon the aid of the two other constituents of the *basic triad* and their soundness. We know that physiological disorders of the brain as well as of the other parts of the physical body interfere with the full development of intelligence and thus cause damage to the virtue of wisdom in one form or the other. Similarly, the organ of will, or the mind also, if it is sound, contributes to the formation of the virtue of wisdom, and if not sound it damages it in its own way.[2]

BRAVERY (SHAJA'AH)

According to Walīullāh's principle of the development of virtues from the primitive *instincts* of animal aspect in human nature, the virtue of bravery has its root in the *instinct* of anger (*Ghadab*) or pugnacity. It is under the control of Intellect and its universal purpose (*Rai al-Kulli*), that this instinct is transformed into

1. Budur, p. 40, *l.* 12.
2. Cf. pp. 33-37, Budur. Also *see* the development of the complex characteristics and sentiments and emotions of human dispositions. Also the theory of interactionism and development of the disposition in chap. I.

righteous form of anger and the virtue of bravery comes into being.[1]

One of the outstanding characteristics oft he triad of qualities of human Intellect is the universality of purpose (*Rai al-Kulli*), which leads to the use of the instinct of anger for ends of wider purpose and ultimate benefits. It does not then allow to give way to an outburst of rage impulsively, like animals.[2] If a virtuous person has been outraged, the basis of his reaction will not be immediate explosion of anger caused by the injury, but an end dictated by reason, even if it be in the form of retaliation.[3] In brief, the virtue of Bravery (*Shajā'ah*) consists in the capacity to control one's instincts of rage and pugnacity, according to the dictates of reason, and to use it for an universal purpose.[4]

According to this principle, the instinct of rage and pugnacity should be at the service of reason and should appear or disappear according to its dictates. Personal

1. Budur, p. 30, *ll.* 10-12. Also *see* instincts and emotions in chap. I.
2. Budur, p. 30, *ll.* 9-11. Also *see* the additional note on the Triad of the Qualities in chap. I.
3. Budur, p. 30, *ll.* 4-11. "If he decides to take revenge, he fights in accordance with the virtue of bravery and in a way that develops the same virtue and does not damage it. The urge to fight that is created in his disposition (*Ṭabī'ah*) is only due to the fact that the mind has decided but not at all for the anger that is caused."
4. *See* the additional note no. 9 on the virtue of bravery.

revenge should have no place in it.[1] A person may not be personally hurt, and from his individual point of view should not become angry or rise to fight an opponent. But if, in view of an universal end, his reason directs him to fight, his capacity of rage should be at the disposal of the dictates of his reason. He should under such circumstances get into a temper and keep on fighting with his adversary. If his reason, however, directs him not to take any step against an opponent who has caused him pain, he desists, notwithstanding the harm he personally suffers at the hands of the enemy.[2]

It should however be noted that it is the *Ghaḍab*, or faculty of pugnacity and anger which not only enables a person to use violence against an antagonist, but also enables him to face grave dangers such as suffering the loss of property, position, the fear of poverty and calamities of a social or of individual kind.[3]

1. Budur, p. 44, *ll.* 11-12.
2. Budur, p. 44, *ll.* 3-7.
3. Budur, p. 45, *ll.* 5-6. Originally the term *Shajā'ah* (bravery) connotes the virtue shown in situations of physical violence or danger of loss of life or some sudden shock of that sort. But it does not end there. *Shajā'ah* (bravery) connotes a capacity not only to fight against physical but against psychical or mental situations as well. Walīullāh illustrates this by giving the example of a person who executes what he has resolved against the opinion of other members of society, and, in the face of opposition from them, sticks up to his view in spite of calumny and abuse. Cf. Budur, p. 45, *ll.* 4-5.

In *al-Budūr al-Bāzigha* Waliullāh defines the virtue of bravery in the following words: "The virtue of bravery consists in the state of (the mind's) self-confidence and steadfastness in withstanding dangerous calamities and long hours of violent opposition. The intensity of an opponent's fury or the danger of painful suffering can not hinder or incapacitate him from facing them. Thus in such a case, facing the danger in accordance with the dictates of *universal purpose* is a part of a well considered plan (*al-Maṣliḥah al-Bālighah*)."[1]

The presence of a deliberate substantial and higher purpose in facing danger is essential. If a person suffers death for no particular reason, he is not brave.[2] Accordingly bravery would consist in facing the danger of death and suffering, for some substantial and rational purpose, like saving one's honour etc.[3]

At certain times the rational or universal purpose may not be served even in giving one's life on the battle-field. In such a case bravery, on the contrary, would be in saving one's life by quitting the field.[4] A person who, because of the fear of death or failure of his nerves, cannot get away and gets killed, cannot be called brave. On the contrary, he is the opposite of it.[5]

1. Budur, p. 44, *ll.* 1-3.
2. Budur, p. 44, *l.* 14.
3. Budur, p. 44, *ll.* 15-16, 4-6.
4. Budur, p. 44, *l.* 16.
5. Budur, p. 44, *l.* 18.

The purpose that leads one to exercise one's courage should be of the category of the *universal* or the *rational*, or related to an important end (*Ghard Muhimm*). Hence the rude and churlish person (*Faẓẓ*) who takes delight in picking quarrels with people over trivial matters cannot be said to be possessed of the virtue of bravery.[1] Nor can they be called brave who, owing to foolhardiness, conceit and over-confidence in their strength, plunge into dangers without any important purpose or rational cause, caring little what happens to them.[2] Nor are they brave who throw themselves into grave danger or destruction for greed of wealth or for the satisfaction of their animal urges and petty impulses or individual ends. Such persons face dangers because they are slaves of their urges and impulses and not because they have courage.[3]

CHASTITY ('IFFAH)

Another virtue that springs from an *Instinct* in the animal aspect of the human disposition under the refining influence and control of Intellect, is chastity.[4] It consists in the mind's attitude towards the urges of the *sex instinct* to control and utilise it to evolve higher values from it.

1. Budur, p. 44, *l.* 19.
2. Budur, p. 45, *l.* 1.
3. Budur, p. 45, *ll.* 2-3.
4. Budur, p. 30, *ll.* 4, 19.

The basis of this virtue lies in two biological factors of the animal aspect of human disposition and the influence of the triad of qualities of Intellect.[1]

The biological factors are:—

(*a*) Strength of the sexual instinct and its urges, as they are generally found in the case of sound dispositions with a strong and healthy physical constitution.[2]

(*b*) *Masterly* and assertive conduct of the male, which by virtue of his strength dominates over the female. The *submissive* behaviour of the female towards the male and her coyness are due to her innate mildness and delicacy of disposition.[3]

These two factors are outstanding characteristics of animal and are innate in the animal aspect of human disposition as well, and form the basis of the natural behaviour of the members of the opposite sexes towards each other, but in the case of the human beings, variations begin, as they evolve, as it will be discussed below.[4]

1. No instinct could develop into a specific complex sentiment or emotion of the human being without the influence of the Triad of the Qualities of the Intellect. *See* the sentiments and the Triad of the Qualities in chap. I.
2. Budur, p. 41, *l.* 12. Huj-I, p. 26, *l.* 15. (*Shabq Wāfir*).
3. Budur, p. 41, *l.* 19; p. 61, *ll.* 3-4, 7.
4. Budur, p. 41, *l.* 14; p. 30, *ll.* 1, 4.

Behaviour of the Opposite Sexes among Animals

It is in the above two biological factors in animal that lies the root of the behaviour and attitude of members of the opposite sexes towards each other.[1] In the case of the animals, the male can deal with several females at one time, whereas the females always remain under the control of that one male which is capable of commanding their submission and putting other males to flight.[2]

This behaviour results in the difference of the attitude of the members of the opposite sexes towards each other. Because of the sex urge common to male as well as female, the members of both the sexes show an attachment to the members of the opposite sex. But as a result of its being in constant touch with one male, the female develops a sense of attachment for that one male only. The male on the other hand does not develop a similar attachment for one female only. He, on the contrary, treats individual females in his group with a sort of indifference and detachment. His strong sex urge drives him to show a strong concern for the members of opposite sex on the whole, and for females in *general*.[3]

1. Huj-I, p. 22, *ll.* 1-2. Budur, p. 97, *ll.* 1-2.
2. Budur, p. 41, *l.* 14; p. 117, *l.* 1. Huj-I, p. 81, *l.* 31
3. Budur, p. 41, *ll.* 11, 14.

This idea is expressed in Walīullāh's following words: "Don't you find that the strong and sturdy male animal picks up several females which submit to his power and supremacy, exercising his dominion over females, at the same time keeping detached from them?"[1]

Development of Similar Characteristics in Man

The same characteristics develop in man's *normal* disposition. They take the form of a strong liking for women in *general* accompanied by a temporary passion, without infatuation, for one or other individual woman in particular.[2] Whereas the conforming sense of attachment found in the female sex develops, in the case of woman, into a sentiment of strong love and affection exclusively for the man who is her husband. It is on this account that originally, man by his disposition is bigomous and tends to have sex relationship with several women and treat them as his wives. A woman by her innate nature is not to have such relations. She would take one man at a time, who is her husband. This man naturally becomes an object of her strong love and affection.[3] It is

1. Budur, p. 41, *l.* 14.
2. Budur, p. 41, *l.* 11. Huj-I, p. 27, *ll.* 26-27. The lack in having a liking for the opposite sex in general, signifies the lack of the sex urge. Such a deficient person is likely to be attracted by individual women not because they belong to the opposite sex, but because they possess some beautiful features etc. Budur, p. 41, *ll.* 15-17.
3. Budur, p. 41, *ll.* 18-19.

because of the natural capacities, tendencies and differences between the innate characteristics of the dispositions of man and woman, that in history, we find that almost all the nations, all over the earth, have been of the opinion that a man may have several women but for a woman to have several men at the same time would be vicious.[1]

It is a vice that a woman may have more than one husband at one and the same time. It is contrary to her physio-biological need. It is also opposed to the natural disposition of the male with *Ḥamiyyah* (self-esteem), the self-regarding instinct and the strong masterly attitude, being the characteristic marks of his sound disposition.[2] If several men agree to marry (or cohabit with) one woman, it denotes a proportionate lack of the above mentioned characteristic of *Ḥamiyyah* (self-esteem, etc.) and a deficiency in their dispositions, which reveals physical and psychical deficiencies. This is expressed in the following words of Walīullāh: "Self-esteem (*Ḥamiyyah*) in regard to the matter of his wives and children is an essential characteristic of man's disposition. It is therefore not agreeable to him that several men should flock

1. Budur, p. 42, *ll.* 1-2.
2. Budur, p. 60, *ll.* 10-12.

over one woman. It is the same with animals of strong self-regarding instinct."[1]

When do these Characteristics Become Virtue?

These primitive instincts and sentiments when refined by one characteristic of the *Triad* of *Qualities* of Intellect, the universality of purpose (*Rai al-Kullī*),[2] produce the virtue of chastity and become ethical. "The tendency of a strong liking for women without submissive attachment to any particular woman, is transformed into the virtue of chastity when it is modified by and directed to the universal purpose."[3]

The way in which the tendency of universality of purpose, regulates and modifies the sex urge and its tendencies is as follows. The animal is incapable of having a universal purpose, hence its purpose in every form of behaviour is *individual* and particular, and the satisfaction of its urges is for animal an end in itself.[4] But in the case of man, the satisfaction of the sex urge or other tendencies *related* to it, is *not* generally regarded as an end in itself.[5] He, on the contrary, as is commonly the case, satisfies his

1. Budur, p. 60, *ll.* 10-11.
2. *See* the additional note on the Triad of Qualities, chap. I.
3. Budur, p. 30, *l.* 19. Huj-I, p. 113, *ll.* 20-22, 14.
4. *See* Animal Behaviour, chap. I.
5. Budur, p. 50, *ll.* 18-19. Huj-I, p. 113, *ll.* 20-22.

sexual urge for the sake of ulterior ends and *values* of *wider* and *universal* import. Those ends are standardised by society or by its wiser members and sages. These ends and values, sometimes, are constituted in the form of marrying for the sake of humanitarian ends like the survival of humanity, the development of the manpower and the strength of one's community, the welfare of the family etc.[1]

When the sex urge is controlled according to the universal purpose of the types mentioned above man employs the sex urge, with his own discretion, according to the demands and dictates of the Intellect and in conformity with external circumstances and internal, psychical and spiritual needs. Hence, if a person who is able to control his sex urge with discretion for the universal purpose, finds that polygamy is essential according to an universal or higher purpose and then decides to have more than one wife without submitting to the impulses of the instinct of sex urge, he is *chaste* '(*Afīf*) according to Walīullāh.[2]

Essentials of Virtue of Chastity

Without a strong sex urge and the tendencies accessory to it, as described above, the virtue of chastity cannot come into being. For a person who is sexually impotent the virtue of chastity does not exist.[3]

1. Budur, p. 60, *l.* 17. Huj-I, p. 42, *l.* 1.
2. Budur, p. 41, *ll.* 12-13.
3. Budur, p. 41, *l.* 15. Huj-I, p. 52, *l.* 1.

The *control* of the sex urge with discretion as described above, and the freedom from subjugation to the sex urge, is the essence of chastity according to Walīullāh.[1] A lack of the capacity of the control of the sex urge is equivalent to a want in the virtue of chastity. In the case of woman, her virtue of chastity gives rise to her love, exclusively for her husband and affection for her children as is natural to the disposition of women.[2]

MAGNANIMITY (SAMAHAH)

In accordance with the principle of evolution and development the virtue of magnanimity *Samāḥah* grows out of the self-regarding sentiment (*'Ujb*)[3] and impulses of assertion and repulsion (*Tīh wal-I ṭrāḥ*).[4] These in their primitive form are *instincts*, which when developed, are not used by man, like animal or primitive man, for individual ends and

1. Huj-I, p. 113, *ll.* 20-22. Budur, p. 40, *ll.* 14-17. The virtue of *'Iffah* (Chastity) consists in the mind's control over the sex urge and the mental attitude towards the sex urge in such a way that it is able to decide in the matter with independence and discretion.
2. Budur, p. 41, *ll.* 18-19. This is the analysis of the original significance of the term *'Iffah*, though sometimes the terms *Afīf* and *Ghair 'Afīf* are used in relation with freedom in matters other than sexual urge. This, according to Walīullāh, is a secondary use of the terms, e.g., men who are not free from infatuation for poetry, or the games like chess, or delicious food, or excessive love of certain objects are *Ghair 'Afīf* (unchaste) and those free from infatuation are *'Afīf* (chaste). Yet these are not matters of sex. Budur, p. 42.
3. Budur, p. 30, *l.* 17.
4. Budur, p. 30, *l.* 17; p. 34, *l.* 19. It should be noted that the instinct of *Tīh* is also a source of the complex instinct of *Ghadhab* which is the source of Bravery.

personal gratifications, but for *higher* purposes and for ends of *universal* character, in which the self is identifying itself with a larger self.[1] The self-regarding instinct takes the form of self-esteem, which, combined with the two other instincts mentioned above, develops into an attitude of superiority, elevation and predominance as well as that of avoidance of objects repugnant to the instincts of repulsion and assertion.

This complex sentiment, in time, crystallises into a sense of honour that sacrifices personal ends for larger purposes and is disgusted by everything dishonourable, low and mean. The virtue of magnanimity thus comes into being. Its essence lies in a state of mind which refuses everything that is below human dignity and self-esteem. Everything that falls short of being in conformity with universal ends, belongs to the category of the petty, the low and the mean hence it is below human dignity and self-esteem, and therefore it is contrary to the virtue of magnanimity.[2]

1. Budur, p. 60, *l.* 15. Also *see* principles of ethics in chap. V. Any human being who behaves like the animals in satisfying his urges and instincts without any regard for others who belong to a larger self (*al-Insān al-Kabīr*), is one whose disposition is not refined and modified by the qualities of the universal purpose (*Rai al-Kullī*) and the rest of the Triad of Qualities. His unrefined disposition is therefore a primitive disposition.
2. Budur, p. 42, *l.* 6. *See* the definition below and also the general account of the virtue of *Samāḥah*.

Having a natural innate dislike for mean ends, a magnanimous person has a natural desire to live for and attain higher ends in life. Having little care for low ends, his mind is not affected by the corresponding effects of failure or success in the attainment of low ends.[1] Walīullāh defines the virtues of magnanimity in the following terms: "Magnanimity consists in the mind's attitude of dignity and self-esteem being averse to everything that smacks of narrow-mindedness or light-headedness and in the mind's state of attitude of domination over every kind of low and mean purpose."[2]

Before explaining the virtue of magnanimity, and superiority further, it would be worthwhile to understand what is meant by a low and mean purpose or a low and mean end.

Low Ends versus Higher ends or Individual Ends versus Universal Ends

From the discussion on the essence of the virtues and the vice, it is clear that narrowness of the mind and meanness of the behaviour go hand in hand and being contrary to the state of universality and broad-mindedness they have a tendency towards ends of individual and

1. *See* below.
2. Budur, p. 42, *l.* 6. In the religious literature this virtue is known as *al-Khulq al-Ḥasan*. Budur, p. 43, *l.* 19.

selfish character, as it is in the case of animals. Selfishness of a lower sort, therefore belongs to the category of a mean or low purpose.[1]

By individual ends we mean those ends that are subordinate to higher ends, from the universal point of view. Individual ends are low from the point of view of the universal purpose (*Rai al-Kullī*). Physical comfort as an end in itself, money or wealth as an object of love in itself, personal aggrandisement, the gratification of personal revenge, belong to the category of low or mean ends.[2]

The Persons who Lack the Virtue of Magnanimity

Persons who lack this virtue display the tendencies of the categories enumerated above. Such people are subject to *dejection* (*Dhajr*) and despondency, when faced with a slight physical discomfort and disadvantage.[3] They become *pessimistic* (*Radī al-Rajā*) at the slightest failure or discomfiture, and cannot think "except in terms of personal loss, frustration and humiliation."[4] People with such a temperament generally look dissatisfied. They carry frown on their foreheads, as if they have been

1. Budur, p. 42, *ll.* 7, 11. Also *see* the beginning of this chapter on the seven virutes. *See* also Animal Behaviour.
2. *See* the *Rai al-Kullī*, the additional note No. 2 in chap. I, and also the virtue of Bravery.
3. Budur, p. 42, *l.* 16.
4. Budur, p. 42, *l.* 18.

stricken with grief or anger. Their attachment or overdue importance to the low ends develops in them dispositions of gloomy and melancholy character, in contrast to a magnanimous person who has no fondness for such low ends and no craving for their satisfaction. It is immaterial for him if these ends are satisfied or not.[1]

It is the characteristic of the non-magnanimous persons of a strong urge towards the possession of wealth or self-aggrandisement, to become stingy, niggardly (Shaḥīh) and vainglorious.[2] In their personal behaviour towards others they become selfish and mean, so much so that they even grudge others the slightest charity, respect or courtesy, while they fawn on those from whom they expect personal gain and behave like a parasite (*Imma'ah*) with rich people.[3] They become furious if any person less rich than themselves happens to walk in front of them or occupies a seat higher than theirs. Things, such as these, hurt their conceit. Walīullāh gives illustration of such a mean temperament with the behaviour of some low and mean

1. Budur, p. 45, *ll.* 6, 1-2.
2. Budur, p. 42, *l.* 19. It should be noted that the psychic faculty that ought to develop into the virtue of Bravery (Shajā'ah) sometimes deteriorates into the state of hardness of the heart and of the lack of kindness and tender feelings. This state also, in turn, develops into the *vice* of niggardliness (Shuḥḥ). *See* Budur, p. 49, *ll.* 10-11.
3. Budur, p. 42, *l.* 19; p. 43, *l.* 3.

upstarts, who, on the strength of their newly acquired wealth try to dominate over the poor and the needy. They show themselves off and grow unbearably snobbish.[1]

The Magnanimous Person

The magnanimous person, on the other hand, is ever dignified (*Waqūr*), generous, liberal, forgiving, capable of repressing and controlling his anger. He is optimistic and hopeful in his out-look (*Jīd al-Amal*). He possesses confidence of mind (*Thābit al-Qalb*) and capacity for action.[2] He hates snobbery and practises humility. He is friendly and kind-hearted (*Līn al-Ṭaba'*).[3] He abhors to take revenge for a personal grudge; though sometimes he may be compelled to take steps against some offender. This would always be for some higher and more important purpose beyond the individual end in view.[4] The sense of honour is so innate in him that he never regards trivialities as worthy of his attention. It is for this reason that he disregards personal revenge, not because of cowardice, weakness, inability or lack of sensitiveness and feeling.[5] Similarly the qualities of generosity and liberality shown by a magnanimous

1. Budur, p. 42, *ll.* 7-11.
2. Budur, p. 43, *ll.* 8-9.
3. Budur, p. 43, *l.* 10.
4. Budur, p. 43, *ll.* 10-11.
5. Budur, p. 43, *ll.* 11, 15-16.

person are not the result of his incapability for managing his monetary affairs and looking after his property, nor owing to addiction to any bad habit like being a spendthrift.[1] "A liberal person is one whose attitude to wealth is that of a master to his servant. He considers it to be a thing at his complete disposal, to make use of it at will. He knows fully well the uses and benefits of wealth and makes use of it accordingly."[2]

In the same way optimistic and cheerful attitude of a magnanimous person in the face of odd situations is not due to any lack of realisation of danger or insensibility arising out of sluggishness (*Sukūn al-Nafs*), stupidity and torpor of his disposition or from any psychical convulsion.[3]

Magnanimity as One of the Four Cardinal Superior Virtues

From the definition of the virtue of magnanimity, it is evident that magnanimity consists in a state of mind being above the low and the mean and individual ends. As the satisfaction of all animal urges and instincts if it is opposed to universal purpose, belongs to the category of the low purpose and the mean ends, the development

1. Budur, p. 43, *ll.* 9. 16.
2. Budur, p. 43, *ll.* 17-18.
3. Budur, p. 43, *l.* 16.

of the virtue of magnanimity may eventually lead to a state of mind that refuses all low animal urges and vulgar individual ends and soars far above them. Thus this virtue has a much a wider scope than has been described and becomes the source of all moral virtues with the exception of the virtue of wisdom which is purely an intellectual virtue. Hence this virtue has been included by Walīullāh in the *Four* Superior Virtues essential for the Real Happiness (*Sa'ādah*).[1] Magnanimity, as such, consists not only of the qualities described above, but also of the transcendental state of sublimation of the mind as well, which develops as a result of its being above and beyond animal urges.[2] At this level in its content this virtue is different from the virtue of magnanimity that belongs to the category of the *Seven* virtues.

At the level of the seven virtues, magnanimity is ordinary virtue and has no such state of sublimity. Like the rest of the seven virtues, this too has been dealt with from the point of view of the virtues that are the marks of distinction of the human disposition which outgrows its animal aspect under the influence of reason and

1. Huj-I, p. 54.
2. Huj-I, p. 54, *see* the account of *Samāḥah* and also *see* the number of virtues in the beginning of this chapter, vide Huj-II, p. 68, also Ham'āt, p. 49.

intellect. The virtues at that stage have no transcendental aspect which is characteristic of the superior virtues.

TWO VIRTUES OF EXPRESSION

Fasahah and Diyanah

In addition to the one intellectual virtue and the three moral personal virtues, there are two other qualities in man by means of which he *excels* the animals. These two qualities of excellence or virtues are embodied in forms and modes of expressing his ideas, thoughts and emotions lucidly and effectively.[1]

Animals have, no doubt, the capacity of expressing their feelings through their tongue in various forms of cries and sounds. Through the other parts of body they express themselves in various forms of facial expressions, physical poses and postures.[2] The same faculties being innate in man's animal aspect are moulded and developed under the specific characteristics of man's nature. They are thus transformed into forms of expression which far excel those of animal in lucidity and efficiency. Hence efficiency of expression of the psychical states and consciousness or the states of the mind, be it by the tongue or otherwise, is considered

1. Budur, p. 45, *ll.* 11-12; p. 46, *l.* 16.
2. Budur, p. 46, *l.* 19; p. 116, *ll.* 15-19; p. 117, *ll* 1-3, 8-10. Also *see* Interactionism in chap. I.

by Walīullāh to be virtuous, and is a mark of excellence that distinguishes man from the animals.[1]

Walīullāh divides man's excellence of expression into two forms, the virtue of expression through the tongue which he calls *Faṣāḥah* and the virtue of expression through other modes called by him *Diyānah.*

FAṢAḤAH

The Virtue of Eloquence or Lucidity of Speech

The primitive basis of this virtue exists even in animal when it tries to express feelings with sounds produced by the tongue and throat.[2] The same faculty under the influence of the aesthetic quality (*Ẓarāfah*) of the intellect produces articulate and harmonious sounds which, again, under the guidance of the intellect's faculty of generalisation or universality of purpose (*Raī al-Kullī*), become speech. Speech is a *virtue*, as it distinguishes man from animal. It develops due to the Intellect, quality of urge for self-perfection (*Takammul*) aided by the aesthetic quality (*Ẓarāfah*), and in its developed form it takes the form of the virtue of eloquence.[3]

The essential factors of the faculty of speech, and all the more of its developed forms, eloquence and lucidity,

1. *See* below; cf. Huj-I, p. 22, *ll.* 25-27.
2. Budur, p. 29, *l.* 18; p. 30, *l.* 15.
3. Budur, p. 30, *ll.* 15-16.

are (*a*) the soundness and strength of the psychical disposition of man, (*b*) the healthy and normal functioning of the physiological organism essential for the working of the tongue and production of ordinary speech in harmonious voice, and (*c*) the strong link between the mind and the action of the tongue. A strong and sound disposition, with a mind that has at command its Intelligence (*'Aql*), the faculty of comprehension, is, therefore, able to produce speech and express itself with lucidity and efficiency.[1] To put it again in Walīullāh's words: "In the case of a sound and normal man his tongue and his faculty of thinking and consciousness are linked together."[2] He expresses the same idea in the following words: "God has created in the species of animals a link between the faculty of voice and the faculty of consciousness; but in the case of man, He has distinguished him with articulate speech characterised by greater harmony and consistency."[3]

Walīullāh's *definition* of this virtue could be rendered thus: "*Faṣāḥah* or the virtue of lucid speech consists in the mind's power of simultaneously controlling the faculty of thought while it is engaged in directing the function of the tongue, and the functioning of the tongue while

1. Budur, p. 46, *ll.* 11-12; p. 45, *ll.* 16, 18.
2. Budur, p. 46, *l.* 11.
3. Budur, p. 45, *ll.* 11-12.

it is engaged in acquiring ideas from the faculty of thinking. Thus through the exercise of control over the two faculties, simultaneously, when both of them are sound, a consistent language or speech is produced in a lucid and efficient (*Balīgh*) expression."[1]

Such an expression becomes rhetorical or musical only if it is a work of a mind with an outstanding aesthetic quality (*Ẓarāfah*). Minds with a strong aesthetic quality (*Ẓarāfah*), have a wonderful faculty of choosing suitable words, selecting appropriate expressions befitting the occasion and have the ability of the artistic employment of subtleties conceived by the mind.[2]

The Essence of this Virtue

The persons, in whose dispositions the characteristics described above are prominent, possess in their essence the virtue of lucid speech.[3] As each nation differs to a great extent from the other in temperament, in ideas, ideologies, and language, the standards of the best forms of speaking of each nation are therefore bound to be different from those of other nations.[4] In each nation from amongst its own people, it is the people of the

1. Budur, p. 45, *ll.* 9-10. The word *Īḥā* signifies conveying mind's orders through the medium of efficient nervous system.
2. Budur, p. 45, *l.* 19; p. 46, *ll.* 1, 3-5.
3. Budur, p. 46, *ll.* 3-4.
4. Budur, p. 46, *ll.* 2-3.

above mentioned category who are in possession of the faculty of lucid speech and the virtue of eloquence that set the standard of eloquence and rhetoric for rest of the people. "While speaking, they are bound to make a choice of suitable and appropriate words which appeal to the ear and are familiar to the mind. Their compositions dignified in form, immune from laxity, abruptness of construction, and extreme brevity, are of a style that is subtle and admirable."[1]

It should be noted that eloquent rhetorical speech does not necessarily consist of an excessive use of verses or couplets unnecessarily heaped one upon another, nor in the profuse use of foreign words, nor in the forced and artificial use of rhythm or figures of speech, so that the mind and thoughts of the composer become fettered to these artifices. On the other hand, it becomes admirable, if these artifices are a natural and spontaneous production of the mind with outstanding aesthetic quality.[2]

Defects or Vices in Speech

Defects in the faculty of producing lucid speech are caused by the failure of the mind to have a grip over either the faculty of thinking or the action of the tongue.

1. Budur, p. 46, *ll.* 3-6.
2. Budur, p. 46, *ll.* 8-10.

The mind loses control over the thinking faculty and fails to produce lucid speech on account of the following reasons:—

(*a*) Deficiency in the virtue of wisdom; hence the mind is not able to think consistently, but if it can do so, it may not be able to think deeply and elaborately on the objects to be spoken about.[1]

(*b*) Deficiency in the virtue of courage; hence fear of criticism or dishonour, etc., keeps a person from speaking systematically, so that he falters and fumbles in his speech or is unable to speak altogether.[2]

(*c*) Lack of self-esteem or self-reliance or self-assertion; hence an inferiority complex or a sense of shame or shyness disarms him from conveying his thoughts in words properly.[3]

The mind loses its control over the tongue to produce lucid and efficient speech as a result of the following defects:—

(*a*) Functional disorders in the tongue, *e.g.*, stammering, mispronunciation and gibbering.[4]

(*b*) Disorder in the vocal faculty, *e.g.*, shrill voice, low voice, lack of fluency, and lack of regulation of the voice.[5]

1. Budur, p. 45, *l.* 16.
2. Budur, p. 45, *ll.* 14-15.
3. Budur, p. 45, *ll.* 13-14.
4. Budur, p. 45, *l.* 17.
5. Budur, p. 45, *l.* 18.

When these two faculties, the faculty of thought, the faculty of voice and use of the tongue, are sound, there may be another cause that may result in the defect or lack of lucid speech. It consists in the general weakness of the mind in controlling the two faculties simultaneously. If it cannot control them simultaneously, a lucid and eloquent speech cannot be produced.[1]

DIYANAH[2]

Consistency between the Inner State and its Expression in External Behaviour

This virtue has the same source as the virtue of lucid speech, except that here the mind controls the physiological function that determines the forms of expression in facial and other modes of representation, in poses and postures. If the mind is strong and is fully conscious, it directs the physiological expression in conformity with the state of inner consciousness.[3]

1. Budur, p. 46, *ll.* 12-13. *See* the definition.
2. Here Walīullāh uses the term *Diyānah* (which also signifies submission and obedience in general) in a comparatively restricted sense, i.e., obedience and submission of the external modes of expression and physical poses and postures to the will and motive force of the consciousness of the mind. This relation of submission between the mind and the body is however present in the behaviour manifesting what may be called honesty, piety or religious devotion each of which is implied by the term *Diyānah* but not necessarily here in this context as is clear from the general account of the virtue.
3. Budur, p. 46, *l.* 16.

As in *Faṣāḥah* (the virtue of eloquence), the mind in this case also should be capable of controlling together and simultaneously the both, the faculty of consciousness and the faculty of physiological representation.[1] Walīullāh's definition of the virtue of *Diyānah* is being rendered in this way: "*Diyānah* consists in the mind's co-ordinating the faoulty of comprehension and consciousness with the external motion and activity of the organism in such a way that both the faculties together, are under its control and are functioning in the most appropriate way."[2]

The Essentials of this Virtue

It should again be noted that, as in the case of *Faṣāḥah* (the virtue of eloquence), perfection of this virtue also depends on the soundness of the two faculties and a strong link between the two, to express or represent each other, as Walīullāh says: "Perfect control of the mind over the two faculties results in the functioning of each in the appropriate way and in the co-ordination of the two."[3] When a person's inner disposition and its external representation have arrived at such a state as is described above, his external behaviour reflects correctly what is in his inner psychical state and his organs (i.e. physiological

1. Budur, p. 46, *ll.* 17-18.
2. Budur, p. 46, *ll.* 13-15.
3. Budur, p. 47, *ll.* 2-3.

parts or body) become, as if it were, the mirror of his mind.[1]

This state manifests perfection of the constitution of a person. Henee it is a virtue from that point of view as well, in addition to its being a means of distinction between man and animals, as has already been described.[2]

The people who lack in this virtue fail to show consistency of their behaviour with their state of mind, *e.g.*, some persons cannot remove the gloomy expression from their faces, even when they are happy in their minds. Some people nurse a reverential attitude for some one but they cannot show it properly.[3]

It should be noted that Walīullāh states that the virtues like piety (*War'u*) and true adoption of forms of worship, veracity (*Ṣidq*) etc. are subsidiaries of this virtue. Those who possess this virtue of *Diyānah* develop these subsidiary virtues with the aid of the practice and training that people receive within the atmosphere of the traditions of society and conditions of their education.[4] The details of the significance of these subsidiary virtues and the process of their development need not be discussed here. A more detailed psychological background is needed for their discussion

1. Budur, p. 47, *l.* 2; p. 46, *l.* 19.
2. *See* above. Also *see* Huj-I, p. 47, *l.* 26.
3. Budur, p. 47, *l.* 4.
4. Budur, p. 47, *ll.* 6, 13-15.

which relates to the higher ethics and not to the ordinary ethics that form the main basis of this work.

SAMT AS-ṢALIḤ

The Virtue of Balanced Conduct, Stability and Homogeneity of Character

The source of the virtue of *Samt as-Ṣāliḥ* lies in the existence of a *well balanced disposition* developed with innate harmony and right proportion of its various parts and constituents. The mind is thus able to develop a character which displays *consistency* and *harmony* in its external conduct at all times.[1] With the development of such a disposition a well organised, a well balanced and harmonious character is evolved, which, having a source in the innate disposition, becomes a stable character and cannot easily be affected by less deeply rooted thoughts or transitory feelings and momentary urges or by less impelling external circumstances.[2]

Persons who lack such a harmonious disposition are unable to display stability and consistency in behaviour for a long time. Because of the innate discord and wrong proportion of the constituents of their disposition or the substance of their mind, their behaviour is bound to consist of a series of acts, discordant

1. Budur, p. 48, *l.* 3.
2. Budur, p. 47, *ll.* 17-18.

and inconsistent with each other.[1] For example, at times such persons may display in their behaviour marks of an elevated character, the qualities of self-determination, superiority and dignified authority (*Sūdad*) whereas the same persons may at other times, reveal a character marked by contrary qualities, of dependence, of smallness, of incapacity and of meanness.[2]

It is due to disharmony and discord in their dispositions that at one time such people appear virtuous, performing acts of magnanimity, bravery, while on another occasion the same people appear, on the contrary, to behave cowardly, mean, and miserly.

This change in behaviour is due to the lack of strength of various parts and constituents of their disposition, which come to be dominated by each other according to the temporary situations created by transitory feelings, or caused by a change of environments. Such people, therefore, lack stability of character owing to defects and weakness in their disposition. Hence their behaviour indicates lack of this virtue (Samt aṣ-Ṣāliḥ) to the extent of their deficiency.[3]

In certain cases a person may have a stable character as a result of a strong disposition with well developed

1. *See* Interactionism in chap. I, also the virtue of *Diyānah* above.
2. Budur, p. 48, *ll.* 4-9.
3. Budur, p. 48, *ll.* 8-9.

constituents and deeply rooted faculties; but his disposition may lack homogeneity in its parts, displaying qualities of certain virtues and marks of certain vices simultaneously.[1] A person may be in full possession of the virtue of bravery, but at the same time he may lack the virtue of magnanimity and display the character of an extremely mean and niggardly person. Another person may possess both of these virtues and, yet he may lack the virtue of expression and eloquence.[2] These persons, too, like those whose character is unstable, have defective dispositions. Hence they lack this virtue of homogeneity of character (*Samt aṣ-Ṣāliḥ*) to the extent of the inner discord in their disposition—in addition to the lack of that virtue or those virtues contrary to which a vice or vices they possess.

The Essence of this Virtue

The essence of a balanced conduct lies in the soundness of the disposition with its well developed, harmonious and homogeneous constituents deeply and strongly established in it, so that the mind is able to display the innate disposition in a poised and harmonious external behaviour. The substance of Walīullāh's definition

1. Budur, p. 48, *ll.* 1-2.
2. Budur, p. 48, *ll.* 1-3, 10-11.

of the virtue of *Samt aṣ-Ṣāliḥ* is as follows: "The virtue of *Samt aṣ-Ṣāliḥ* consists in the soundness of the substance of the mind in exercising control over cognition and thought and in its competence to transform thought into action, so that on one hand no transitory thought or momentary impulse can divert the course of behaviour which has become habitual, while, on the other hand, there is no conflict or discord between one part of its external behaviour and another, *e.g.*, one part displaying marks of superiority, dignity and authority, in contrast to the other part showing marks of inferiority, meanness and subordination."[1]

The Effect of this Virtue

In contrast to those who lack this virtue and whose characteristics have been described above, the effect of this virtue is manifest in the general behaviour, manners of conduct and modes of dress of those people who possess this virtue, which produces harmony and stability in all aspects. This virtue regulates their external behaviour in conformity with the inner states of the psychical disposition, and brings the two into a stable relationship with each other. That is to say, it also regulates the virtue of *Diyānah* and stabilises it.[2]

1. Budur, p. 47, *ll.* 16-19.
2. *See* the virtue of *Diyānah*.

Its effect permeates the whole conduct of the person, his ways of thought, his modes of behaviour, his dress, his tastes, his likes and dislikes, all of which show marked consistency with each other and with the inner state of the person as well. Thus the person becomes an embodiment of a praiseworthy character and conduct.

Subsidiary Virtues

As the essence of this virtue lies in giving stability and strength to the character, as well as consistency to it, every virtue or quality that is based upon strength and stability of character becomes subsidiary of this virtue from that point of view. Hence the virtues of forbearance (*Ḥilm*), assiduousness and patience (*Ṣabr*) are subsidiaries of this virtue. Similarly this virtue gives rise to the virtue of the sense of shame (*Ḥayā*) when the mind fails to act according to its standards. The propriety of manners and etiquette, and choice of proper and becoming dress are marks of the strength of this virtue.[1]

1. Budur, p. 48, *ll.* 12-14.

CHAPTER III
SOCIOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

Introduction

Ethical conduct represents the mode of behaviour which is appropriate and natural in the ordering and carrying on one's personal as well as one's social life, involving rights as well as duties and responsibilities (*Ḥuqūq*).[1] Either case implies the existence of more than one individual, or of an aggregate of individuals or society of some sort. It is in this sense that the science of ethics is related to the science of sociology.

There is no contemporary of Walīullāh who deals with sociology so methodically as he does. His mode of approach here is also the same as in psychology or ethics. One of the fixed ideas that is ever present in his mind is embodied in the fact that he never seeks for the beginning of man anywhere but in animal.[2] Here, too, the mode of life of the animals (*Abnā al-Jins*) is his first thought. Sympathy, responsiveness in need (which in the case of man is perhaps a source of what is called responsibility, or the ability of responding)[3]

1. *See* Ethical Conduct in chap. V.
2. Budur, p. 49, *ll.* 16-19. Huj-I, p. 38, *ll.* 5-6, 13, 15, 19.
3. *See Taklīf*, Huj-I, p. 19, the term *Abnā al-Jins*, literally meaning sons of the genus implies all species of animals, which is the denotation of the term *Animal*. It is a term of the category of the universal (*Kullī*), and of the category of genus (*Jins*) implying all the species of animals.

and mutual defence and co-operation, almost verging on altruism, according to Walīullāh, are writ large on the animal world.[1] Man inherits all these along with other instincts innate in his *Basic Triad* in addition to the emergent qualities of the *Specific Triad* of the Qualities of Rationality and Intellect, namely the universality of purpose, the aesthetic quality and the quality of urge for development and perfection.[2] This is the foundation upon which man builds—no doubt with the aid of his emergent power and faculty to conceive and rationalise—and new values, new modes and new purposes emerge.[3] Thus man progresses further and farther from his ancestors, be they animals or primitive men.[4]

In sociology too, *Evolution* and *Relativity* are his maxims.[5] Society evolves like an organic individual.[6] Walīullāh conceives human society not as an aggregate of units joined by some artificial means or social contracts, but as a veritable living organism.[7] It obeys the laws of its own evolution. It has an end and a purpose.[8] It works

1. *See* Animal Disposition in chap. I.
2. Huj-I, p. 20, *l.* 11; pp. 21-22. Budur, pp. 97, 99. Also *see* Human Disposition in chap. I.
3. *See* the *Triad* of Qualities—Additional Note no. 2, chap. I.
4. Taf-II, p. 80, *ll.* 6-11. Also Budur, pp. 18-19; p. 22.
5. Ibid.
6. Huj-I, p. 89, *ll.* 7-8. Budur, p. 94; p. 12, *ll.* 9-11.
7. Budur, p. 48, *ll.* 17-19; p. 95, *ll.* 2-3; p. 132, *ll.* 8-12.
8. Budur, p. 21, *ll.* 9-19; p. 128, *ll.* 9-19. Also *see* the cycle of life, Sat, p. 17.

on lines almost analogous to those of the individual, being subject to states analogous to health and soundness, progress and advancement, weakness and regress, and decay and death (*Buḥrān*).[1] As the individual grows more unified and integrated in virtue of a strong centre in his faculties that organises and co-ordinates his ideas and action, so does a growing society. It grows in dimension and also becomes more and more organic.[2] What is habit to an individual becomes custom to society. The individual's memory of customs gives rise to traditions of society. As the individual evolves a will, so does the society or community.[3] The more organised it grows the more co-ordination appears amongst its units which are its organs, like those of the individual. This account is true not only in the case of a particular human society but also in the case of all human societies.[4] As a matter of fact, this is Walīullāh's account also of *Humanity* in the *Aggregate* called by him *Insān al-Kabīr* or the *Huge Human Person*. Indeed *Humanity*, according to Walīullāh, behaves like one organic individual.[5]

1. Budur, p. 132, *ll.* 14-19; p. 95, *ll.* 2-12.
2. Budur, p. 135, *ll.* 12-13; p. 137, *ll.* 1-3. Huj-I, p. 39, *ll.* 9-12.
3. Huj-I, p. 16, *l.* 17; p. 24, *ll.* 2-3; p. 31, *l.* 2.
4. Budur, p. 94, *ll.* 4-6, 9-12. Huj-I, p. 49, *ll.* 5-11.
5. Sat, p. 31, *l.* 10. Budur, p. 132, *ll.* 8-9, 14. The individual human beings are just like limbs of the body of humanity as a whole, or parts of the physique of the huge person of humanity in the aggregate called *al-Insān al-Kabīr*. Budur, p. 132, *l.* 9; p. 48, *l.* 17.

As in the chapter on the Psychological Background so also here the subject will not be dealt with beyond those aspects which are necessary in order to understand Walīullāh's socio-ethical system. The appropriate and natural conduct that he conceives in ethics cannot be fully appreciated unless one is acquainted not only with the natural way in which the disposition of the human individual develops, as discussed in the last two chapters, but also with the natural process of development of society and its customs and traditions, which form a part of Sociology.

Four Stages in Social Evolution

IRTIFĀQ-I, IRTIFĀQ-II, IRTIFĀQ-III, & IRTIFĀQ-IV

As the life of the individual may roughly be divided into four stages, namely childhood, adolescence, manhood and maturity, so, for the sake of convenience Walīullāh divides social evolution into four stages which he calls *Irtifāqāt*,[1] though the four stages are so linked with one another that a line of demarcation can hardly be drawn. It is on the basis of the peculiar features and institutions of each that he draws broad outlines of each stage.[2]

The satisfaction of needs (*Ḥājāt*) is the common ground upon which the ties of society are externally

1. Huj-I, p. 39, *ll.* 6-11, 12, 16, 21. The term *Irtifāq* appears to be Walīullāh's own coinage. *See* the Additional Note no. I on *Irtifāq*.
2. Budur, p. 51, *ll.* 8-15. Huj-I, p. 59, *ll.* 7-8

established.[1] The satisfaction of the primary needs of food, shelter against cold, heat and inclemencies of weather, mating and reproduction of species and other physico-biological needs, play the most important part in building up the primitive human society which, in the beginning may hardly be better than that of animals, but in the course of evolution develops certain characteristics that distinguish its behaviour from the modes of behaviour of groups and aggregates of animals and give it the specific marks of human society.[2]

IRTIFĀQ—I

(Human Society in the First Stage of Social Evolution)

In the first stage of its development, while it is still in its early primitive state, human society develops on the following lines.[3]

The first thing that human beings develop over and above animals and that gives them the capacity for closer contact with their own kind is the power of speech.[4] The next thing, that is conducive to the formation of established groups of individuals, is the settlement of agricultural

1. Budur, p. 49, *l.* 16; p. 50, *ll.* 1-5, 16-17; p. 51, *l.* 6.
2. Budur, p. 51, *ll.* 9, 14-15; p. 49, *ll.* 16-17.
3. *See* Huj-I, pp. 39-40. *Irtifāq-I.* Also Budur, pp. 53-55. *Irtifāq-I.*
4. Huj-I, p. 39, *ll.* 26-27. Also Budur, p. 53, *ll.* 12-15.
Note: Walīullāh's ideas about the process of the development of the language are interesting, *see* the pages referred in 3.

groups out of nomadic people.[1] These two lead to the further necessity of co-operation, division of labour, dependence of members of the group upon each other, and the spirit of team work in ploughing the field, in making the plough, and in producing the apparatus of irrigation. This not only compels human co-operation, but makes the domestication of animals also necessary.[2]

The development of human needs and their gradual complexity evolving into new forms such as building shelters, providing clothing of a sort, and eating cooked food, necessitate more and more mutual help.[3] Domestication also establishes family life which becomes a standing institution in the group.[4]

The other necessity is defence. It often happens that a group attacks another group; not only that, but many a time there is internal discord—members of a group fighting between themselves, disputes arising between them which sometimes become the cause of extermination of the whole group. This gives rise to the formation of related customs and traditions which are strictly guarded, necessitating the existence of the leader and his followers to command in warfare and to settle disputes.[5]

1. Huj-I, p. 40, *ll.* 3-4.
2. Huj-I, p. 40, *ll.* 3-4, 8-10. Budur, p. 54, *l.* 14.
3. Huj-I, p. 40, *ll.* 3-4. Budur, p. 54, *ll.* 16-17.
4. Huj-I, p. 40, *ll.* 5-6. Budur, p. 54, *ll.* 18-19.
5. Huj-I, p. 40, *ll.* 10-12.

These are the fundamental traits that early human societies display.

Even in primitive societies this complex activity, eventually, gives rise to a conduct appropriate and natural to their circumstances and to their physical and psychical needs, which may be called ethical conduct[1] leading to the development of certain virtues such as courage, unselfishness, thinking of the group more than one's own self, sharpness of wit and intelligence, though the significance of those virtues as understood by primitive societies is not so lofty and sublime as in the case of advanced societies.[2] There is a sense of rivalry and competition, as a result of which the individual who is outstanding in a particular aspect takes the lead. The strongest and bravest who can lead in battle becomes the leader of the group.[3] The aesthetic tastes are also not absolutely wanting in primitive societies. Beauty is not disregarded, nor is enjoyment for the sake of enjoyment unknown.[4] So all the fundamentals that become more and more pronounced later in the higher stages of development of society are present here in rudimentary form.

1. Huj-I, p. 40, *l.* 12.
2. Huj-I, p. 40, *ll.* 13-14.
3. Huj-I, p. 40, *ll.* 10,14.
4. Huj-I, p. 40, *l.* 13.

IRTIFĀQ—II

(Human Society in the Second Stage of Social Evolution)

The discipline and strength furnished by experience and knowledge, acquired during the first stage, open the way for further progress.[1] Any impediment in the way of advancement creates the same effect as in the case of the individual is done by the thwarting of the impulses of the innate disposition resulting into discontentment and unhappiness.[2] This as a result may lead, as we know, to revolution. What is noteworthy is that even at the first stage the needs as well as the ways and means of satisfying them start to grow and become more and more *Complex.* It is due to this process that later on the second stage of social evolution comes into being.[3]

Five Departments of Life

Walīullāh divides the complex life of the second stage into five departments, in which appropriate modes of conduct governing each department evolve and form the bulk of the code of ethical conduct of society.[4] These departments are:—

I. The department of the life of the individual, or of personal life. The principles that govern the

1. Budur, p. 49, *l.* 19; p. 55, *l.* 5; p. 60, *l.* 4.
2. Budur, p. 50, *ll.* 2-3.
3. Budur, p. 50, *ll.* 1-4. Huj-I, p. 39, *ll.* 9-12.
4. Budur, p. 50, *ll.* 6-15.

appropriate conduct of personal life, called by Walīullāh *Ḥikmat al-Ma'āshiyya* (the wisdom of the way of living), are related to the appropriate modes of satisfaction of the individual's needs of food, drink, dress, place of abode, manner of sitting, of walking and moving about, and of conversation, and also of travelling as in advanced societies travelling is a necessity at times.[1]

II. The department of domestic life. Family life, too, at this stage grows more complex. The relations between husband and wife give rise not only to responsibilities for children, but to other relations, friends of the family, servants and others. Thus new traditions, customs and manners come into existence. The joint family also becomes one of the phenomena in certain cases. The principles that govern domestic life belong to what Walīullāh calls *Hikmat Tadbīr al-Manzil* (the science of the wisdom of the conduct of the domestic household).[2]

III. The department of vocational life. It relates to the drive for a high standard of living on the basis of a further division of labour, specialisation and improvement of the means of production and

1. Budur, p. 50, *ll.* 6-7; pp. 55-60. Huj-I, pp. 40-41.
2. Budur, p. 50, *ll.* 13-14. Huj-I, pp. 41-43. Budur, pp. 60-66.

earning of living. This department belongs to what he calls *Ḥikmat al-Iktisābiyya* (the wisdom of earning livelihood).[1]

IV. The department of business contract relations and the exchange of goods with others. This department is based on what he calls *Ḥikmat al-Ta'āmuliyya* (the wisdom of mutual dealing), the science that deals with principles of matters like sale, lease, contracts of hire, loan, debt, mortgage, etc.

V. The department of co-operation. It is governed by the principles of *Ḥikmat al-Ta'āwuniyya* (the wisdom of mutual help), dealing with surety (security, etc.), co-proprietorship, partnership, agency and other contracts of that type.[2]

The last three departments represent various aspects of development of the conduct of the economic life of society. Hence all these departments may jointly be considered as one department as the department of the conduct of economic life.

All the departments of life, discussed above, are essential characteristics of a society which has advanced from its primitive stage Each has its inevitable part in the formation of the advanced society. In advanced

1. Budur, p. 66, *ll.* 5-6.
2. Budur, p. 50, *ll.* 15-16. Also Budur, pp. 60-70.

societies each of the departments is auxiliary to others. Being inter-related with each other, these five departments unite the members of society as one whole, giving the society the character of a single family on a large scale.[1]

The State—Madina

During the period of its passing through the second stage of evolution the society develops into a form of a wide unity that constitutes the state.

In the words of Walīullāh "the real state is not a fortress, lofty buildings and trading centre, but it is a form of *Unity* between various groups of human beings, which comes into being as an essential consequence of the principles (of the various departments of life) that link together the various groups of society through diverse forms of intercourse, transaction and co-operation, giving them internal unity and integrity of *One Person*."[2]

In order to safeguard the State and its unity, the society creates a form of *Government* for the State and develops it. The development of the State Government is the mark of the society which has advanced to the *Third stage* of social evolution and is called by Walīullāh *Irtifāq III*.[3]

1. Budur, p. 70, *ll.* 17-19; p. 51, *ll.* 9-15. Huj-I, p. 39, *ll.* 7-13.
2. Budur, p. 50, *l.* 19; p. 51, *ll.* 1-4.
3. Budur, p. 50, *ll.* 16, 17; p. 51, *ll.* 2-4.

IRTIFĀQ—III

(Human Society in the Third Stage of Social Evolution)

The third stage of social evolution is the natural outcome of the preceding stage in which the society is eventually marked with a unified organism which is the foundation of the State.[1] The *Unity* and the organism necessitate the further evolution of society. This takes place in the direction of creation and development of a congenial State Government. The schemes for this do not only aim at the safeguarding, preservation and conservation of the society, its *Unity* and its State and Government, but are also conducive to the fullest benefit that the *Unity* and the State and Government can yield to the members of the Society.[2] The development of the Government of the State and Governmental schemes of this kind belong to the category of what Walīullāh calls *Irtifāq III*, and are marks of the society that is advanced to the third stage of social evolution.[3]

Before an analysis is given of the requirements of the State and the methods of a Government to meet these, it would be interesting to quote a passage from Budūr to give Walīullāh's views regarding the *Unity* of the State, and that of the Government of the State and

1. Budur, p. 50, *l.* 18.
2. Budur, p. 70, *l.* 19; p. 71, *l.* 1. Huj-I, p. 39, *l.* 12.
3. Huj-I, p. 39, *ll.* 12-13. Budur, p. 51, *ll.* 3-4, 11-12.

their relationship with each other. This is corroborated by Walīullāh's following words:—

"Indeed when men carry on these transactions with each other, and different men specialise in different kinds of work, produce and supply for each other's needs, and, as a result, the various forms of exchange of goods etc., co-operation etc. come into being, it necessarily signifies that there exists a kind of *link*—a unity between various groups of people like farmers, merchants, weavers etc.

"It is these groups of people that by reason of that unifying link form the body of the *State* imreality. The real state is not the name of the city wall, fortress, and trading centre. If there are many towns in the vicinity of each other, and people living in them carry on transactions with each other, we will call them a *State*.[1]

"From the point of view of the unifying link a state is just like *One Person* or an Organism, while every group of people and every member is like a limb or part of the body of that person.

"Unity is essential in a state. This unity must, first of all, be preserved, then improved and developed to yield its full benefits. The system (*Tadbīr*) of the Government through which that object is attained is the real

leader (*Imām*) or Governor of the State. The Governor of the state is not, according to *us* (i.e. Walīullāh), at all *the form of a human individual* except of course when a capable person of strong and powerful personality, the one who is absolutely suitable for the task, undertakes the task of government of the state, he is the head of the state, though outwardly and only in appearance."[1]

The system of government of the state aims at fulfilling the following requirements that are essential for the safety and progress of the state.

The Requirements of a State

1. Judiciary. A grave danger to the unity of the state lies in the disputes and competition that are bound to spring up amongst the people of a state in various departments of life. If the disputes are not settled they will grow and result in discord and conflict between the people of the state, leading to an ultimate ruin of the state. Hence the state is in great need of a form of institution, to be included in its system of government, that should settle disputes effectively. This need is supplied by the Judiciary with equitable and agreeable system of settling disputes.[2] It is necessary that the Judiciary should be just and strong and its judgements capable of being executed. Otherwise, the requirements

1. Budur, p. 70, *ll.* 13-19; p. 71. *ll.* 1-3.
2. Budur, p. 71, *ll.* 6-10.

of the state which it is supposed to serve will not be fulfilled.[1]

II. Executive. In order to suppress the activities of people of *weak* and *perverted* dispositions which are likely to cause corruption in the state it is necessary that there should be a strong body to take punitive and deterrent measures against such people and equitable and civilized methods (*Sunnat al-'Ādila*) of dealing with them must be adopted.[2]

III. Military or Defence Force. A society of men cannot be without people of 'perverted dispositions'[3] who wilfully create causes of quarrel and conflict, many of whom take to violent activities like killing, plundering or rebellion against the state and deliberately try to disturb peace and order for reasons of personal interests like the acquisition of property, possession of land, the attainment of power and position, or the satisfaction of personal revenge and enmity, or religious bigotry.[4]

1. Budur, p. 71, *ll.* 10-12. The power of executing the decisions of the judiciary may or may not be vested in the judiciary. What is important is the fulfilment of the requirement of the state for which the judiciary is set up. The requirement is met with only when the decisions of the judiciary are executed. Even if the executive powers are not vested in the judiciary, the purpose of the judiciary is served if there is an executive body always ready to execute the judgements given by the judiciary.
2. Budur, p. 71, *ll.* 13-16.
3. *See* the Additional Note no. 8 to chap. I, on Pathology of Human Dispositions.
4. Budur. 71. *ll.* 17-19.

In order to control such violent situations and preserve the state from their danger, a defence force is essential in the form of an army of brave people. The mobilisation of an army may either be according to a set custom that appeals to the minds of the people and is observed in the hour of danger or it may be at the disposal of men of *prestige* and *honour* who are well versed in the art of battle and command a willing obedience of people. This institution is called *Jihād* by Walīullāh.[1]

IV. Public Welfare and Public Works. An advanced and developed state is in the need of some sort of institution to look after the welfare of the people—to find out ways and means of doing the work that people are unable to do themselves—and to construct public buildings and public works, etc. This institution of the government is *Niqāba*, according to Walīullāh, and the head of the institute may be called *Naqīb* or *Walī*.[2]

V. Education of the People of the State. The needs of the state require that its people should be well instructed, both, in the spheres of livelihood necessary for a high standard of living, in conformity with the social progress and development of the two previous stages of social

1. Budur, p. 72, *ll.* 1-3; pp. 84-85.
2. Budur, p. 72, *ll.* 4-12.

evolution, and in the sphere of spiritual and moral advancement.[1]

The Charge of Government of the State

A Perfect State (*Madīnat al-Tāmma*) is that which has a standard form of efficient mode (*Sunnah*) of fulfilment of each of the requirements enumerated above. As generally is the case that when many people of discordant dispositions and conflicting interests meet, there is bound to be a divergence of opinions regarding the interpretation of the form and mode of conduct of Government in accordance with a set standard and prevailing tradition. It will, therefore, be better that in order to avoid any danger to uniformity and unity, the work of each department should be entrusted to one person or a head-official, who is again under another person who is responsible for various departments and is the ultimate head of the whole state.[2]

IRTIFĀQ IV

(Human Society in the Fourth Stage of Social Evolution)

International State

The state so formed during the course of evolution in the two advanced stages of social evolution, forms itself

1. Budur, p. 72, *ll.* 13-16; pp. 81-82; p. 84, *ll.* 3-4.
2. Budur, p. 72, *l.* 19; p. 73, *ll.* 1-2; pp. 84-85. Huj-I, p. 46, *l.* 1.

into a unit, which is actually one amongst many units of that kind when the population of any nation and of the whole of humanity is taken into consideration. Like individual members of the state, each state is in a way a member of a large state constituted by the bulk of humanity belonging to the whole world and some of those constituent states are bound to come into conflict with others and threaten the internal peace and unity of their opponent states.

This state of affairs necessitates a more powerful system for controlling all the different states to keep them in peace and order with each other so that they should not be able to interfere with the unity of humanity or *al-Insān al-Kabīr*. This need is supplied by a form of Supreme Caliphate or an *International Government* which is adopted by nations when, in their course of evolution, they advance to the *Fourth Stage of Social Evolution called by Walīullāh Irtifāq IV*, without which the real peace and tranquility of nations and the safety of individual states will always be in a precarious condition.[1]

Different Levels

Though these are the four stages through which society evolves, yet, it is not necessary that everysociety

1. Huj-I, p. 38, *ll.* 19-26.

should have gone through each of them. As some societies are more advanced than others some rise to a higher *Irtifāq* and some fall to lower ones after their progress, therefore, every society is to be judged from its present level whether it is in the First, Second or Third stage, or it is partly in one and partly in another stage.[1]

1. Huj-I, p. 49, *l.* 16. Budur, p. 73, *ll.* 5-8.

CHAPTER IV

AL-RASM (CUSTOM)

Social Customary Code

The realisation of the essential features of each *Irtifāq* or social evolution in each of the *Four stages*, takes place in certain *forms* of conduct or ways of doing things and *patterns* of action. These modes of action gradually acquire the universal approval of the members of society who invariably accept these modes as *models*, as they help them in the attainment of their ends and satisfaction of the needs which these modes are meant to give.[1]

Owing to the universal approval of society, such forms of conduct grow into beneficial social customs (*al-Rusūm al-Ṣāliḥa*) or universal traditions (*Sunan al-Sāira*). They are then included in the *social code* of people and become lasting social tradition. People adhere to such social traditions as they provide convenient and useful modes (*Irtifāqāt*) of attainment of *ends* or *needs* of social character developed and grown in the process of social evolution, while their disregard causes harm or danger to society and its progressive purposes.[2]

1. Budur, p. 51, *ll.* 5-9. Huj-I, p. 39, *ll.* 17-21; pp. 47-48.
2. Budur, p. 53, *ll.* 5-11; pp. 89-90. Huj-I, p. 39, *ll.* 5-7.

How Customs and Traditions Come into Being

No social code is the result of efforts of one individual, nor is it an outcome of the activities of a single generation of Society.[1] Social code or tradition comes into being by a gradual process of evolution. It develops under the guidance of people's innate tendencies of *intellect* and is modified and supplanted in the course of their experience, through the processes of trial and error.[2] Hence an advanced code of social modes of conduct is built up through a long period of development, and represents the best forms and patterns for fulfilling the *needs* that the social institutions are meant to fulfil.

The *main factors* which enable the social traditions and customs *to survive* and gain universal approval of people of a community are their *usefulness* in serving their purpose and the *inability* of people of one generation to formulate by their own unaided reflection a code for themselves, especially when the majority of people, as it is always the case, lack sufficient intelligence and capacity to make their own code. It is mainly the task of *the intelligent* and *the prudent* to supply those patterns and modes that formulate traditions.

1. Budur, p. 87, *ll.* 7-9, 17-19; p. 15, *ll.* 3-4..
2. Budur, p. 49, *l.* 19; p. 55, *l.* 5; p. 60, *l.* 4.

The rest of the people who are unable to find their way by themselves simply follow those patterns and stick to them faithfully, because they benefit by so doing and suffer loss and harm by a disregard of the same. Social codes and patterns of conduct *evolve* and *develop* with the *progress* of the society. How various patterns and modes of custom come into existence, both, in primitive societies and also in advanced societies, has been discussed at length by Walīullāh. Its details may be seen in his works.[1]

Characteristics of Customs and Traditions in Advanced Societies

In advanced societies customs and traditions are (*i*) *well developed* naturally, owing to the influence of the previous experience, and (*ii*) *refined* being directed towards large and universal ends and purposes (*Rai al-Kullī*), and moulded by a stronger sense of aesthetic qualities (*Ẓarāfa*) such as elegance and refinement leading to a high standard of living.[2] Those customs and traditions (*iii*) satisfy the tendencies, and the impulses of *sound dispositions* possessing the *seven virtues*, and are also (*iv*) conducive to the higher growth and further development of those dispositions as well as to (*v*) advancement of social well being.[3]

1. *See* Additional Note no. 2.
2. Budur, p. 49, *l.* 19; p. 50, *l.* 1. Also *see* Triad of Qualities in Additional Note no. 2, chap. I.
3. Budur, p. 55, *l.* 4; p. 60, *l.* 4; p. 66, *ll.* 5-8. Huj-I, p. 49, *ll.* 18-19.

On the basis of these characteristics, the main purpose of most of the customs and traditions in advanced societies generally becomes *threefold*, as follows:—

I. Sublimation of the lower needs, *i.e.*, elevation of the needs of the animal aspect by adopting peculiar modes of their satisfaction with high and sublime points of view, so as not only to make the fulfilment of those needs no longer crude and unrefined as it is in the case of animals, but to conceal them under cover of various forms and modes of custom and varieties of ideals. Thus customs provide a device for fulfilling the animal needs without giving them any importance as ends of animal aspect, and serve to elevate man above the level of the animals.[1]

II. Upholding of the structure of the society and sustaining its *unity* by serving as the cement that keeps different parts of the edifice together, is another purpose fulfilled by Customs and Traditions. It is through these, that members of society are kept in contact with each other by generating goodwill, amity, etc., amongst them.[2]

III. The third purpose is *conservation* of the above mentioned characteristics and purposes from quick

1. Budur, p. 60, *ll.* 18-19; p. 49, *l.* 16; p. 87, *l.* 19. The term Huj-I, p. 42, *l.* 1; p. 49, *l.* 19. *See* Additional Note no. 3.
2. Budur, p. 65, *ll.* 12-19; p. 64, *l.* 8. Huj-I, p. 42, *l.* 2. *Milāk al-Manzali.*

changes leading to the decay and degeneration of society.[1]

These points are clearly illustrated by what Walīullāh says about the wedding ceremonies and customs and traditions relating to that occasion including the wedding feasts and other family traditions.[2]

Types of Customs and Traditions

The account so far given concerns the righteous conduct and patterns of *righteous custom*, which evolve with the evolution of the society, provided no uncongenial cause or impediment comes in the way of its natural evolution.[3] The ultimate source of creation of conduct lies in the prudent members of the society such as the *sages* and *prophets*, who possess the *supreme* character constituted by the *seven virtues* and other *superior qualities* and are the *natural guides* and leaders of the society. "The rest of the people are naturally disposed to accept their lead."[4]

At times strong people with perverted dispositions introduce forms of custom of mischievous nature.[5] On account of their innate tendencies contrary to those of the

1. Huj-I, p. 49, *ll.* 12, 18. Note the terms *Ḥāfiẓat al-Irtifāqāt and Muhaimin.* Budur, p. 88, *l.* 7.
2. Budur, p. 60, *ll.* 14-19; p. 62, *ll.* 4-19. Also *see* Principle of the Conduct of Domestic Life in chap. VII.
3. Huj-I, p. 50, *ll.* 1-5.
4. Budur, p. 87, *ll.* 12-13. Huj-I, p. 38, *ll.* 18-20.
5. Huj-I, p. 50, *l.* 2.

righteous traditions such forms of custom ultimately prove injurious to the welfare of the society and are therefore called by Walīullāh *al-Rusūm al-Fāsidaa* or *al-Rusum al-Bāṭila, i.e.* corrupting or false customs.[1] It will be useful to mention salient features of the righteous custom or tradition, so as to distinguish it from the types of tradition that are contrary to it.

Righteous Tradition (Sunnat al-Rashida or Sunnat al-Saliha)

The righteous tradition is that in which the *threefold* purpose of custom is realised as has already been described. It constitutes one of the modes of performance of the *progressive social institution* and of the *preservation* of human *natural* behaviour in accordance with the innate tendencies of the virtuous disposition allowing *full scope* to the development of each *virtuous* faculty innate in the disposition of the individual.[2] Any tradition or custom, that falls short of that standard, is not righteous tradition to the extent it falls short of that standard.

Corrupting Tradition or Destructive Custom (Sunnat al-Fasida)

Every righteous custom has *good* and reformative and progressive effects on the disposition of individuals and on

1. Budur, p. 88, *ll.* 14, 15. Also he calls the mischievous custom *al-Rasm al-Ṭāliḥ* as contrary to *al-Rasm al-Ṣāliḥ*.
2. Budur, p. 88, *ll.* 8-9; p. 91, *l.* 1. *See* Criteria of Ethical Conduct, chap. V.

the society.[1] But this is the characteristic of only that sort of righteous custom which is practised by the right kind of people, at the right time and situation. The same customs may prove harmful and destructive if they are practised out of place and not on proper occasion. Thus misplaced or out-of-date customs fall under the category of those customs which have become harmful incidentally and eventually (*Sharr bil-'Araḍ*) though they were beneficial originally.[2]

To the same category of harmful customs belongs the practice of extremism or exaggeration in certain righteous customs to such an extent that the lack of moderation and undue attachment to them lead to the neglect of some other important customs or duties, and thus the righteous custom becomes harmful in its effects.[3] For example, the observance of certain modes and patterns of behaviour or customs of earning livelihood is essential and righteous, but, going to extremes in earning a livelihood (*Ta'ammuq wal-Inhimāk fil-Ma'āsh*), and to get so engrossed in it that one's legitimate attention is diverted from intellectual advancement and spiritual welfare altogether, is harmful. Such a society

1. Budur, p. 88, *l.* 7.
2. Budur, p. 88, *ll.* 8-13. Also *see* Additional Note no. 4.
3. Budur, p. 88, *ll.* 18-19.

of individuals, amongst whom spiritual values are lost, will ultimately come to destruction.[1]

In the same way the adoption of the opposite extremes also would bring ruin to the society, which happens if people disregard their work and earning livelihood, either on account of their plunging into sports and other entertainments like drinking, musical parties, etc., to the extent that their work suffers extremely or on the other hand, on account of their excessive engrossment in spiritual practices, they renounce the world.[2]

Absolute Corrupting Custom

This kind of custom is contrary to the righteous tradition or custom, as has already been said. In contrast to the righteous tradition or custom the absolute corrupting custom satisfies the *unnatural* tendencies of *perverted disposition* and embodies modes and forms of satisfaction of its *perverted impulses* or *vices*. Hence such customs have a direct dangerous and harmful effect upon the disposition of individual members and upon the welfare and unity of society.[3]

These customs are brought into existence by people of perverted dispositions with a dominant *animal* aspect

1. Budur, p. 88, *ll.* 16-17.
2. Huj-I, p. 49, *ll.* 24-25; p. 53, *ll.* 4, 8-9.
3. Budur, p. 88, *ll.* 14-15.

whose *angelic* aspect is *subdued* by their *individual* motives, *without* any regard for *higher ends* or *universal purpose* such as the welfare of the society, etc. Their traditions or customs consist of (*a*) patterns of *A'māl Saba'īyya* (Brutish activities) *e.g.* plundering, robbing, killing, etc., (*b*) *A'māl Shahwīyya* (Illicit forms of satisfaction of sexual passion and other biological needs) *e.g.*, adultery, sodomy, adoption of women's ways by men and vice versa, gluttony, etc., or of (*c*) *Aksāb Dārra* (Transactions that are detrimental to the welfare of the society) *e.g.*, cheating and deceit in exchange of goods and materials, usury, etc.[1]

Such harmful activities, if allowed to continue for some time, do, in the course of time, actually take the form of outstanding customs or traditions adopted by the people, especially, if perverted people are left to have the upper hand in the society while they are also supported and imitated by people of *weak dispositions* which are susceptible to both, good and bad influences alike.[2]

The Best Custom

In view of the previous discussion about custom and of what Walīullāh says about it in Budur,[3] the best forms of *good* conduct or *best* tradition are those that are

1. Huj-I, p. 49, *ll.* 22-23; p. 80, *ll.* 10-11.
2. Huj-I, p. 50, *ll.* 3-5.
3. Budur, p. 88, *ll.* 18-19; p. 80, *ll.* 1-2.

(*i*) conducive to the *improvement* of the *innate virtuous* faculties of individuals and to the advancement of the various forms of their social aspects. They should be (*ii*) wide and not narrow in their application. They should (*iii*) not be rigid so that slightest disregard in practice of a minute detail, even for a better purpose, may lead to unbearable public disapproval and cause great harm to the individual who takes such a liberty. They should embody a way of living with *moderation*, a standard that is just midway between the extremes of the elegance, and felicity of a comfortable living, and the coarseness and hardship of a life of austerity.[1]

Diversity of Forms of Customs

The righteous tradition remains suitable and useful custom (*al-Rasm al-Ṣāliḥ*) so long as it serves its purpose described above. But sometimes, owing to the change

1. Budur, p. 83, *ll.* 17-18; p. 89, *ll.* 1-2. Huj-II, p. 126, *ll.* 8-9. According to Walīullāh, in the days of the Prophet, the *Quraish* were the civilized people in Ḥijāz. Their standard of living was much higher than that of the sluggish and austere way of life of the desert people. The standard was a *moderate* one, which is essential for the general welfare, physical comfort, intellectual advancement and progress of society. It had none of the vices of the elegant and pompous way of life of the Persians and Romans in those days, whose standard of living was too much high and extravagant, which ultimately led to the economic ruin of the common people and of their countries. Hence the customs of the Quraish were *'Ādāt al-Mutawassiṭa* (moderate standards), and they were midway between the standards of the Bedouin way of life and that of the Persian Aristocracy.

in circumstances and other factors, it ceases to serve its original purpose or interferes with the welfare of individuals or of society as a whole. The same tradition, then, becomes a mischievous or harmful custom (*al-Rasm al-Ṭāliḥ*). This necessitates a reform and change in such a tradition.

That is why diversity of forms of the same tradition appears in the history of one society as a result of the change of factors and circumstances which form the basis of the tradition.[1] The same rule applies to the case of diversity of forms of traditions in different societies living at one and the same time, because the societies living in different parts of the world in different circumstances and conditions may not be able to adopt one and the same form of a tradition.[2]

As a matter of fact, the whole humanity (*al-Insān al-Kabīr*) has the same kind of needs. But those needs have different forms of satisfaction in different societies on account of their different living conditions, circumstances and stages of evolution. Hence it is generally the case that one and the same purpose is fulfilled by *different* forms of righteous traditions of different societies.[3]

1. Taf-II, p. 217. Huj-I, p. 89, *l.* 7.
2. Budur, p. 51, *l.* 18.
3. Budur, p. 94, *ll.* 5-6. Huj-I, p. 48, *ll.* 18-21; p. 49, *ll.* 5-7.

This also accounts for the fact that people of different regions on earth have their own peculiar traditional forms of speech, clothing, celebrations of events, etc. Thus the peculiar traditions of different states and even of families constituting one and the same state, come into being.[1]

Factors that Contribute to Diversity of Traditions and Customs

From Walīullāh's account, it is clear that the following factors contribute to varieties of customs and diversity of traditions.

(*i*) *Age and Time*. Every age has its own spirit and conditions that are products of the whole previous history of the people. Walīullāh compares the history of humanity as a whole and its societies with that of one individual human being. As the individual passes through various stages of life (*e.g.*, childhood, youth, old age), being governed in each stage by different *rules* of conduct, in the same way the rules governing various societies *change* with the *change of times*. "Indeed the forms of useful customs vary with times and with the general behaviour of people."[2]

(*ii*) *Peculiar geographical position*. This also influences the habits and customs of people, as we know that climate

1. Budur, p. 88, *l*. 4.
2. Huj-I, p. 89, *ll*. 7-10; p. 24, *ll*. 1-6; p. 25, *ll*. 7-12.

and other conditions of a country mould the mode of living of people and their general behaviour and customs accordingly.[1]

In addition to these, (*iii*) the *Peculiarities of nation, tribe and family* contribute to the diversity of customs and traditions as has already been said.

To the above factors may be added a very important factor which has a dynamic force in moulding the forms and modes of customs of people, *viz*., (*iv*) *ideology of the people and their beliefs*. The main ideologies of people have changed from time to time, and their general customs and manners have also changed accordingly. The effect of ideology upon the customs and manners of people is illustrated with the examples from different religions or religious institutions, *e.g.*, *Millat al-Najjāmiyyīn* (The Institutions of the Star-worshippers) whose whole system of life was moulded in accordance with the idea and belief that stars influence human life on earth. In the same way ideology and beliefs of *Millat al-Ṣābiyyīn* (the Institutions of Magians) about the peculiarities of the Intelligences (*'Uqūl*) and their influence on life were the basis of their peculiar mode of way of living, and likewise, those who are believers in Monotheism (*Tauḥīd*) and are the people of purity (*Ikhlāṣ*), beautific vision and

1. Budur, p. 88, *l*. 4. *Iqlīm*. Also *see* "Dress" in chap. VI, on Principles of Conduct of Personal Life.

transcendence (*Iḥsān*) in their approach to God, mould their mode of life in accordance with their own ideologies and beliefs in which selflessness and love of God is predominant.[1]

No Human Society can be without Customs, Social Institutions or a Customary Code Governing their Way of Living

This proposition is based on Walīullāh's assertion that *human society necessarily evolves its own code and social institutions according to its needs, circumstances and other general factors*, the particulars and the details of the forms of their behaviour constituting their social institutions, etc., are evolved by human society, *consciously* being aided at times, by higher *intuition* or *revelation* of Prophets. Whereas animals and birds find their way to their modes of living *instinctively*.[2]

A proof of the fact that humanity *is guided* even in the details of forms of institution. and that the source of their guidance, also, lies in their innate specific dispositions can be found, according to Walīullāh, in the

1. Budur, p. 89, *ll.* 10-13; pp. 87-88.
2. Huj-I, p. 24, *ll.* 9-11, Budur, p. 132. *ll.* 7-12. It should be noted that according to Walīullāh's doctrines of monism (*Waḥdat al-Wujūd*) and determinism (*Qadr*), the evolution of the social forms and customs, when viewed in relation to the human society as an aggregate of whole of humanity, appears to be involuntary and spontaneous process, whereas the same, when viewed in parts, appears to be a product of conscious will and efforts on the part of individual human beings. Budur, p. 132, *ll.* 10-11.

fact that no human community, without exception, has ever failed to develop social institutions that are supported by public approval.[1]

This is not the case with civilised people only. Even the most primitive people, living on mountains or in deserts, without adopting fixed forms of advanced or developed modes of institutions, do observe some forms of customs handed down to them by their ancestors and do have certain forms of basic institutions. and some qualities of virtuous character displayed in their behaviour, though lacking in the perfection and the soundness, which are the characteristics of customs and institutions of the civilised societies.[2]

The demand for the social institutions and the urge for formation and development of society are innate qualities in the human disposition. They are present in all human beings alike, whether civilised or primitive.

Upon this basis, Walīullāh asserts that a human male individual, if left alone to himself in a desert, far away from civilisation, comes into contact with a female, they will essentially produce a family out of sheer need for the fulfilment of the urges of their innate dispositions. This family eventually is bound to evolve into

1. Huj-I, p. 48, *ll.* 18-20; p. 49, *ll.* 5-7.
2. Būdur, p. 94, *ll.* 13-15.

a full-fledged society, according to the principles upon which the whole humanity has evolved.[1]

Who Disregards Custom

Custom and tradition, however important, are disregarded by people of only two categories.

CATEGORY I. Those who have corrupt dispositions and are of perverted minds. They would naturally act wantonly for the satisfaction of their perverted impulses if they are not checked or trained to behave in an orderly manner. Even these people are well aware in their minds that the breaking of social customs is harmful and brings injury to the members of society. To the same category belong the sceptic and ignorant people who pretend to deny the usefulness of customs. These persons may deny and repudiate customs. Their repudiation can only be verbal, because, inspite of repudiating custom with their tongue, they, would, still, have to observe some form of custom and social code essential for their welfare. "Their repudiation of it would be like that of a person who denies the existence of the faculties of sight, hearing and perception, in spite of the fact that he possesses them and exhibits the characteristics manifesting their use."[2]

CATEGORY II. The people of *real wisdom* and *leadership* who are *sound* in intelligence and angelic aspect.

1. Huj-I, p. 49, *ll.* 7-11. Budur, p. 94, *ll.* 9-12.
2. Budur, p. 89, *ll.* 2-3; p. 95, *ll.* 16-19. Huj-I, p. 49, *ll.* 1-5.

Such people disregard an established social custom (*al-Rasm al-Ma'āshi*) for the sake of another custom which according to their reason, is better and more suitable and far more becoming than the custom which is already in vogue. The worth and beauty of such new customs is eventually realised by people who will adopt them sooner or later.[1] The act of disregard of the custom, by the people of wisdom and virtues, is for the betterment of society, whereas, that of the pervert, the ignorant and the sceptic results in harm and disruption to society.

The Need for Discipline and Training

The majority of human beings are of *weak* and *slumbering dispositions*, as has been described in the Chapter I. Their innate faculties are not strong enough to resist the impulses of their lower or animal aspect. Hence, it is essential that they should be well disciplined and prevented from indulging in behaviour that endangers the welfare and unity of the society.

Moreover, such people, having no strong predilections and proclivities of their own, tend to adopt those forms of behaviour and customs or patterns that attract them and give them satisfaction. Hence, if people of perverted dispositions are in a dominant position, they

1. Budur, p. 89, *ll.* 3, 5-6.

introduce corrupting customs or traditions, in accordance with their own perverted motives, with the result that the common people, who are with slumbering dispositions and lack the power of discrimination or self-control, are drawn to adopt these customs, to the ultimate ruin of themselves and society. It is, therefore, essential that the heads of government should suppress the activities of people of perverted dispositions and see that no *al-Rasm al-Ṭāliḥ* takes the place of *al-Rasm al-Ṣāliḥ* and train the common people accordingly.

CHAPTER V

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ETHICAL CONDUCT

Introduction

Happiness '*Sa'āda*', according to Walīullāh, is the state of those dispositions of human beings which, in the course of their development along the lines of natural development of the specific human nature, are able to *evolve* and progress *without* any of the *hindrances* due to suppression, distortion or perversion caused by external or physical or inner or psychical factors.[1]

That *conduct*, which is *appropriate* and *conducive* to human happiness, may be called *ethical conduct*, and that which is conducive to unhappiness and misery may be called unethical conduct. But *human happiness* does not denote only physical comfort, psychological and intellectual satisfaction and social welfare, to which only a small part of Walīullāh's ethics is related, but also the attainment of a high level in the higher spiritual potentialities (*Laṭāif*) and capacities of beatitude (*Iḥsān*), and their development and perfection.[2] The ethics of Walīullāh have, therefore, much a wider range than that which ethics, in the ordinary sense of the word, connote.

1. *See* "Happiness' in chap. I.
2. *See* the Four Superior Virtues in Additional Note no. 5, chap. I. Also chapters on *Iḥsān* in Ḥujjat, Vol. 2, *Izālat al-Khafa*, Vol. 2, *Hama'āt*, *Alṭāf al-Quds*, etc.

Before outlining the ethical system of Walīullāh, it is necessary to have some notion of the general principles, which are not only the bases of his ethics, but are also the permanent background of his ideas. Without this background it would not be possible to comprehend properly the details of his system of thought.

The first and foremost idea that he stresses and never loses sight of is that *Humanity is one organic whole* which he calls *al-Insān al-Kabīr* (The Great Man).[1] If he were to stop here, one might think that he is giving us a system of ethics that may be called humanitarian, or universalist ethics in the ordinary sense, which is the outcome of the consciousness of being one with humanity. As it is, he makes this organic whole an integral part of a much larger unity, which, in our phrase, we may call the Universe, and which he calls *al-Shakhṣ al-Akbar* (The Greatest Person). By this he means not only the physical universe as such, but all universes, the seen and the unseen.[2] This would give us some idea of the extension of his system which does not stop at providing rules of conduct only for good citizenship, but has ends far beyond it. According to his system the end of Appropriate Conduct is not only

1. Sat. p. 31, *l.* 10. Budur, p. 48, *l.* 17. The individual human being is called by him *al-Shakhṣ al-Ṣaghīr*. Budur, p. 132, *ll.* 8-9.
2. Sat. p. 3, *ll.* 4, 17-19.

that the individual should fit in with his Society and that he and his Society should fit in with humanity as a whole or with the manifold other societies of human beings that constitute the bulk of humanity, as good and useful parts,[1] but also that the individual should attain such a universality (*i.e.* by transforming the individuality or animal aspect) that he could fit in even in the ranks of higher universes, with what he calls *Mala al-A'lā*, (the Assembly of Higher Beings) that mould the destinies of humanity.[2]

Secondly, the reader must keep in view that Walīullāh is conscious, at all times, of the fact of the *continuous evolution of all the universes*,[3] and, therefore, of existences of manifold stages and variations through which everything passes in the *cycle* of its process[4] and that Universal Law applies to ethics as much as to any

1. Budur, p. 48, *l.* 17. Huj-II, p. 170, *ll.* 22-23.
2. Sat, p. 25, *l.* 17; p. 26, *ll.* 12, 15-16; p. 32, Saṭ'a no. 4. For *Mala al-'Alā see* Huj-I, p. 16, *ll.* 2-20.
3. The names of the Universes that are contained in the *Shakhṣ al-Akbar* are *'Ālam al-Arwāḥ*, *'Ālam al-Mithāl* and *'Ālam al-Shahāda* or *'Ālam al-Ajsām*, *i.e.*, the Universe of Spirits, the Universe of Forms and the Universe of Matter. The details of the Universes and of the *Shakhṣ al-Akbar* belong to Walīullāh's cosmology and metaphysics. *See* Saṭ'āt and Budur, Tafhīm, etc.
4. Change and evolution are the forms of *emanation* through which the Ultimate Reality manifests itself in the Universe of Matter. The details of these ideas form a part of Walīullāh's concept of emanation, *Tajallī*, which again forms a part of his concept of *Waḥdat al-Wujūd* or monism, and are beyond the scope of the present thesis. Sat, p. 8, Saṭ'a no. 10, pp. 27-29. Saṭ'a nos. 36-37. Also *see* Taf, Vols. 1-2, and al-Khair al-Kathīr.

other branch. The individual and his society, as well as humanity in the aggregate, and human institutions and customs evolve and develop through a particular order of progress.[1] Necessarily, therefore, Walīullāh's ethics deal not only with particular people in particular conditions or particular times, but also with humanity at every stage of its evolution.[2] According to his system, ethics are *relative*, in the sense that no *perfect* and *absolute* form can be determined for the whole of humanity at all stages and times,[3] and that one characteristic of ethical conduct is that, it preserves and protects the individual and the society from destruction and that ethical conduct is conducive to their survival and to the possibility of their further progress and development or evolution.[4]

Thirdly, ethical or appropriate conduct is identified by him with what he calls "*Fiṭra*" (*the nature*), adopted by human beings according to the demands of their *specific nature*.[5] Appropriate conduct satisfies the *natural needs* to the satisfaction of which human

1. *See* chapters III and IV.
2. *See* Human Society in the first stage of Social evolution, chap. III. Also Budur, p. 90. *ll.* 5-10.
3. Budur. p. 51, *ll.* 16-18; p. 50. *ll.* 4-5. Also *see* The diversity in the forms of social custom, chap. V. Taf-II, *l.* 1
4. *See* Righteous Custom in chap. IV. Also *see* Natural Needs below and chapters VI & VII.
5. Huj-I, p. 49, *ll.* 5-7. Huj-I, pp. 55-56.

beings with '*normal and sound dispositions*' are *spontaneously* and *naturally* drawn.[1] The range of his ethical system is *positive* in that negativity and resistance or curbing are temporarily allowed only in the case of those whose dispositions are subverted or are not rightly developed, (*e.g.*, weak, distorted, or perverted dispositions) or in the case of 'corrupt and harmful tradition or custom' which requires to be reformed or discarded and replaced by a 'Righteous' custom.[2]

The ideas of *happiness* and *satisfaction of natural needs* give the ethics of Walīullāh a resemblance to the ethics of utilitarianism and hedonistic philosophy, but the province of utilitarianism and hedonism is a very limited one in comparison with that of the ethics of Walīullāh, which, as has already been said, extend beyond the limits of the physical, psychical, and social phenomena.[3]

Walīullāh upholds the views of *Natural Conduct* and of Naturalism in the province of human life and in the phenomenal world and noumenal universes respectively.[4] In order to avoid misconception, it should be understood

1. Huj-I, p. 51, *ll.* 19-20.
2. *See* the Additional Note no. 8 on Pathology of dispositions, chapter I, and also *see* forms of custom in chapter IV.
3. *See* the "Nature of the Needs" that are satisfied by ethical conduct.
4. This idea is clear from the study of his metaphysics and the *process of the becoming* of things in various stages of the universe.

that he does not deny nor is he agnostic about the existence of God, the *Ultimate Reality*, and that of *Supernatural Universes* higher in reality and being than the psychical and the physical phenomena of mind and matter.[1]

He is a *determinist* and a positive *monist*, holding views similar to those who are believers in theistic emanation, according to which the Whole of the Universe (*al-Shakhs al-Akbar*) is a manifestation of series of emanations of the Ultimate and the only Reality.[2] The whole of the Universe (*al-Shakhṣ al-Akbar*) as such, is governed by a *Universal Scheme*, (*al-Maṣlaḥat al-Kulliyya*) or the *Universal law*, pre-determined by God's eternal will and knowledge.[3] Each of the smaller universes is governed by a particular law peculiar to that Universe,[4] which law, in its turn, is a part of the Universal Law. So the Phenomenal World is governed by particular laws which also form the part of the Universal scheme to which the laws of human conduct, freedom of will, law of evolution, law of progress and development of human societies, including the mission of prophets and other agencies that contribute towards it, etc., are no

1. Budur, p. 13, *ll.* 15-19; pp. 10-12. Taf-II, p. 79; p. 81.
2. Sat, p. 6. Saṭ'a nos. 8-9.
3. Huj-I, pp. 12-13; pp. 17-18.
4. Budur, p. 20, *ll.* 2-3. Note the nature of things in the Universe of Forms (*'Ālam al-Mithāl'*) Huj-I, p. 13.

exception.[1] That every process in the Universe is pre-determined by God is a fact that becomes manifest when the whole of the Universe, the seen and the unseen (*i.e.*, whole of *Shakhs al-Akbar*) is viewed wholly and together, though if the physical universe is viewed separately and apart from other universes, the laws working in it appear to be independent and *automatic*, as they are conceived to be according to materialistic philosophy.[2] The views of Waliullāh, regarding the actual process of the natural conduct of humanity and ethical conduct of human beings as it is manifest in the phenomenal world, are, therefore, not in their purport greatly different from those of ethics of naturalism, humanitarianism, evolutionism, and utilitarianism, though, of course, his views differ vastly from those of these several philosophies, in the scope of ethics and in their metaphysical and supernatural background.

After thus introducing the background and broad outline of the nature of his ethics, it is proposed to give an outline of certain salient features of principles of Ethical Conduct. Most of these principles can easily be deduced by the reader from the introductory discussion and from the previous chapters.

1. Sat, pp. 10-16. Saṭ'a nos. 14-21.
2. *See* Determinism in Part II on Practical Theology. Also Huj-I, p. 67, *ll.* 16-24; p. 68, *ll.* 11-13.

Principles of Ethical Conduct

The principles of the ethics according to Walīullāh are universal principles upon which the ethical conduct of all nations in the world, or that of humanity in the aggregate (*al-Insān al-Kabir*). could be estimated.[1] These universal principles are realized through particular forms of conduct, as some sort of form or mode of conduct is essential for human beings, in the course of their life on the planet Earth, which forms or modes of conduct constitute "Righteous Customs" if they are appropriate and are in conformity with the universal principles.[2]

Ethical Code

The code of ethics of a society consists of forms of the "Righteous Custom" which govern the conduct of the life of its people.[3] In the last chapter we have acquainted ourselves with the fact that forms of the "Righteous Custom" vary from people to people, and undergo changes even in the course of the history of one and the same society. On the basis of these ideas one could assert that corresponding variations exist in the ethical code of diverse people, giving rise not only to different ethical codes of different societies, but also to

1. Budur, p. 180, *ll.* 5-18. Huj-I, p. 89, *ll.* 2-3. *See* Additional Note no. 2.
2. Budur, p. 184, *ll.* 3-4. Huj-I, p. 89, *ll.* 19-20; p. 90, *ll.* 17-18; p. 129, *l.* 3.
3. *See* Additional Note no. 2.

different ethical codes of the same society observed by its members during the different stages of its history. These are the views of Walīullāh regarding the code of ethics, which could explicitly or implicitly be traced in various contexts in his works.[1] The ideas of evolution and the conduct of humanity in the aggregate (*al-Insān al-Kabir*) are in the background of these views. We, therefore, find Walīullāh not only asserting the idea of the possibility and existence of *several ethical codes* being practised *simultaneously* by different nations in the world; but also supporting the idea of *evolution* and *development* of ethical code in conformity with the evolution and advancement of society.[2]

Satisfaction of Needs and Attainment of Ends

However, constituted by different forms or patterns of conduct, the various codes of ethics have, according to Walīullāh, what we may call certain 'bases' (*Arkān*)[3] that are common to them all, according to which, patterns of conduct are adapted and codes of conduct are evolved.

The 'bases' are certain needs (*Ḥājāt*) of the individual and of the society for their survival and further development.[4] The needs for survival evolve and

1. *See* Huj-I, p. 132, *ll.* 15-26; p. 89, *ll.* 2-3, 7. Taf-II, p. 217, *l.* 4.
2. *See* Additional Note no. 3.
3. *See* Additional Note no. 4.
4. Budur, p. 49, *l.* 16; p. 50, *ll.* 1, 3, 17, p. 51, *l.* 5.

develop with the evolution of Society. To every stage of development there is a set of needs peculiar to the stage upon the *satisfaction* of which the survival of the society and that of its members depends. In the primitive stage, a society has particular needs essential for its survival at that stage; whereas, a society in an advanced stage experiences manifold different needs conforming to its stage of advancement and upon the satisfaction of which its survival in that stage depends. It is clear from Walīullāh's line of thought that every society, though it may experience different kinds of needs in different evolutionary stages, has similar needs to those that are experienced by other societies in the same stage of their social evolution and development.[1] These needs serve as the common bases for the conduct of societies at the same level of advancement. The patterns of conduct are adapted to the common bases in order to realise the end, the satisfaction of the needs (*Ḥājāt*)[2] being the end to be realised.

Before discussing the nature of the needs that constitute the common bases of conduct of societies at various levels of development, it is worthwhile to point out, that it is upon the *satisfaction* of those needs that the maintenance of the level of advancement attained by

1. *See* the stages of social evolution. Also Huj-I, p. 49, *ll.* 8-10. Budur, p. 49.
2. Budur, p. 52, *ll.* 3-8. *See* 'Needs' chap. III.

society as well as its progress and further development depend.[1] The satisfaction of these needs is realised through the particular course of conduct constituted by particular *forms* and *patterns*. But those particular forms and patterns and that particular conduct *need not be the only means* to realise the same end. The same end and the same common bases could be realized through the media of several *equivalent* forms and modes or patterns of conduct, each of which could independently be a means towards the same end.[2] This brings us to Walīullāh's view, according to which, the *forms* and *patterns, by themselves, have no importance* in the conduct of human society; it is the *end or attainment* of the end to which the conduct must lead *that is important*.[3] The importance of these forms or patterns lies only in their being an effective means towards the attainment of their ends. Any form or pattern of conduct that does not serve that purpose is redundant and worthless.[4]

The Nature of the Needs and their Categories

From a general examination of the arguments stated by Walīullāh, his views regarding the nature of the needs,

1. Budur, p. 90, *ll.* 1-10. Huj-I, p. 122, *l.* 16. Also *see Fiṭra* in the beginning of this chapter.
2. Budur, p. 180, *ll.* 16-18.
3. Huj-I, p. 122, *ll.* 16-17; p. 92, *ll.* 5, 9; p. 93, *l.* 5; p. 187, *l.* 16.
4. Huj-I, p. 92, *ll.* 5, 9; p. 93, *l.* 5.

the satisfaction of which forms the basis of the conduct of societies at various stages of development, may be summed up as follows.

The needs forming the bases of conduct, evolve and develop with the evolution of the society. In the beginning, human needs are *simple* but with the advancement and development of society they become complex and multiple; though the complexity and multiplicity arise out of the development of the original simple needs.[1]

The survival of the individual and of the society to which he belongs, and the preservation of the both, against destruction, and their progress for further development and advancement, in short, the general welfare of the society and its members, depends upon the realisation of those needs which are secured through the medium of appropriate conduct. The end of the satisfaction of those needs, therefore, seems to be the survival or the preservation and progress of the individual and of the society and the welfare of both; and the same may be of an ulterior end of the conduct of the individual and society.[2] In this sense, ethics of Walīullāh are utilitarian.

1. Huj-I, p. 39, *ll.* 7, 10, 18-19. Budur, p. 59, *ll.* 16-17; p. 51, *ll.* 9-14.
2. *See* natural needs above. Also Budur, p. 90. *ll.* 2, 9; p. 61, *l.* 1. And also Huj-II.

In the primitive stage, *physical survival* and the *preservation of physical existence* seem to be the immediate ends of the conduct of *Primitive Man*.[1] But with the advancement of society the importance of the social and cultural aspects of human life is also gradually realised and the survival and preservation of social and cultural aspects is considered as important as physical survival.[2]

The conduct in advanced societies, therefore, aims at the *complex end* of the *survival* and *preservation* of the *physical*, *social* and *cultural* aspects all together, though with varying degrees of emphasis in accordance with their general conditions and circumstances in different stages of the history of their civilised life.[3] The process of realisation of this complex end gives rise to a multiplicity of *intermediate* and complex *proximate ends* embodied in the forms of satisfaction of various sets of needs essential to each of the *Four Departments*[4] as will be seen later on.

To give a brief idea of the nature of the *intermediate complex needs* it may be stated that for his preservation and survival on an advanced level the conduct of the personal life of the individual has to satisfy needs that come under the categories of what we may call *physical*

1. Budur, p. 51, *l.* 14.
2. Budur, p. 50. *ll.* 1-4.
3. Huj-I, p. 39. *ll.* 9-10.
4. *See* Society in the Second Stage of Social Evolution, chap. III.

needs, *biological needs* and *psychological needs*. The psychological needs of the individual may be conceived to include the needs of his mind, or his disposition, to maintain and advance the 'virtues' or virtuous faculties in him, which faculties may be said to constitute the *cultural aspect* of the individual.[1] For the survival and preservation of society (from the physical and psychical existences of which the individual cannot be separated), there are categories of *social* and *political needs*. The *social needs* may include the *needs* of *the domestic life* and the need of establishing a high standard of living which brings into being the *economic needs*. The preservation of the higher standard of living realised through satisfaction of the social and economic needs gives rise to the category of *political needs* which have to be satisfied in order to attain the ultimate end of the survival and welfare of society and its members on a high level of advancement.[2]

Spiritual Needs

To this list of needs may be added the categories of needs the satisfaction of which is essential for the *awakening*, survival and *development* of *higher* or *superior virtues* or *faculties*, that is to say the *higher spiritual aspect* of human life *(al-Laṭāif al-Bāriza wal-Kāmina)*.[3] An account of the

1. *See* the contents in chapter VI.
2. *See* the contents in chapter VII-VIII.
3. *See* Superior Qualities in Additional Note no. 5, chap. I.

conduct required for the realisation of these is beyond the scope of the present thesis and comes under the heading of the *Higher Ethics* which need to be examined in a separate study.

Ethical Conduct

After a description of the common basis and of the nature of the needs that form the common bases of conduct in various stages of development of society, it would be convenient to give some definitions of Ethical Conduct.

Ethical Conduct signifies that conduct which is characterised by Walīullāh as *Righteous and Appropriate* (*Hudan Ṣāliḥun*) and which, as it appears from the study of his account of such conduct, affords an appropriate means of satisfying the needs that constitute the common 'bases', the satisfaction of which is essential for maintaining the level of society in the stages of civilisation or social evolution and the standards that it has attained.[1] It can, therefore, *conversely* be said that any *conduct* that *fails* to *satisfy* these needs *appropriately*, and falls short of maintaining the standard and high level of society may be considered as *inappropriate* and *unethical*.

In other words, what we may call *Ethical Conduct* is *that conduct which*, in the view of Walīullāh, *provides*

1. Budur, p. 52, *ll.* 14-18. Huj-I, p. 106, *l.* 15.

an effective means to the survival, preservation and welfare of society and its members, and is conducive to the progressive life that the human being is destined to attain. Any conduct that falls short of being of an efficient means to that end should be considered unethical to the extent of its deficiency. As it satisfies the needs that, as we know, are *natural needs* of human disposition and to the satisfaction of which human beings are, so to speak, naturally drawn, in a manner consonant with its natural and determined superior end, ethical conduct may be called *natural conduct* from that point of view.[1] The term *unethical conduct* from the same point of view signifies *unnatural conduct* or conduct that is not in conformity with the tendencies and needs of the human disposition or human *specific nature.*[2] The idea of natural conduct is found in numerous contexts in Walīullāh's works.

The forms and patterns that constitute ethical conduct tend to crystallize 'Righteous Custom'. Walīullāh's views regarding the nature of 'Righteous Custom', how it develops and what factors contribute to its development, are known to us from discussion on Custom in the last chapter. However, it may be reiterated

1. Huj-I, p. 49, *ll.* 5-6.

2. *See* additional note no. 5.

here, that forms of 'Righteous Custom' or so to speak *patterns of ethical* conduct are the *product* of continuous past experience of *trial and error*, of ideas and ideologies, urges and tendencies developed with the development of society, of the pursuit of a *high standard* of living and better economic conditions, and of the 'specific human disposition', its intellect, its 'universality of purpose', its 'aesthetic quality', its 'seven virtues', etc. Even such forms of righteous custom or patterns of ethical conduct, in the course of time, *outlive* their utility and a new dispensation or renovation or reform, then becomes necessary.[1]

Criteria of Ethical Conduct

From the general account of ethical conduct, one may deduce the criterion or the criteria by which ethical conduct may be judged. For the sake of convenience of recognising ethical conduct easily, it may be pointed out that Walīullāh has certain other additional criteria as well, which are easier to understand and more comprehensible to the common mind than the abstract criteria that could be deduced from the discussion given so far.

One of these criteria relates to the realisation of the end of ethical conduct which we know to be the *survival and welfare* of the individual and his society. But this

1. Huj-I, p. 49, *ll.* 5-7. Also *see* Custom, chap. IV.

end is secured, in actual life, through intermediate or proximate ends which are tangible and easily comprehensible to the common mind. The realisation of these ends could therefore be intelligible criteria of ethical conduct, by which the nature of conduct could ordinarily be judged.

A given pattern of conduct is ethical, according to Walīullāh, if through its medium, are secured the following ends, out of which, the *fulfilment* of each end may be considered a criterion: (*i*) fulfilment of outstanding physical and biological needs, (*ii*) satisfaction of psychological needs resulting in the development of the individual's personality by strengthening his virtuous qualities, like magnanimity, dignity, self-reliance, integrity, etc., (*iii*) promotion of amity and goodwill amongst the members of society, and (*iv*) decreasing of chances of illwill and discontent and other causes of damage or disruption to such a structure of the domestic household, social system and state government as is conducive to the welfare of society, (*v*) realisation of the purpose of well thought out plans for the general welfare of domestic, economic, civic and political conduct on the standard of *moderation*, and (*vi*) the safeguarding of the individual and the society against imminent dangers to their physical existence and to their general welfare.[1]

1. Budur, p. 52, *ll*. 14-16. Also *see* these points in chapters, VI—VIII.

Another criterion of ethical conduct, according to Walīullāh, is even the *behaviour* of people with *sound, healthy and normal dispositions*, (*al-Ṭabī'at al-Sālīma*).[1] Such people, according to Walīullāh, *spontaneuosly* adopt righteous or ethical conduct in the course of their general behaviour in society. *Sound* and *healthy taste* (*al-Dhauq al-Salīm*) is another criterion. Virtuous conduct and Righteous Customs are cherished and bad custom and vicious conduct are unpalatable to those who are possessors of healthy taste.[2] The *consensus* of *mankind* upon a particular form of conduct is also a criterion for its being a pattern of ethical conduct.[3] These are some of the important immediate criteria upon which Walīullāh bases the *testimony* of ethical conduct.

There are three more characteristics of ethical conduct which could serve as criteria for distinguishing ethical from that which is unethical. These characteristics consist in its being conducive to (*i*) *moderation* (*ii*) a *high standard of living* and (*iii*) *progress* respectively.[4] The conduct that is not conducive to these three factors, being detrimental

1. Budur, p. 52. *ll*. 10-11; p. 91. *ll*. 6-7. Huj-I, p. 51. *ll*. 19, 21.
2. Huj-I, p. 56. *ll*. 6;. p. 81. *ll*. 18-19; p. 82. Last line. *Wijdān*. p. 83. *l*. 19. the importance of *al-Dhauq al-Salīm*. p. 86. *l*. 19. *See al-Dhauq al-Fāsid*. p. 173. *l*. 24.
3. Huj-I, p. 45. *ll*. 2-3; p. 49. *ll*. 5-6; p. 51. *ll*. 24. *See* Additional Note no. 1.
4. Budur, p. 55. *ll*. 10. 17-18; p. 66. *ll*. 5-8; p. 89. *l*. 1; p. 53. *ll*. 6-8; p. 91. *l*. 1.

to the welfare of society and its members, is, according to Walīullāh, inappropriate and unethical.

In the end, it may be emphasised that outstanding *criterion* of ethical conduct of *social life* is that it should conform to the important end of creating *amity* and amiable relations and *unity* between the members of society. As is generally the case, those amiable relations are created on practical grounds that induce the minds of common people to have amiable relations with others and keep in with them in the fold of unity. Those practical grounds consist of mutual assistance and co-operation in satisfying the needs of each other. The feelings of love, affection and goodwill, that lie at the root of the relation of amity existing among members of a society, are usually mixed with self interest, and motives of ends of mutual benefit.[1]

Four Departments of Conduct

After introducing the principles that govern ethical conduct in general, it is proposed to give *outline* of principles of ethical conduct concerning each of the *Four Departments of Life*, namely, the Department of the Conduct of Personal Life, the Department of Conduct of Domestic Life, the Department of Conduct of Economic Life, and the Department of Conduct of Political Life.

1. Budur, p. 52, *l.* 19; p. 65, *ll.* 13-15. Huj-II, p. 124. Also Additional Note no. 6.

CHAPTER VI

PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT OF PERSONAL LIFE

The branch of ethics dealing with department of the conduct of personal life includes that conduct which the individual adopts in order to secure the satisfaction of the needs essential for his *personal survival, welfare and progress.*[1]

Need of the Individual

The primary needs of every individual are: the need for food, the need of protection and the need of mating and procreation. But as the individual rises in the scale of evolution, other needs develop, *viz.*, aesthetic, intellectual and spiritual needs which are deemed essential for his individual survival and welfare and which he has to satisfy without infringing or endangering the right of other individuals to secure the same needs for themselves.[2] The needs as conceived by Walīullāh could be classified in the following manner:

A. Needs for a person's physical survival.
   - (*i*) Food, Eating, Drinking.
   - (*ii*) Protection, Clothes (Dress), Dwelling Place.
   - (*iii*) Accessory needs—Cleanliness, Sleep, Help and Treatment in Illness.

1. *See* Categories of needs, and Ethical Conduct in chapter V.
2. Budur, p. 40, *ll.* 14-19, p. 50, *ll.* 1-5; p. 66, *ll.* 3-4.

B. Aesthetic needs of adornment and decoration.

C. Personal need of association with ones own kind and members of species or social intercourse, in other words the needs of:

(*i*) Moving amongst, Meeting and Treating other Fellow Human Beings.

(*ii*) Comradeship and Exchange of Ideas and Talking or Holding Conversation.

D. Need of Mating and Procreation or Conjugal Relationship.[1]

Ethical Conduct

Therefore, personal conduct, ethically considered, would consist in that conduct of the individual which efficiently satisfies the needs enumerated above, without retarding the satisfaction of his *higher needs*, that is, his intellectual, cultural and spiritual needs. In one place, Walīullāh expresses the same idea which could be rendered in the following manner:

Appropriate conduct or ethical conduct of a person "consists in that conduct which is highly efficient in satisfying his primary needs in conformity with the requirement of the 'seven virtues' (which include *Diyāna* and *al-Samt al-Ṣāliḥ i.e.* efficiency, homogeneity and propriety of manner, etc.) with due regard to 'the universality of

1. Budur, p. 55, *ll.* 5-7; p. 50, *l.* 4. Also see Huj-I,

purpose' and conformity with the ideas, experiences and attitudes acquired in the past history of society."[1]

Physical Needs

From the analysis of Walīullāh's discussions on the subject it becomes clear that the basis of personal conduct consists in the satisfaction of not only the *physical needs* (including *medical* and *hygienic needs*) but in the satisfaction of other needs as well, for which, for our convenience, the term *psychical needs* or *psychological* needs may be used.

Psychological Needs

These include the needs of the human being for his intellectual progress, cultural refinement and spiritual development, the needs of the aesthetic quality, the needs due to the urges of the innate virtue or the faculties of the 'Seven virtues', and the needs of the normal sentiments impulses and emotions and of cultural and spiritual tendencies. The *criterion* of the ethics of personal conduct is that their justification may be found on. both, physical and psychological grounds *simultaneously*.[2] If a pattern of conduct could be justified only on physical grounds, but not on both the grounds together, it is bound to be an inappropriate form of conduct and hence unethical.

1. Budur, p. 55, *ll.* 4-5.

2. Budur, p. 50, *l.* 4; Huj-I, 181, *l.* 14, Huj-I, pp. 81-82.

Economic Needs

To these needs should be added economic needs which, as it will be seen, aim at a high standard of living. The satisfaction of economic needs in relation to the members of human society is meant to satisfy, both, their physical needs by enabling them to create better economic conditions and their psychical needs by providing them with a scope for better mental and intellectual conditions by maintaining a *high standard* of living. Hence, the economic needs could be included in either of the two kinds of physical and psychological needs from their respective points of view. Here, it may be mentioned that the satisfaction of these needs is qualified by an additional consideration of *moderation* (*I'tidāl*) with due regard to the higher standard of living, not only physically but aesthetically, intellectually and spiritually.[1]

After this outline of general principles and criterion or criteria it will be worthwhile to point out the application of the principles to personal ethical conduct in the concrete.[2]

Food

Ethical conduct concerning the satisfaction of the need of food according to Walīullāh, first and

1. Budur p. 55, *l.* 12. Huj-I, p. 53, *ll.* 7-9. *See* Harmful Custom, chapter IV; also Huj-I, pp. 114, 110; Huj-II, p. 107, *l.* 21. Note *Iqtiṣād fil-'Amal*.
2. It should be noted that the following analysis is mainly based upon the chapters on *Irtifāqāt*, Huj-I and Budur, *Ma'isha*, Huj-II, pp. 178-204, on *Ṭahāra*; Huj-I, pp. 173-186.

foremost, includes the mode of securing a *right kind* of livelihood,[1] and then, not only the manners of eating and drinking, but also the choice of the material and quality of food and drink as well as the method of service and the material of the utensils in which they are served.

Excepting the choice of the material of the utensils and quality of food, the rest of the points enumerated above are related to ethical or appropriate forms of conduct justified on both physical as well as psychological grounds, whereas the ethical element in the choice of material of the utensils and quality of the food is based on the principle of *moderation* and economic *welfare* as well as the psychological principle according to which the use of utensils of silver and gold as well as extremely luxurious food is objectionable, owing to the vices of greed, vanity and vainglory.[2] The choice of the foodstuffs and drink also involves *medical grounds* based upon the fact that food and drink should be of a sort that are not only fit for human consumption but are wholesome, nourishing and agreeable to the normal physiological organism of the human body.[3] The same choice has *psychological grounds* also, based upon a due regard to the normal feelings and sentiments and

1. *See* chapters on *Ibtighā al-Rizq*. Huj-II, pp. 103-122.
2. Budur, p. 56, *ll.* 2, 13. Huj-I, p. 105, *ll.* 12-28. Huj-II, p. 191, *l.* 11; p. 192, *l.* 18.
3. Budur, p. 56, *l.* 12; p. 55, *ll.* 11-15.

aesthetic tastes of human beings which are averse to the use of unclean food, and consumption of the flesh of such animals as are carrion eaters and have dirty habits, are extremely vicious and have harmful and injurious tendencies towards human beings.[1]

The *manners of eating* and *drinking* have *hygienic* grounds that demand cleanliness of the hands, of the mouth, and of the place and utensils in which the food is served. They have some *physical grounds* demanding peaceful behaviour and a proper way of sitting. The *psychological grounds* demand good manners and qualities that are contrary to the exhibition of the vices of greed, wantonness, etc., and to behaviour that creates disgust, illwill or heart burning in the hearts of other members who are sharing the food or drink in one's company.[2]

Against the use of *intoxicating drinks*, Walīullāh's argument is based upon the grounds of *economic* welfare as well as upon those of psychological needs. As the use of intoxicants is likely to endanger health and form an additional economic burden to those who indulge

1. Huj-II, pp. 179-185. Here, Walīullāh shows that the flesh of at least five categories of animals, birds and insects (that includes lizards, scorpions, vultures, crows, donkeys, pigs, etc.) should not be used as food for human beings, both on medical and psychological grounds.
2. Budur, p. 56, *ll.* 9-17. Huj-I, p. 40, *ll.* 26-27, *ll.* 1-2.' Huj-II, p. 179, *ll.* 19-20; p. 185, p. 187, *l.* 2.

in them and to society, and since at the same time it affects their propriety of manner (*Samt*) and clarity of mind and intelligence (however temporarily), the use of intoxicants constitutes an inappropriate conduct on social, psychological and economic grounds in addition to its effect on health; hence it is unethical.[1]

Dress and Dwelling Place

The basis of *ethics of dress* and that of ethics of dwelling place, as conceived by Walīullāh, lies both, on the grounds of physical protection, as well as in aesthetic and psychological needs that formulate the attitude of the human mind in relation to these two institutions.[2]

In view of the physical needs, the dress and the dwelling place should offer *efficient* forms of protection against wind and weather and in the case of the dwelling place, it should also secure protection of one's property against thieves or intruders and provide privacy.

In regard to the psychological needs, the institutions of dress and dwellings are meant to preserve the virtue of modesty (*Ḥayā*) and afford privacy and non-interference from outside, at the same time manifest one's virtuous qualities, like magnanimity and avoidance of miserliness and niggardliness in consonance

1. Budur, p. 56, *ll.* 14-15. Huj-II, p. 154, *ll.* 6-22; pp. 187-188.
2. Budur, p. 49, *ll.* 15-16; p. 57, *ll.* 8-19. Huj-II, p. 189, *ll.* 19-26; pp. 125-126, the chapter on Privacies, *Aurāt*.

with the virtuous sentiments of dignity and respectability. The choice of a suitable and becoming material for dress and that of a dignified style of clothes should *not*, however, be the result of the effect of those tendencies of mind that, being averse to the virtues of magnanimity and propriety of manner, are considered to be reprehensible, like the vices of snobbishness, *vanity*, *conceit*, *excessive delight* in clothes (*Ṭarb*), etc. Owing to its unhealthy effect on the mind the choice of such clothes and indulgence in such a behaviour, would be deemed inappropriate and unethical.[1] Similarly, over-fastidious attention to elaborate architectural designs, gorgeous paintings, etc., may lead to creation or strengthening of a state of vainglory in the mind of those who own and dwell in, such buildings and thus vitiate their minds. This is, therefore, supposed to be unethical.[2]

On the grounds of *aesthetic* and *psychological* needs inherent to the human mind, Walīullāh seems to recommend a becoming and pleasing quality of dress and beautiful and comfortable dwellings, yet on economic grounds and the needs essential for the welfare of society, he recommends *moderation* in matters both of *dress* and of housing.[3]

1. Budur, p. 57, *l.* 11. Huj-II, p. 190, *ll.* 1, 11-14.
2. Huj-II, p. 189, *ll.* 19-21. Huj-I, p. 105, *ll.* 19-21; p. 110, *ll.* 1-3.
3. Budur, p. 55, *ll.* 18-19; p. 56, *ll.* 1-7.

So far as the *sex distinction in dress* is concerned, Walīullāh justifies it on the basis of difference between what we may call the *masculine* and the *feminine* disposition and character and the innate tendencies and specific functions of men and women. Delicate, colourful and womanly clothes are contrary to the masculine character, and inappropriate and unethical form of dress for man, because of the fact that a distorting influence upon man's disposition, is generated if he habitually dresses himself in the fashion of women in soft and colourful clothes. Similarly, it is inappropriate for women always to be dressed in coarse and masculine apparel, with scanty regard to beauty and refinement.[1]

Adornment and Decoration

Here a separate word may be said about the aesthetic side of the matter, as Walīullāh makes it a major head, *viz.*, *Zīna* and Tajamnul The appropriate conduct recommended by Walīullāh for decoration or adornment (*Zīna*) of one's self, one's dress, or surroundings is justified by him mainly on psychological grounds, though in certain cases, as for example in the cases of tattooing oneself or branding with iron or other forms of mutilation for embellishment, there are physical or medical grounds

1. Budur, p. 57, *ll.* 10-12, 13-14, p. 61, *ll.* 3-4. Huj-II, p. 190 *ll.* 19-21. Budur, p. 78, *ll* 17-18

against them, not to speak of their doubtfulness from the point of view of refinement.[1]

The psychological justification for adornment consists in the *aesthetic appreciation* innate in the human disposition, and also that the virtues of magnanimity and dignity and propriety of manner demand that one should appear in appropriate, dignified and refined demeanour.[2]

Against *excessive indulgence* in *self adornment* there are objections on psychological grounds, as excessive indulgence may engender a state of *morbid self-love* wrought with *self-admiration, snobbishness, vanity*, etc., which are vices contrary to the virtue of human dignity (*magnanimity*) as well as the universality of purpose (*al-Rai al-Kulli*), etc.[3] Excessive indulgence in the use of embellishment may also result in economic loss. Not the least is the harm that is caused setting a bad example to others so inclined by *nature* and to create a social vice of vainglory and extravagance.[4] Hence Walīullāh recommends the observance of a standard of *moderation* in *conduct* which can be justified on all the grounds referred above.[5]

1. Huj-II, p. 21-25. *Taghayyur* ***al Khilqa Mutilation*** of the natural figure).
2. Budur, p. 57, *ll.* 4-7.
3. Huj-II, p. 189, *ll* 21-22, 24. Budur, p. 57, *l.* 11.
4. Huj-I, p. 105, *ll.* 24-26.
5. Budur, p. 55, *l.* 10.

Cleanliness

Inclusion of conduct relating to *cleanliness* which includes washing and cleaning one's body, clothes and dwelling place as well as the observance of the rest of the items of what are called *Khiṣāl al-Fiṭra* or the *hygiene habits* of normal human being is in ethics justified by Walīullāh on both what we may call *ground of hygiene*, as well as *psychological grounds.*[1] He does not mention details of hygienic grounds and seems to content himself by referring his readers to the books on medical science.[2] His arguments in favour of patterns or modes of cleanliness (*e.g., Wuḍū, Ghusl*) and observance of the items of the *ten hygienic habits* are based on ample psychological grounds.[3] These seem (*Khiṣāl al-Fiṭra*) to have their basis in the *aesthetic quality* in the human disposition, due to which, normal dispositions are averse to filth and uncleanliness. Perhaps because of *that* a state of uncleanliness of one's body creates, according to Walīullāh, a sort of state of physical mental, and spiritual *lethargy* and affects the *clarity* or the faculty of receptivity of one's mind, the effect of which is felt in the form of dullness, more

1. Taf-II, p. 48, *ll.* 8-19. *See* chapter on Cleanliness (*Ṭahāra*). Huj-I, pp. 173-186.
2. Huj-I, p. 182. *ll.* 17-18. *Khiṣāl al-Fiṭra.*
3. Budur, pp. 204-208. Huj-I, p. 173.

clearly on the occasions of devotion and deep contemplation (*Zikr and Fikr*).[1]

Evacuation of one's bowels or attending to the toilet, oozing of blood or of impurity from any part of one's body and the act of cohabitation have a depressing and dulling effect on the mind. The act of cohabitation has a greater effect of that kind than the rest of these situations. Hence a more complete form of washing (*i.e.*, bath or Ghusl) is required to recover from its effects; whereas lesser forms of washing or ablution, Wudū, seem to be adequate in the case of the remaining. Sleep also has a similar dulling effect which needs washing to relieve its effects.[2]

Psychic sentiments and emotions that develop for particular forms of cleanliness are also one of the bases upon which particular modes of cleanliness related to the 'hygienic habits' are justified by Walīullāh; as in certain cases people's minds are not satisfied unless they clean themselves in accordance with the modes that are most common in their society.[3]

1. Huj-I, p. 52, *l.* 1; pp. 71-72.
2. Huj-I, p. 71, *ll.* 11-14; p. 53, *l.* 23; p. 173, *ll.* 27-28.
3. Huj-I, p. 173, *l.* 20; p. 182, *ll.* 12-13.

Sleep

The conduct recommended by Walīullāh regarding sleep is justified on physical grounds as well as on psychological grounds. Here again; he does not mention the physical grounds in detail. In one place, only he recommends sleeping on one's left side; on the grounds that it is more comfortable and better for the liver and for the wakefulness of the mind.

As sleep is meant not only for physical rest but for mental rest as well. Walīullāh therefore recommend certain methods of clearing the mind of distracting thoughts that are likely to disturb sleep.[1]

Illness

Regarding the appropriate mode of treatment in case of illness, Walīullāh's suggestions could be analysed into what we may call physical treatment and psychical treatment. The physical treatment consists of the medical treatment, in addition to which, Walīullāh suggests certain psychological treatment by means of prayers and spells that have, according to him, a great healing effect. He, also suggests ways and means that recover and preserve peace and contentment of the mind during the time of suffering or illness, the basis of which is naturally psychological.[2]

1. Budur, pp. 58-59. Huj-II, p. 126, *ll.* 1-3; p. 199, *Ādāb al-Naum*, (manners of sleeping).
2. Budur, p. 59. Huj-II, p. 32, *Janāiz*, *ll.* 7, 23-26.

Manners of Association

Social intercourse and association with other members of society, with whom an individual is bound to mix, is justified by Walīullāh on the grounds of pursuit of personal needs[1] and of the existence of the gregarious instinct innate in the disposition of human beings. Here, he provides abundant details regarding good behaviour with refined manner and its justification. Regarding *appropriate form of walking*, justification is found on physical grounds as well as psychological grounds. For physical reasons, the normal form of walking should be free from slouchiness and laziness. On psychological grounds such an inappropriate form of walking is likely to exhibit some bad qualities contrary to certain virutes; as, jerky and hasty walking may exhibit the state of stupidity or frolicsomeness of the walker, or certain gaits of walking may manifest and enhance the state of vanity and self conceit.[2]

The justification of *greeting* each other by *verbal facial* or *gestural* expressions is based by Walīullāh on the ground that it engenders or strengthens the virtuous qualities and love in case of elders or those who are in high positions, and promotes feelings of respect and reduces the vices of arrogance and meanness in case

1. Huj-II, p. 196, *l.* 19; p. 134, *l.* 4. Budur, p. 65, *ll.* 12-13.
2. Budur, p. 58, *ll.* 11-12.

of the younger ones, and also it creates amity among members of society.[1]

Against the forms of the greetings by means of the *humiliating gestures* like kneeling or prostration (that were current in the courts of the Persian and the Roman Monarchs), one argument of Walīullāh is that such traditions are likely to debase the mentality of people to the level of the slavery and Polytheism (which has distorting effects on the mind).[2]

The ethics of *manners of sitting* has also similar bases of physical propriety, virtuous conformity and social amiability. Hence, sitting on the stomach (*e.g.*, like a dog), sitting with the air of arrogance and vanity, behaving in a way that gives the people in company a cause of complaint against one, behaving comically, etc., are not justifiable on the grounds mentioned above. The exchange of cordial expressions and observance of careful behaviour, etc., are justified on the same grounds.[3]

The virtue of lucidity of speech in conversation is a basis of Walīullāh's account of the *form and style of* one's *conversation*; but it is for the preservation of the psychic disposition against the vices of vanity, self admiration and conceit, when he says that one's conversation

1. Huj-II, p. 198.
2. Huj-II, p. 198, *ll.* 13-15.
3. Huj-II, p. 199, *ll.* 14-15. Budur, p. 58, *l.* 12.

should be *free from* an *artificial tone*, *accent* and unnecessary use of bombastic words.[1] Promotion of amity and goodwill in the hearts of others is the basis of his exhortation that conversation should be free from backbiting, abusive language, sarcastic and slandering remarks and nicknames, etc.

The preservation of the mind from untoward effects is the basis of his recommendation that one should avoid unnecessary talking or chit chating and gossip as well as vulgarity in talking, etc.[2]

Conjugal Act

The justification for an appropriate conduct in conjugal relations is based by Walīullāh on biological, psychological and social grounds.[3] The sex urge and the urge for procreation and having children belong to the biological necessity of human beings; which, if not satisfied properly, might lead to psychic vices, distortion or perversion of the human specific disposition.[4]

Unnatural forms of gratification of the sex urge and those that consist of deliberate attempts to avoid reproduction are unjustifiable on one or more of the bases referred to above. The same is the case with *unnatural*

1. Huj-II, p. 201. *ll.* 10-13.
2. Huj-II, p. 201, *ll.* 1-3. Budur. p. 60. *ll.* 1-3; p. 59. *l.* 1.
3. Huj-II, p. 124. *ll.* 20-25; p. 138. *l.* 11. Huj-II, p. 107, *ll.* 15-14; p. 110. *ll.* 20-21.
4. Huj-II. p. 122. *ll.* 26-28; p. 123. *ll.* 4, 8, 11.

methods of getting rid of the sex urge by medical treatment, gelding, etc., that lead to a permanent sex disability.[1]

In view of the harmful effect on the virtuous faculties of the sinner and culprit and on the amiable relations of members of society, that fornication and adultery are bound to produce, the act of conjugal relation without *legal marital contract* is considered inappropriate, unsocial and unethical. On the same grounds marriage contracts and sublimation of the institution of marriage are recommended.[2]

In case a person is unable to marry, Walīullāh recommends certain modes of subsiding the vehemence of what he calls "the agony of the sex urge", *without unnatural suppression* of the *natural disposition* and its natural urges, by such means as regulation of one's diet and fasting.[3]

1. Huj-II, p. 134, *ll.* 17-19, 4-9. Here Walīullāh mentions that *Tabattul*, or the renouncement of the world and the married life completely, is unnatural and unjustifiable on similar grounds.
2. Huj-II, p. 122, *ll.* 28, Huj-I, 41, *l.* 20, *See Nikāḥ*, marriage contract below.
3. Huj-I, p. 74, *ll.* 20-21. Huj-II, p. 123, *ll.* 3-4. Budur. p. 37, *ll.* 13-14, Huj-I, p. 110, *l.* 24. *Alma al-Chilma.*

CHAPTER VII

PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT OF DOMESTIC LIFE

The Criterion

In dealing with the ethics of domestic life the criterion expounded by Walīullāh is that appropriate domestic conduct *creates, preserves and promotes the link and unity that must necessarily exist between the members of a family in advanced society.*[1] This is attained through the creation of *feelings of amity and goodwill*, by means of satisfying the needs of each other by *mutual service* and by co-operation in gaining mutual ends. Apart from the propagation of the human species and preservation of society, the domestic conduct has other ends, such as the satisfaction of certain psychological and social needs that are common to every member or satisfaction of similar needs that are peculiar to different families.

Ethical Domestic Conduct

Appropriate domestic conduct is, therefore, that in which due regard is paid to the categories of ends relating to the propagation of the human species, the preservation of virtuous faculties, sex characteristics, and the progress and development of potential capacities of individual members of the family, and to durable and lasting relations of amity and goodwill that becomes the

1. Huj-I, p. 15. *Ḥifẓ al-Rabṭ*. Huj-II, p. 138, *l.* 15. *See* 'Amity', chap. V.

basis of a well organised society on a larger scale.[1] In support of the latter part of this statement, the following statement from *Buḍūr* may be quoted: Appropriate conduct according to the "*Ḥikma* (Wisdom or wise principles) of domestic conduct of life consists in your giving due regard to the characteristics of the 'seven virtues' to 'the universal purpose' and to the *general lights* and experience, in your dealings and conduct with other members of your family and household and with family-friends, in such a way that your conduct and association with them maintains the highest form of refinement and most honourable form of relationship and unity."[2]

Sublimation

To these characteristics it may be added, that another mark of domestic conduct or the conduct of conjugal relationship is sublimation and elevation of the ṣex and procreation urges, above the same urges in animal, and to import and promote higher and sublime psychical ends. The patterns or customs of domestic conduct are so formulated that they emphasise social and humanitarian ends over and above and in addition to giving a due regard to the satisfaction of the sex urge and its direct purposes, so much so

1. *See* Righteous Custom chap. III. Huj-II, p. 144, *l.* 14; p. 128, *l.* 22.
2. Budur, p. 60, *ll.* 4-5.

that these low ends are never allowed to come up to the surface so as to display themselves and become more prominent than the higher and superior ends enumerated above.[1]

Amongst the social ends that are realised through some of the basic and elemental patterns of domestic conduct, are the maintenance of amicable and neighbourly relations with other families, and the creation of opportunities for their contacts with each other, to produce children and bring them up properly with a view to increasing the bulk and strength of society and contributing to its survival. These social ends expand to serve humanitarian ends, *viz.*, survival and amity and upliftment of the human species at large.[2] The realisation of the same ends with a view to serving *higher divine purposes*, apparently, transcending even the humanitarian ends, gives the highest level of universality to the attitude of the mind.[3]

Walīullāh's discussion regarding domestic conduct may, conveniently, be divided into *four* main parts[4] relating to (*a*) Husband and Wife, (*b*) Children, (*c*) Servants, and (*d*) Relations and Social Contacts.

1. Budur, p. 60, *ll.* 17-19. Huj-I, p. 42, *ll.* 1-2.
2. Huj-II, p. 145, *l.* 24; p. 146, *ll.* 23-27. *See Irtifāq IV*, in Human Society in the fourth stage of social evolution, chapter III. Also Huj-I, p. 15, *ll.* 23-25.
3. Huj-II, p. 145, *l.* 14. Budur, p. 189, *ll.* 3-5.

Husband and Wife

Walīullāh devotes much space to the justification of customs and manners which are conducive to the creation of durable *amity* and lasting relationship between husband and wife at the time of marriage and after they have married, as well as to the realisation of the purpose of marriage and building of the family and its future social relations with other families or other members in the same society.[1]

Such customs that are conducive to the things mentioned above, are the customs relating to (*a*) the choice of partner,[2] (*b*) exclusion of marriage between certain categories of near relatives (*Muḥarramāt*)[3], and (*c*) the traditions of betrothal (*Khi'ba*),[4] dowry (*Mahr*), marriage contract (*Nikāḥ*)[5] and wedding celebrations (*Walīma*).[6] To the same domestic purposes, also, lead the domestic institutions governing the conduct after marriage,[7] based upon the couple's sincerity, faithfulness and goodwill towards each other and upon mutual assistance

1. Huj-I, pp. 41-42. Huj-II, p. 135, *ll.* 18-23; p. 138, *l.* 18.
2. Budur, p. 62. Huj-I, p. 41. Huj-II, pp. 123-124. *See* Additional Note no. 2.
3. *See* Additional Note no. 3. Huj-I, p. 41. Huj-II, pp. 131-132.
4. *See* Additional Note no. 4. Budur, p. 61, *ll.* 8-9. Huj-I, pp. 41-42. Huj-II; pp. 124, 127.
5. Huj-I, pp. 41, 110. Huj-II, pp. 128, 137. *See* Additional Note no. 5.
6. *See* Additional Note no. 6. Budur, p. 61. Huj-I, p. 42. Huj-II, p. 130.
7. *See* Additional Note no. 7, on Domestic Life after Marriage.

and co-operation in the work and the welfare of their family, with due regard to the natural distinction between the duties of husband and wife.[1]

The present higher standing of men over women is based upon the facts of their greater physical strength, of the dependence of women (who, as has become customary, devote their time to indoor household duties), on men, for their economic needs and welfare, of the wider experience gained by men from their wider range of contacts in the spheres outside the homestead and their external affairs therein, and of their greater capacity and fitness for defending society from outside attacks.[2]

Children

Similarly, regarding the care of children, Walīullāh stresses the necessity of co-operation between the parents,[3] and justifies the tradition of birth celebration (*'Aqīqa*) on social grounds as well as on the ground of its psychological effect in strengthening the sense of parental care and responsibility.[4] The parental care and responsibility is not limited to the physical welfare of the child but extends to the provision for its intellectual progress

1. *See* Additional Note no. 8, on Duties of Husband and Wife.
2. Huj-I, p. 41, *ll.* 17-20; p. 42, *ll.* 4-5.
3. Huj-II, p. 145, *ll.* 25-27; p. 146, *ll.* 1-2. *See* Additional Note no. 9, on Children.
4. *See* Additional Note no. 10, on Birth Celebration. Huj-II, p. 144, *l.* 14. Budur, p. 64, *ll.* 9-10.

and education in order to fit it to take its place in advanced society.[1]

Thus the relation between children and parents finds its natural basis in affection and benevolence on the part of parents, and respect, gratitude and obedience on the part of children.[2]

Termination of Marriage

When the purposes of domestic life are frustrated and marriage has been such a failure that there is no hope of re-establishing the normal marital relations and amity between husband and wife, termination of marriage (*Ṭalāq* or *Khul'u*) is justified as a last resort to save husband and wife from further unhappiness, and society from discord and disharmony, and degradation and disintegration.[3]

In order to save domestic life from frequent and quick disruptions, the conditions and limitation put on 'divorce' and the provisions relating to the customary forms of separation like *Zihār*, *'Īlā*, etc., are meant to ensure that no divorce or separation (*Ṭalāq* or *Khul'u*) takes place without reasonable and substantial grounds.[4]

1. *See* Additional Note no. 11, on Education of Children. *See* Budur, p. 64, *ll.* 11-16.
2. *See* Additional Note no. 12, on Relations between Children and Parents. *See* Budur, p. 64, *l.* 17.
3. Budur, p. 63, *ll.* 5-10. Huj-I, p. 42, *ll.* 7-8. Huj-II, p. 138, *ll.* 17-18.
4. Budur, p. 63, *ll.* 11-14. Huj-II, p. 138, *ll.* 7-15; pp. 138-141.

The requirement of the period of waiting (*'Idda*) after the death of the husband or after divorce rests upon certain grounds of psychological and social categories.[1]

Servants

The main reason why some people become servants of others lies, according to Walīullāh, in the variety of human dispositions, of which some have *natural qualities* of *integrity*, *self-determination*, and the *initiative* of the masterly dispositions of the people "who are *masters by nature*, whereas, some other dispositions, due to lack of such characteristics, have the qualities of those who are 'dependent by nature'."[2] Economic needs bring such people together, and in most of the cases, they form relations of employer and employee between themselves and by satisfying their mutual needs, they work for the welfare of the domestic household and of the society.[3]

For the attainment of that purpose, durable relations between master and servant are essential which are not likely to be realised without the relation of *amity*, which includes cordiality, benevolence and generosity, on the part of master, and obedience, compliance, honesty and goodwill on the part of servant. It is for the same end

1. Huj-II, pp. 142-143.
2. Huj-I, p. 22, *ll.* 6-7: p. 42, *ll.* 13-15. Budur, p. 61, *ll.* 14-19. Note *Sayyid bil-Ṭab'a* and *'Abd bil-Ṭab'a*.
3. Budur, p. 62, *ll.* 1-3.

that Walīullāh recommends that the master should share with his servant food and clothes and associate with them as much as possible on the level of equality.[1]

Forced labour, compulsion to serve against one's will, or suppression of the abilities or faculties of those who want to live a free life on their own, does not, according to Walīullāh, only defeat the purpose of domestic welfare, but it is also dangerously mischievous to the welfare of society as a whole.[2]

Social Contacts

For the sake of unity and harmony, social contacts between members of various families are essential. The basis of such contacts, which unite members of many families into the *aggregate body* of *one* society lies, according to Walīullāh, in the satisfaction of their psychological, social and economic needs, leading to amity and goodwill among them.[3]

Such contacts satisfy their gregarous instinct of association (*Madaniyyat al-Ṭab'a*) and at the same time they form means to the realisation of the satisfaction of their timely needs in hours of danger and calamity, as well as of some of their economic needs by means of their mutual assistance and co-operation. This subsists.

1. Budur, p. 54, *ll.* 2-5; p. 63, *l.* 19.
2. Budur, p. 64, *ll.* 2-5; p. 63, *l.* 19.
3. Huj-I, p. 42, *ll.* 18-24.

particularly in their narrower social contacts and relations with relatives, in which lies the origin of the law and traditions of inheritance and wills.[1]

Appropriate social conduct, therefore, is that which preserves and promotes *amity* and makes for consolida-tion of good social relations. This, according to Walīullāh, takes the form of mutual visits to each other, exchanges of gifts, correspondence when the individuals are away from each other, mutual help and assistance—economical or otherwise—mutual goodwill and sym-pathy, overlooking each other's defects, charity to each other's mistakes, carefulness, even in small matters that might ultimately result into discord and illwill, and defeat the purpose of integrating society into an organic whole.[2]

1. Budur, p. 65, *ll.* 12-19. *See Farāid.* Huj-II, pp. 117-122.
2. Budur, p. 65, *ll.* 17-19; p. 66, *ll.* 1-4.

CHAPTER VIII

PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDUCT

I—ECONOMIC CONDUCT

A high standard of living and provision of amenities of life are a necessity for a progressive society, in which these are as important as the psychological, social and other ends described above.[1] The aim of appropriate or ethical conduct in this respect is to provide a *high standard* of living in a way that is harmonious and conducive to the satisfaction of the various categories of the needs of the individual and of the society.[2] From this point of view, the appropriate or ethical conduct of economic life of society is a part of ethics. Here, a brief outline of the basis of such economic conduct is to be given as is essential to the high standard of living and welfare of society. For further details reference may be made to the previous discussions on the nature and importance of economic needs, given in chapters III, IV, V and VI.

High Standard of Living

To attain a high standard of living, which is so essential for ethical conduct, in societies of advanced levels, the people have not only to produce all the

1. *See* Ethical Conduct and Criterion of Ethical Conduct, chapter V.
2. Budur, p. 66, *ll.* 5-8. Definition of *al-Ḥikma al-Iktisābiyya*, p. 55, *ll.* 18-19. *Taraffuh*. Huj-I, p. 43, *ll.* 6-7.

necessary commodities, but they have to specialise in every kind of work to increase efficiency in the production of quality and output of goods in conformity with high aesthetical tastes and provision of comfort and satisfaction.[1]

Industries

This end is realised through introducing varieties of industries, amongst which, those industries, which provide for the necessities of life (*e.g.*, agriculture, other basic industries like seafaring, mining, toolmaking, production of clothes, building houses), are *basic industries*.[2]

In addition to the basic industries, people in advanced societies work in industries that produce luxury goods and artistic products. The government and military services, etc., also provide means of earning a living.[3]

Trade and Commerce

The division of labour in various industries give rise to the various forms of trade and commerce consisting of exchange of goods, co-operation, agency, etc., for which the existence of a standard form of currency is a necessity.[4]

1. Huj-I, p. 43, *l.* 15.
2. Huj-I, p. 43, *l.* 15.
3. Huj-1, p. 43. *ll.* 9-14, 21.
4. Huj-I, p. 43, *ll.* 18-19.

Appropriate work for a person is that which *suits* his *physical* as well as *mental* capacities and his tastes, and at the same time provides an *adequate livelihood*.[1]

Economic Welfare

It is essential for the economic welfare of society that no one, so far as possible, should remain idle, making no contribution to the welfare of society. The drain on the state treasury or on people's property caused by such people is detrimental to the state economy as well as to the welfare of society and is not only uneconomical but unethical.[2]

The same is a result of crimes against property, like cheating theft, robbery, etc., and of the demoralising traditions of gambling and usury.[3]

The principles of the systems followed in the matters of exchange of goods and other categories of economic relations, are based upon the concept of the *welfare* and *high standard* of living of society and upon preserving the relations of *amity* and *goodwill* amongst its members and protection of their '*virtuous tendencies*' against the vices of *stinginess, selfishness, deceit, wilful procrastination, etc.*[4]

1. Budur, p. 68, *ll.* 3-6.
2. Huj-I, p. 45, *ll.* 7-9.
3. Huj-I, p. 43, *ll.* 22-23.
4. Huj-I, p. 45, *l.* 25. Budur, pp. 68-69.

II—POLITICAL CONDUCT

Appropriate conduct of the political state in society aims at the preservation of the *unity* of the society and promotion of its welfare (economic as well as general) against internal and external dangers.[1]

The dangers that are detrimental to the unity of society and its welfare are summarised by Walīullāh as follows:[2]

Violent and criminal activities against life and property, tendencies that are likely to corrupt *natural* faculties of sound dispositions and cause perversion in normal dispositions (*e.g.*, *immoral* traditions and customs, sexual or otherwise), activities that bring disharmony in the members of a domestic household (*e.g.*, adultery, attempt to create breach of *amity*, etc). *Ruinous economic systems* that are based upon fraud, extremely high rate of interest, monopoly, hoarding, etc. *Disregard of work* and general tendencies towards living an *unprogressive* and *primitive* life.[3] *Emigration* or *immigration* of population to the extent detrimental to the welfare of the state and society. Lack of *mobility* of labour and disproportionate distribution of labour to the neglect of *basic industries*, and excessive

1. Huj-I, p. 44, *ll.* 4-6.
2. *See* chapter on *Siyasat al-Madīna*. Huj-I, pp. 44-45.
3. Huj-I, p. 44, *ll.* 22-23.

engrossment in producing luxury goods and in *unproductive labour*. (8) Spreading of epidemics or other physical dangers to the state and to the life of people (like diseases floods, etc. (9) Levying of heavy taxes on the working people so as to render them destitute and cause them either to rise in rebellion or to sink into ruin both economically and spiritually.

Duties of State

The duties of a state consist in taking proper control of all these affairs, the mismanagement of which might prove dangerous to the welfare of society.

The state's other duties are to carry out work of national welfare in the form of public works, encouraging *farmers* so that *no piece* of land should be left uncultivated, and patronising *industrial workers* so that their output of goods should be best in quality as well as largest in output. It should be a great concern of the state to look after the *welfare of the poor* and the needy (*i.e. Niqāba*).

The state should *encourage art*, *engineering*, study of *history*, medical science, and various kinds of knowledge essential for scientific discoveries.

It is essential that the state departments should be run by honest and efficient people who are possessors

of *sound dispositions*, outstanding in the qualities of 'the seven virtues', healthy tastes and *normal* tendencies.[1]

Here, only an outline of those basic and fundamental purposes of political conduct is given, which are extremely important for ethical and appropriate conduct in societies of advanced levels. For further details of the nature and importance of political aspects of human society, reference may be made to chapter III, on Sociological Background, in which, society in the Third Stage of Social Evolution during which it developes its political institutions, has been discussed in some detail.

1. Budur, pp. 79-85.

PART II

FOUNDATIONS OF BELIEF

CHAPTER IX

INTRODUCTION

It has been mentioned in the preceding pages that Shāh Walīullāh is interactionist in psychology, but it has also been indicated that his psychology does not end there. To him interaction is only an intermediate phase. Below it lies the sphere of physiology and above it lies the sphere of detachment where the mind is independent and needs no aid from the sphere of physiology, which becomes, on the contrary, an impediment until it is effectively excluded.

In ethics it has been said that he is utilitarian, but a utilitarian to whom the uses of life and life itself are not limited to physical being or even to mental being, unlike the ordinary utilitarian who finds no use for ethics except to make man live a comfortable and happy life on this planet. His ethics start even below this level but go up far beyond the conception of the ordinary utilitarian.

In the same way he differs from many others in the realm of religious beliefs and so-called theology. In this respect he may be called natural theologian, but not that whose theology has dwindled to scholastic dialecticism. Walīullāh is true to the original source of natural theology, which lies in the universe around (*Āfāq*) and

in the inner selves of men (*Anfus*). This is the basis of his orthodox religion in the substantiation of which he lays stress on the observance of human mind and its *natural* tendencies and the universe and the way it works.[1]

He traces the consciousness of God, not like a natural theologian who is gifted with a powerful understanding, in his own mind, but in the rudiments of Mind itself. The fundamental basis of God consciousness he attributes, for example, to the plant and to the animal, to their innate state of *al-Takaffuf al-Ḥāli* or feelings of dependence for their needs and protection, upon the *Rabūbiyyat* of God to which they owe their protection and sustenance.[2] The ordinary phenomena of the plant bending towards the sun and of the animal, *e.g.* a dog, sitting awe-struck in the presence of his master fondling the hand that feeds him, looking at him with wistful eyes and faithful to him till death, are rudimentary impulses which indicate the source of God consciousness.

In man, however primitive, the idea of being suddenly thrown into an alien world antecedent to his own birth, in which he has no hand, evokes in his enquiring mind the idea of some One who is the creator (*Khāliq*)

1. Taf-II, pp. 220-221.
2. Huj-I, p. 22, *ll.* 13-17.

of the world and of man himself. Immediately follow the needs, exposure to pain, sickness and the danger of extinction and death and the realisation of refuge and protection of man from these calamities. All this suggests the idea of *Rabb* the power that supports, nourishes, maintains and protects and of *Mumīt* that kills and destroys. Thus the ideas of the existence of *Khāliq*, the Creator, the *Rabb*, the Supporter and *Mumīt*, the death sender, come into being. Similarly, the ideas of the other Attributes of God are gradually formed.[1]

In the beginnings of humanity it may have been the case with the majority of people, of course with the exception of a few gifted people enlightened with prophetic knowledge that these three powers, the creator, the sustainer and the destroyer, and other powers also, were considered to belong to separate beings who jointly governed the universe. With the growth of a higher understanding and gradual evolution of knowledge, the idea of multiplicity of the powers governing the universe gave place to the idea of unity of the power that governs the whole universal scheme. Thus the concept of the Unity of God is a mark of a later and higher development in the human consciousness, and the concept of *Tauḥīd fil-'Ibādah* is still higher and is the mark of the religion of advanced human society.

1. Huj-I, p. 22, *ll.* 11-12.

Religion is Law introduced by a prophet (*Shāri'*) according to Walīullāh. The peculiarity of religion is that it is imposed from above on men who cannot yet grasp, by themselves, the facts and the feelings that are brought to them by *Azka* the highest amongst them in intelligence and inner light.[1]

In other words prophecy is the natural source of religion and for the time being, man has to accept on faith the authenticity of the experiences and the validity of the advice of another (*i.e.* the prophet) and walk by it till he himself comes to experience the same.[2] What you have not seen, you have to take for granted for the time being if you are convinced that the person who brought it is not one who could possibly be untruthful.

It stands to reason, life being progressive and continuously evolving, that pioneers, who have attained high levels and reached advanced places, must inform and lead those who are far behind.[3]

It is not only the rationalist, however, who is admitted into the fold of Religion but even the nature worshipper so long as better information and fuller light are not available to him.[4] But when the *al-Aql al-Ma'āshī*,

1. Huj-I, p. 88, *ll.* 5-6, 11-13, p. 16, *l.* 15.
2. Huj-I, p. 52, *ll.* 18-19.
3. Huj-I, pp. 82-86.
4. Huj-I, p. 25, *ll.* 25-26.

(rationality) itself indicates that it cannot go beyond a particular limit, there is no excuse for one's clinging to it for further guidance. In the same way, after an advanced dispensation and guidance to direct the God consciousness towards the supreme transcendental being, to linger on in the worship of the created objects is to lag behind and to keep the mind from its natural flights in the direction of progress and development.

The main function of the ordinary reason (Rationality or *al-'Aql al-Ma'āshī*) is not to find a positive God but negativate temporary gods. The great service that it does is in the way of finding out what is not God and what cannot be God. The positive apprehension of God comes later on by means of faculties higher than rationality. Walīullāh therefore denounces the methods of the dialectic theologians and scholastics who try to adduce positive rationalist proofs of things that lie outside the pale of sense perception and reason itself.

Awe and Love are fundamental bases of religion and essential marks of the God consciousness. The rudiments of these qualities are found, as it has been remarked, ven in the lower species. In the case of animals they are more marked than in plants. In man they go on developing, deepening and becoming more and more

complex till they take the form of the strong emotions of reverence, love, humility, etc., that constitute the worshipful state of mind.

It is difficult to define the full significance of what Walīullāh calls *Fiṭrat* "the natural" which forms a main basis of his ethics, philosophy of religion and practical theology. "The natural" is the characteristic of the sound working of the whole of the universe. It is not the specific mark of one species or one stratum of being. "The natural" of Walīullāh does not end with the creation and the phenomenal world, but extends to the far beyond the phenomenal world. There are further and further regions of being which no man has reached and which perhaps no man, as man, can ever reach. The quality of human knowledge must admit that it has not known enough and that there are still higher reaches in which there is much more yet to be known.

To him the natural mind, if not impeded by corruption and unnatural circumstances, is ever able to find its natural way to proceed further and further to higher levels of being and the attainments of higher consciousness. Anything that thwarts its progress

1. Taf-II, pp. 220-221. Huj-I, pp. 19-25; p. 49, *ll.* 5-6; p. 51, *ll.* 19-21; p. 55, *ll.* 5-8; p. 58, *ll.* 18-20; p. 58, *ll.* 25, p. 78, *l.* 24; p. 79, *l.* 19.

towards that attainment is unnatural and *Sharr* or Evil. The natural state conducive to the natural progress is *Khayr* or *Birr* or Good. The external behaviour conducive to the specific nature of human beings is *Birr* or the human Righteousness and the Natural Good, the contrary of which is *Ithm* or natural evil.[1]

The nature and the natural and everything else has been determined by the decree of God's Will and *Qadā* and *Qadar*. Man's whole life and his destination are all previously determined. Within this deterministic framework, however, Shāh Walīullāh finds a place, as far as man is concerned, for the freedom of choice and man's responsibility. It is determined that man cannot attain any psychical development without using the facutly of his will and doing things consciously and of a free choice. Man's freedom is thus a part of this determinism, in Shāh Walīullāh's view, and is not the antonym of it, as it is made out to be by some of the scholastic theologians.

Practical Theology

In this work it is proposed to limit the discussion to the problems of what is called Practical Theology. The main difficulty will arise when the attempt is made to discuss Walīullāh's Eschatology, since its details are closely related to higher psychology and higher ethics,

1. Huj-I, p. 25, *l.* 17.

which have been excluded from this book. To the common sense (*al-'Aql al-Ma'āshī*) of the ordinary man, the eschatological views would seem to be mere assertions without any rational proofs whatsoever. It is proposed, however, to give an outline of his statements on this subject, the justification of which lies, for the time being, in the same argument as that in the favour of faith in religion and the acceptance of the validity of the statements for granted.

It my be pointed out here that the English term theology owing to its literal significance is repugnant to the Muslim Scholastic thought and religious philosophical system. God is beyond human comprehension, hence there can be no theology in the true sense of the term that can deal with His Essence and Nature. Muslim Scholastic system is therefore, called *Kalām*—Dialecticism and not theology, though this word has been used here on account of the want of a better term. Here the term Practical Theology is applied to the subject matter of this part of the work, covering the practical foundations of the belief about God and the attitude towards Him including the idea of the *return process* related to Eschatology.

Scope of the work

Being restricted to the so-called Practical Theology, this work is mainly concerned with what may be called practical bases of knowledge and consciousness of God such as can usually be attained by ordinary human individuals who possess a sound and normal mind and disposition, and also with a practical justification of the *Qurānic* Eschatology. The theological discussions in which the Muslim scholastic theologians have so keenly indulged do not fall within the purview of this book. They have, as a matter of fact, no place in Walīullāh's system, which differs considerably from sytems of the usual scholastic theologians whose ideas are based on Aristotelian philosophy. Out of the vast field of Walīullāh theologico-metaphysical thought peculiar to his system, the only relevant points to be adduced here are those that concern practical theology for the ordinary man. The rest of the pure theological problems in his system are to be omitted here, such as the details of the theory of emanation, *Tajalli*, the descent of Being in various stages and levels of existence, the concept of monism (*Waḥdat al-Wujūd*), the Universes of Names (*al-Asmā*) and their relation with lower stages of being (*Wujūd*) and the activities in the Universe (*al-Shakhṣ al-Akbar*) governed by what

he calls *al-Maṣlaḥat al-Kullī*, the Universal Scheme, in short, the whole account of what he allegorically calls *Ṭilsim-i-Ilāhi*[1], the DIVINE MYSTERIOUS SHOW, which according to him, connotes the work of the whole Universe (*al-Shakhṣ al-Akbar*) and its relation with the Absolute (*Mujarrad*) and the Ultimate Reality (*al-Ḥaqīqat al-Quṣwā*) the Ultimate source of emergence (*Tajallī*) and evolution assigned to the dual aspects or attributes called *Nafs al-Kull*, the Universal soul, and *Raḥmān*, the Life Giving Principle, the Merciful, etc. These problems could properly be described only in a separate treatise on the pure Metaphysico-theological system of Walīullāh. Being a result of meditation and direct apprehension of the minds of great seers who possess supernormal faculties and higher transcendental intelligence, most of these problems are, according to Walīullāh, beyond the ken of ordinary minds whose normal intelligence (*al-'Aql al-Ma'āshī*) is not capable of comprehending anything beyond pragmatical knowledge (*al-'Ulūm al-Nasamiyya*).[2]

1. Sat, p. 2, *l.* 7; and also pp. 6, 7 and 8. Huj-I, p. 9, *ll.* 7-12.
2. Huj-I, p. 83, *ll.* 5, 15-18.

CHAPTER X

GOD-CONSCIOUSNESS

Ma'rifat Allah—Consciousness of God

According to Walīullāh, consciousness about God is innate in the minds of human beings. This consciousness emerges and develops out of the rudimentary consciousness that things cannot happen without a cause. A simple form of this consciousness of cause of a thing, or of a happening, is found among animals as well.[1]

It is not, however, proposed to give details of how Walīullāh traces the development of this consciousness up to the stage of the apprehension of knowledge of God as the ABSOLUTE and ULTIMATE REALITY. Here it is only to be pointed out that so far as ordinary human beings are concerned an innate tendency prevails in their minds to attribute the universal scheme and the wonderful organism that works systematically within as well as without themselves, in the universe, to some powerful Agent who is different from or is outside the universe itself. This tendency is the natural and ever developing source of the knowledge about God and consciousness about Him.[2] It is only in the form of the conception

1. Budur, p. 98, *ll.* 1-5. The origin of consciousness of God lies in the innate impulse called *al-Maḥabbat al-Zātiyya*, of which the source lies in the Ultimate Reality, as is substantiated by the concept of monism *Waḥdat al-Wujūd*. Huj-I, p. 69, *ll.* 26-27.
2. Budur, p. 86, *l.* 9; also Huj-I, p. 68, *ll.* 26-29.

of this Agent and the ideas of His nature and essence that a diversity of opinions has come into existence, owing to the deficiencies of human minds in comprehending the whole of the universal scheme and its relation t oits source the *transcendental* Ultimate Reality. Those who grew more self-conscious and had an active intellect and yet could not conceive the universe, or a being, beyond what is visible, assigned ultimate causation of the physical phenomena to the Matter and the properties of Matter (*Ṭabī'at al-'Anāṣir*) and ruled out the existence of Higher Being.[1] Those who could conceive the existence of higher phenomenon, they attributed its existence to either the heavenly bodies and their movements,[2] or to the souls of their by-gone sages and heroes or gods and so on.[3] But those who are capable of a much more comprehensive knowledge of the universe find that none of these objects is the Ultimate Cause or the Real Agent that brings the system of the universal scheme into being and maintains it in activity. Even those who are convinced of the control and power or the creatorship of the gods that they have conceived, would find out their error as soon as they progress further in their understanding.[4] It is not only that, owing to their increased

1. Budur, p. 98, *ll.* 3-4; p. 101, *ll.* 4-5.
2. Budur, p. 98, *l.* 12; p. 101, *l.* 6.
3. Budur, p. 98, *l.* 13.
4. Budur, p. 101, *ll.* 6-7.

understanding of the universe and its scheme, they would find out their error, but they could come to the same conclusion if only they had free recourse to the innate attitude of their mind, and to its natural tendencies. They would, in that case, find that anything that comes inside the scheme of things and belongs to the system of the universe and does not transcend it, is not God.[1] It is only ignorance, the lack of understanding, and confusion of ideas acquired through the sense perception and losing the sight of what is beyond the system of cause and effect of one's everyday life, that deprive one of the consciousness of one's natural and real attitude that is innate within one's mind, towards the Real Source, the Ultimate Cause and the Creator of the universe.[2]

This innate consciousness about God in ordinary minds develops on the right lines if it is not mingled with anthropomorphic concepts and is kept free from all the conceptual determinations and limitations conceived by the mind. In the ordinary mind, this takes the form of "an implicit awareness and abstract attitude" relating to God without a definite conception of His Nature.[3] Ordinary minds possessed of only practical

1. Budur, p. 100, *ll.* 16-18; p. 101.
2. *See* the 'Impediments' *Ḥujub* in chap. I; also Budur, p. 101, *ll.* 7-8.
3. Budur, p. 100, *l.* 9.

reason (*al-'Aql al-Ma'āshi*)[1] capable of mere pragmatical knowledge can, according to Walīullāh, have the basis of their knowledge of God and His transcendence upon this kind of consciousness accompanied by the *negative* knowledge about His nature and with negation of His likeness with things of the creation.[2]

When the ordinary mind, which knows God on these lines, advances and develops higher faculties or when the impediments of its physical life are removed, its previous basic knowledge and consciousness about God will not cause confusion and perplexity in its approach to and realisation of God.[3]

Adoration and Admiration—Tasbih and Hamd

The God-consciousness, if it is genuine, produces other corresponding psychic states in the mind. With the realisation of the power and greatness and exaltation of God that this consciousness brings to the mind, the psychic states of admiration, wonder and adoration automatically come into being.[4] Being conscious of what one owes to the beneficence of God, and of how one's own being and one's own welfare and everything that one needs are in absolute dependence on Him, and are due to His Attributes

1. These are the minds of those people who come under the category of *Nā'im al-Ṭaba'*. See chap. I.
2. Budur, p. 100, *ll.* 6, 11, 15-16.
3. Budur, p. 100, *ll.* 17-19.
4. Budur, p. 101, *l.* 13.

manifesting themselves in the *Rahmān*, qualities of benevolence, mercifulness and *Raḥīm*, compassion and graciousness, the mind naturally evolves a state of (*Tazallul* or *Ikhbāt*) supplication, gratitude and humility towards Him.[1] The state of adoration and admiration accompanied with the state of gratitude and humility gives rise to the psychic state of what may be called worship, *'Ibāda* as will be described later on.[2] Thus worship (*'Ibāda*) is a natural outcome of genuine God consciousness.

Sa'adat, Happiness (Natural Development and Progress) and Sound God Consciousness

According to Walīullāh the sound and normal human disposition developing on right and sound lines without impediment, is bound to attain a sound and right consciousness of God owing to its natural innate tendencies.[3] Any impediment that tends to mar the attainment of that

1. Budur, p. 116, *ll.* 1-3. Like other instincts, the instinct of supplication and gratitude is present in animal and is innate in the basic triad of man's disposition. Similarly, love and attachment for benefactor are also present both in man and animal in conformity with the capacities of their natures and dispositions. These in the case of man, are the sources of his emotions of worship and adoration. *See* Budur, p. 116.
2. Budur, p. 117, *ll.* 11-14. *See* discussion on "Worship (*'Ibāda*)".
3. Budur, p. 112, "Essence of man"; p. 96, *ll.* 2-4. *See* Happiness in chap. I.

consciousness is an impediment in the way of the natural development of disposition; hence it is an obstacle in the way of Real Happiness (*Sa'ādat*). Real happiness, the natural development and evolution of the disposition and a sound and valid God consciousness go hand in hand. Human beings, whose minds have been infused with wrong concepts about God owing to one or the other of the three impediments, are bound to be impeded from attaining the state of "happiness", and face the greatest perplexity within themselves and perpetual bewilderment at the time when their souls or psychic selves are liberated from physical body, especially in the case when a worshipful attitude is developed towards other objects considering them as gods. Such wrong worshipful attitudes have perverting effects upon their minds and harmful effects upon the development of their essence and specific nature.[1]

Those who are lost in the physical phenomena and do not believe in the existence beyond what is physical, cannot but submit in a worshipful attitude to objects other than God, and cannot conceive that their life does not terminate with the physical death and that there are states of pleasure and pain that follow after one's death. According to Walīullāh, such persons are materialists (*Dahrī*) in the

1. Huj-I, p. 69, *ll*. 5-9.

true sense of the word,[1] and this state of these persons is due to their lack in the sound specific nature (*Salāmat al-Fiṭra*) in which consciousness of God is a part of what is called *al-Maḥabbat al-Zātiyya*, the attraction of the essence of the 'self', and is innate like the instincts of hunger, thirst, etc.[2] Just as physical pain is not felt due to the temporary effect of an anaesthetic (*Mukhaddir*), so it may be that due to the predominance of the impediments of the physio-biological (*Badaniyya*) and psychic (*Nafsāniyya*) aspects, the soundness of the specific nature (*Fiṭrat*) is affected and the consciousness of God is not felt as it ought to be. But as soon as the impediments are removed, either by the process of what Shāh Walīullāh calls "the Voluntary Death" (*al-Maut al-Ikhtiyārī*) or by the physical death (*al-Maut al-Iḍṭirārī*), a partial consciousness comes into being. Owing to the acquired psychic states that are perverted and contradictory or remote from that consciousness, a state of great pain is suffered by the person, in various modes and forms—natural and conforming to psychical suffering. The details of this suffering belong to Eschatology.[3]

1. Huj-I, p. 68, *ll*. 25, 26. *Dahrī*. Whatever he may outwardly profess, the *Dahrī* (the materialist) cannot, as such, believe in God, and in the life after death—both the beliefs depend upon the concept of the being that transcends the physical existence (Huj-I, p. 79, *ll*. 22-25).
2. Huj-I, p. 68, *l*. 29.
3. Huj-I, p. 69, *ll*. 1-14. *See* Eschatology—chap. XV.

In order to satisfy the innate God consciousness, people take to natural modes of conforming behaviour, directed to express the inner consciousness, and of conforming mental attitude developed from or built upon the emotions developed from that consciousness. This conforming behaviour and corresponding mental state becomes conducive to a further development of the consciousness, according to the principle of interactionism[1] which we have discussed and thus a way is open for the natural development of the disposition of the person and evolution of his psychic self and all that which constitutes essence. This process of the natural development corresponds to the state of Real Happiness (*Sa'āda*).[2]

Higher Consciousness and Higher Ethics and Ordinary Ethics

As the personal and social needs of human beings are satisfied by ordinary ethical systems, so their higher needs arising out of higher consciousness or God consciousness are satisfied by the systems of what may be called higher ethics, which should be considered as complementary to the systems of ordinary ethics. The basis of development of both the branches of ethical systems is almost on similar lines and their development takes place almost

1. *See* Interactionism, chap. I.
2. *See* Happiness (Sa'āda), chap. I.

simultaneously, though different societies have laid varying degrees of emphasis upon one or the other of the ethical systems in the course of their history.[1] Previously there have been periods in human history in which the two systems have been considered as separate from each other. Later on, with the advent of Islam both systems have been combined and co-ordinated with each other so that the adoption of appropriate and ethical conduct satisfies not only one's social and personal physical and psychological needs, but one's higher and spiritual needs and demands of higher consciousness are also satisfied.[2] Thus full scope was afforded to *I'tidāl al-Nau'i*, a well balanced development of the specific nature, and its progress and evolution and natural development conforming to the state of happiness.[3] This has been attained by introducing modes and forms conforming to the procreation of the mental states and attitudes conducive to the development of higher or extraordinary consciousness, actualising in God consciousness and the realisation of higher qualities and superior virtues (*Laṭāif*). The normal ethical conduct accompanied by these mental attitudes and modes of reviving higher consciousness is transformed (so far as its ends are concerned)

1. *See* Development of Custom; chap. IV, and also Budur, p. 181.
2. *Vide* Budur, pp. 186-190.
3. Huj-I, p. 23, *ll.* 5-7. Sat. p. 34, *l.* 14.

into higher ethics and through the medium of which the purpose of the general survival of human beings in their physical, social, psychological, cultural and spiritual aspects is realised.[1] To these modes certain forms of practices and behaviour usually called *'Ibādāt* and *Riyāḍāt*, (modes of worship and spiritual training), serve as an aid and stimulus, although some of these modes serve, at the same time, some social and congregational purposes as well.[2]

Birr or Human Righteousness or Natural Good

The bulk of the ordinary ethics of Walīullāh comes under the category of what he calls *Irtifāqāt*, and the bulk of higher ethics and forms and modes of *'Ibādāt*, worship, come under the category of what may be called *Iqtirābāt* (*i.e.* means of approach to God and of development of higher consciousness).[3]

According to Walīullāh, ordinary ethics as well as higher ethics belong to the category of what he calls *Birr*, the Natural Good which "signifies everything that is beneficial for the specific nature of human beings."[4] The contrary of *Birr* or of any of the two ethical aspects of human conduct is *Ithm*, the natural evil which signifies

1. Budur, p. 181, *ll.* 2-3; p. 183, *l.* 13; p. 189, *ll.* 3-5.
2. Huj-I, p. 57, *l.* 23. *See* pp. 72-73, *Asrār, Ṭahārat, ll.* 9, 14-16, *Ṣalāt, ll.* 22, 23.
3. Budur, p. 181, *l.* 2.
4. Huj-I, p. 25, *l.* 17.

everything that is harmful for the human specific nature.[1] The term *Birr* is applicable to higher as well as ordinary ethics.[2]

Birr and Milla

The *Milla* (Codified Religion)[3] develops in order to satisfy the people's needs arising for their personal survival and social evolution as well as progress in their individual culture and spiritual attainment,[4] thus leading to the full development and progress of the specific nature of people and so to their state of happiness, here, in this life and also in the life hereafter. The *Milla* in the course of time reaches a stage when a code of conduct is more or less fixed. That code is called *Shari'ah* (the Law). The forms of Milla (*Milal*) with their codes of laws have undergone changes from period to period. Most of the changes are introduced by men of extraordinary intelligence (*Azkiya*), under the leadership of the most

1. The terms *Khayr* and *Sharr* are of much wider significance than the terms *Birr* and *Ithm* which are restricted to the conduct of human beings so far as it has good, beneficial or evil, or harmful effects on their specific nature. *Khayr* and *Sharr* are two contrary significances and are accidents of the system of the universal scheme *al-Maṣlaḥat al-Kulliyya* in which *Khayr* represents the accident (*Araḍ*) of the system conforming to the Reality (*al-Ḥaqq*) that is everlasting, whereas *Sharr* represents the system conforming to *Bāṭil* which has only a temporary existence. Both being parts of the universal scheme there is no absolute *Sharr*, and its character as such is only relative (*i.e.* it is only *Sharr bil-'Araḍ*).
2. *Vide* chapter on *Birr* and *Ithm*, Huj-I, pp. 58-82.
3. *e.g. al-Milla al-Mūsawiyya, al-Milla al-'Isawiyya, etc.*
4. Budur, p. 181, *ll.* 17-18.

outstanding personalities of their ages (*Azka Khalq Allāh*). In the case of normal ethics even sages and thinkers contribute to their development, but so far as higher ethics are concerned, the people gifted with extra-ordinary and bright angelic aspect (*Malakiyya*) alone can lead.[1] These persons have been the great prophets and leaders of humanity.[2]

Philosophy of Religion

It is not proposed here to deal with Walīullāh's principles of development of the systems of *Birr*, Natural Good and Righteousness, and of the evolution of *Milal* and laws of religious codes and their development, the missions of prophets and their principles of introduction of new changes, modifications and alterations, and of the development of codes in times later than those of these prophets and the relation of those developed codes to their origins.[3] This could conveniently be dealt with in a more complete treatise on Walīullāh's philosophy of religion. Before an attempt is made in that direction, a full and elaborate discussion on his higher ethics, to supplement the present treatise on normal ethics, would be indispensable. The so-called practical theology in

1. Huj-I, p. 58, *ll.* 16-17; p. 16, *ll.* 15-16; p. 23, *ll.* 6, 9.
2. *See* the classifications of *Sābiqūn* and *Anbiya*, Budur, pp. 158-178.
3. *Vide* chapter on *al-Siyāsāt al-Milliyya*. Huj-I, pp. 82-91; 104-107; 117-131, *al-Nabuwwat taḥt al-Millah*. Huj-I, p. 105; p. 123, *l.* 1. Also chapter on *al-Milal wal-Sharāi'*. Budur, pp. 180-198.

the system of Walīullāh is a part of what he calls *Birr*, human Natural Good, in the account of which he includes practical knowledge of the Attributes of God, of Qadar (Determinism), of *Tauḥid*, and *Shirk*, (the belief in God's unique Oneness and Unity and the discernment of what is opposed to it), and of life hereafter, as well as the practical justification of the various forms and modes of worship, and of prayers, pilgrimage, charity and fasting.[1]

Before an analysis of the so-called practical theology is given, it will be useful to give a resume of Walīullāh's definition of *Birr*, Natural Good or Human Righteousness. According to him *Birr* or Natural Good consists in every form of behaviour that is conducive to the following:—

"The removal of the dominance of the three impediments (*Ḥujub*). The free and harmonious development of human specific nature as we know it is dependent upon the congenial interaction between the animal aspect and the angelic aspect. The ethical conduct essential for social progress and development according to the natural lines upon which human organisation is based. Everything that results in good or better and preferable consequence (*Khayr*), in this life or in the life hereafter.

1. *Vide* Huj-I, pp. 58-82.

And, everything that is an expression of high consciousness, and supernormal qualities, adopted in response to inspriations received from *Mala al-A'lā*, (the High Assembly), or to the selfless and altruistic impulses for the execution of the system of the *Haqq*, the subsisting and lasting Reality."[1]

In contrast to *Birr*, Human Righteousness or Natural Good, according to Walīullāh, is its contrary, *Ithm*, Evil or Human Unrighteousness, perversion, and unnatural state, which is conducive to everything that is contrary to any one of the categories of the behaviour and actions described above.

1. Huj-I, p. 58, *ll.* 10-14.

CHAPTER XI

ATTRIBUTES OF GOD

The Real Happiness of man lies in his approach to and consciousness of God. The development of his essence and his specific nature lies in the process of consciousness of his Creator in such a way as it should aid in his progress and perfection.[1] A natural characteristic of this kind of consciousness is the development of psychic states of humility (*al-Ikhbāt* and *al-Tazallul*) and worshipful attitude in relation to God.[2] God consciousness and the states of humility and worshipful attitude are natural products of the mind's awareness and conviction that the management of the affairs of the world is in the hand of God[3] and that it is in His hand to make a person happy by fulfilling his needs and unhappy by forsaking him. This realisation creates the natural states of humbleness and love and admiration and the other ingredients of the worshipful state of the mind, as it comes to the realisation of God's supreme power in the execution of the scheme (*Tadbīr*) of the whole universe, of the heavens and the earth.[4]

1. *See Ma'rifat* and *Sa'ādat*, chap. X.
2. *See* Adoration and Admiration, chap. X.
3. *See* Worship and *Tauhīd*, chap. XIII—XIV.
4. Huj-I, pp. 59, 68.

The above conviction is naturally acquired through seeing the signs of God's power and realisation of His Qualities and Attributes as are manifest in the universe. The knowledge of God's Attributes and conviction about them is therefore considered as one of the most important factors that help in the attainment of the development and progress leading to Happiness (*Sa'āda*) and is ranked by Walīullāh among the chief ingredients of *Birr*, the human Righteousness or the Natural Good. In religious teachings a special attention has been paid to the account of the Attributes of God, as, through the knowledge of them, the common mind finds a ready means of approach to God and a way is opened for man to know his Lord.[1]

But the question of the Attributes is a delicate problem according to Shāh Walīullāh. The Attributes are often misunderstood or misconstrued. Even the so-called scholastic theologians have not been able to assign to the Attributes their proper significance.[2] The cause of the misunderstanding and confusion in ascertaining the proper significance of the attributes is the disregard of the following facts:—

1. The Attributes are characteristics of God whose Essence is beyond human comprehension.[3]

1. Huj-I, p. 63, *ll.* 11-12.
2. Budur, p. 103, *ll.* 15-17.
3. Budur, p. 100, *l.* 9.

2. As the Essence of God is beyond the ken of human mind, in the same way His Attributes and their exact nature is outside the jurisdiction of the understanding faculty of the human mind.[1]

3. Being Attributes of the Infinite Being, each of them must be of infinite significance and boundless in what it denotes; hence human language, of which words and expressions can only have a limited significance, cannot adequately connote the full significance of the Attributes and describe their nature.[2]

4. The purpose of giving an account of the Attributes in the teachings of religion is that the knowledge of them should be an aid to the Development of God consciousness, *Ma'rifa*, which is an essential trait of human progress and ultimate happiness. The metaphysical discussions about the nature of the Attributes have no benefit of that kind upon the inner state of the mind, and cannot produce the attitude of worship which is the true criterion of genuine God consciousness.[3]

Walīullāh asserts, as has been substantiated in his metaphysics, that the Essence of God is so boundless

1. Budur, pp. 102, 106.
2. Budur, p. 109, *l.* 14.
3. Budur, p. 100, *ll.* 12, 14. *See Ma'rifa.*

that He cannot be brought under any category conceived by the human mind. He cannot be called the *Kulli*, the Universal, nor can He be termed as *Juz'i*, the particular;[1] because these are the categories applied to things that come within our conception. Nothing is like Him. Hence even the nature of His Oneness (*Waḥdat*), must be different from what we conceive as oneness.[2] On the same basis, the nature of God's Attributes cannot be conceived by the ordinary human mind, as their source lies in the Essence of God which is beyond its comprehension.[3] It is for this reason that the common people are restrained from going deep into the discussions about the nature of God's Essence and His Attributes,[4] and no reference to the nature of them is found in the discourses of the holy Prophet of Islam or in those of his companions.[5] It is only in the discussions of scholasticism that arguments about the nature of the Attributes are found.[6] No importance was given to such opinions as whether the Attributes of the ultimate Reality are

1. Budur, pp. 101 and 102, *ll.* 19, 1-3; p. 106.
2. Budur, p. 106, *l.* 12.
3. Huj-I, p. 63, *l.* 12. Budur, pp. 11-12 (the Ultimate Reality); p. 100, *l.* 9.
4. Huj-I, p. 63, *l.* 23; p. 69, *l.* 10; p. 10, *ll.* 5-6.
5. Huj-I, p. 9, *l.* 21; p. 10, *ll.* 1-14.
6. Budur, p. 103, *l.* 17.

separate from its Essence or whether they are identified with it, during the early period of teachings of the religion.[1]

Walīullāh's view of human language is interesting.[2] He describes peculiarities of its use of words and expressions, and argues that the application of these expressions to the Attributes of God, who is Transcendent and Absolute, is possible only in so far as the latter are manifest in the forms of their effects.[3] In this phenomenal world, only the work and effects of the Attributes are perceived.[4] We can conceive some of those effects and their work, and then name them with particular terms from our everyday language to express their significance. Hence the linguistic terms or the words that name the Attributes of God are meant to signify only the aspect of their effects as they are manifest in the world, and in this restricted significance the use of those terms is rather literal[5] and not allegorical as understood by some scholastic theologians.[6] Since their application is restricted to what is manifest of the Attributes,[7] the law of Sharī'ah

1. Huj-I. p. 10. *l.* 12.
2. Huj-I. pp. 38-40. Budur, 53. (chapter *Irtifāq* I).
3. Budur. p. 103. *l.* 15.
4. Budur. p. 102. *ll.* 18-19; p. 104. *ll.* 1-10.
5. Budur. p. 103. *l.* 16. Huj-I. 68. *l.* 17.
6. Huj-I. p. 10. *ll.* 5-6. See *al-Ghazzālī's Iqtiṣād* rel. *Aqtāb*.
7. Budur. pp. 102-103. Huj-I. 65. *l.* 14.

has put a check on going deeper in their significance on their Source side (*Mabda*). Even in the choice of the terms, the jurisdiction of common people is restricted within the limits of what is taught by Shari'ah or sages and prophets. No term may be used if it has not already been taught. Hence the names of the Attributes are called *al-Asmā al-Tauqīfiyya* the names restricted to the teaching and authority of the tradition.[1] This does not mean, however, that those who possess higher reason[2] cannot have a more comprehensive conception of the nature of the Attributes as they subsist in their source (*Mabda*).[3] But those who do not possess higher reason, and who are only equipped with the ordinary reason *al-Aql al-Ma'āshī*[4] (such is the case with the majority of the people), must view the Attributes from the side of their manifestation in this world and not from their source side. It is convenient as well as natural for the common mind to develop awareness about God, and about the Characteristics of His work or His Attributes through viewing their signs and effects that are manifest in the world.[5]

1. Huj-I, p. 64, *ll.* 13-20; p. 63, *l.* 21.
2. Budur, p. 99, *ll.* 3-4; p. 104, *ll.* 12-18.
3. Huj-I, p. 63, *l.* 15. Budur, p. 102, *l.* 15.
4. Budur, p. 99, *l.* 6.
5. Budur, p. 100, *l.* 13. Huj-I, p. 63, *l.* 13

In order to avoid misconstruction, Walīullāh recommends that the manifestations of God's Attributes or Qualities of Characteristics should be viewed with due consideration of the following factors—The ideas associated with the Attributes should be in conformity with the Holiness, Sanctity, Exaltation and Sublimity and Transcendence of God. In view of this consideration Walīullāh has enumerated four principles upon which manifestations of God's Attributes are to be understood by the human mind and expressed in the everyday language. The principles emphasise the eradication of every taint of anthropomorphism (*al-Danāsat al-Nāsūtiyya*) and triviality and deficiency and defect. It is also stressed that every care is to be taken to use dignified language and appropriate expression to denote the manifestations of God's characteristics and Attributes which come under our notice by ordinary observation or by a seer's deeper observation into spheres beyond the physical phenomenon.[1]

On the basis of these principles Walīullāh explains the significance of the Attributes of God and shows how in the Traditional practice a due care has been taken of these factors in the choice of the Beautiful Names.[2] In his extensive interpretation of the Attributes like *Qudra*,

1. Budur, p. 105, *ll.* 6-14.
2. Budur, pp. 106-111.

Power,[1] *Ḥayāt*, Life,[2] *Samạ'*, Hearing;[3] *Kalam*, Speech,[4] *Irāda*, Will, etc., he substantiates that what we realise about them are their effects only. As these effects in their appearance display the same qualities as mentioned above; hence we assign these qualities to God as well. But by assigning these qualities to God we do not mean that they have the same nature in God's Essence, as they have in our own constitution. In the universe, there are signs which show that God is not deficient in comprehending things that we comprehend through the sense of hearing. This means that He hears. But it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that He has ears too. God is kind. But His kindness does not come from a tender heart. On a similar basis Walīullāh differentiates the Attributes of *Irāda*, Will, and *Qudra*, Power, manifesting two stages—of the Will and the execution of the Will—as the Attributes of God, from the characteristics of man.[5] So far as *Kalām*, Speech, is concerned, Walīullāh states that the purpose and the effect of speech is to create an idea or understanding of the idea in the mind of the person addressed. The manifestation of this kind of speech is present in the forms of

1. Budur, p. 107, *ll.* 15-19; p. 105, *l.* 15.
2. Budur, pp. 106 and 107, *ll.* 15-19 and *ll.* 1-3.
3. Budur, p. 107, *l.* 8.
4. Budur, p. 108, *ll.* 1-6.
5. Budur, p. 107, *ll.* 12-13.

revelation. Hence on the basis of the observation of this manifestation one can claim that God possesses the Attribute of speech. The discussions about the nature of God's speech *Kalām* are in a way dabbling with God's Essence, the source of the Attributes. Hence what is termed by theologians as *al-Kalām al-Nafsī*, the inner self speech is an ambiguity according to Walīullāh.[1]

The Practical Significance of the View of the Attributes.

According to Walīullāh, the conceptions of the Attributes formed on the bases of the principles enunciated by him, are not final. They serve only as temporary substrata in the case of a person who starts his approach to God through viewing God's Attributes from the side of their manifestation in this world.[2] This method of viewing the Attributes is established by the advanced religion, the *al-Milla al-Ḥanifiyya*, for the safe and natural progress of those who possess ordinary reason.[3] When man progresses and gains nearness to God he may be endowed with a higher reason and insight with which he can have a higher conception of God's Attributes.[4] His conception may grow more and more extensive according to his proximity to the Reality. If a man

1. Budur, p. 108, *ll*: 1-6.
2. Budur, p. 100, *ll.* 12-19.
3. Budur, p. 99, *l.* 6; p. 191, *l.* 4; p. 197, *ll.* 7-8.
4. Budur, p. 99, *ll.* 10-12.

has put a check on going deeper in their significance on their Source side (*Mabda*). Even in the choice of the terms, the jurisdiction of common people is restricted within the limits of what is taught by Shari'ah or sages and prophets. No term may be used if it has not already been taught. Hence the names of the Attributes are called *al-Asmā al-Tauqifiyya* the names restricted to the teaching and authority of the tradition.[1] This does not mean, however, that those who possess higher reason[2] cannot have a more comprehensive conception of the nature of the Attributes as they subsist in their source (*Mabda*).[3] But those who do not possess higher reason, and who are only equipped with the ordinary reason *al-Aql al-Ma'āshī*[4] (such is the case with the majority of the people), must view the Attributes from the side of their manifestation in this world and not from their source side. It is convenient as well as natural for the common mind to develop awareness about God, and about the Characteristics of His work or His Attributes through viewing their signs and effects that are manifest in the world.[5]

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1. Budur, p. 107, *ll.* 15-19; p. 105, *l.* 15.
2. Budur, pp. 106 and 107, *ll.* 15-19 and *ll.* 1-3.
3. Budur, p. 107, *l.* 8.
4. Budur, p. 108, *ll.* 1-6.
5. Budur, p. 107, *ll.* 12-13.

revelation. Hence on the basis of the observation of this manifestation one can claim that God possesses the Attribute of speech. The discussions about the nature of God's speech *Kalām* are in a way dabbling with God's Essence, the source of the Attributes. Hence what is termed by theologians as *al-Kalām al-Nafsī*, the inner self speech is an ambiguity according to Walīullāh.[1]

The Practical Significance of the View of the Attributes.

According to Walīullāh, the conceptions of the Attributes formed on the bases of the principles enunciated by him, are not final. They serve only as temporary substrata in the case of a person who starts his approach to God through viewing God's Attributes from the side of their manifestation in this world.[2] This method of viewing the Attributes is established by the advanced religion, the *al-Milla al-Ḥanīfiyya*, for the safe and natural progress of those who possess ordinary reason.[3] When man progresses and gains nearness to God he may be endowed with a higher reason and insight with which he can have a higher conception of God's Attributes.[4] His conception may grow more and more extensive according to his proximity to the Reality. If a man

1. Budur, p. 108, *ll*: 1-6.
2. Budur, p. 100, *ll.* 12-19.
3. Budur, p. 99, *l.* 6; p. 191, *l.* 4; p. 197, *ll.* 7-8.
4. Budur, p. 99, *ll.* 10-12.

takes his start on the lines specified by Shāh Walīullāh his later conceptions about the Attributes will be in full conformity with those which he has at the outset.[1] The later conceptions will be only an expansion and substantiation of his earlier ideas. Walīullāh exemplifies this by the analogy of one who looks through a red glass. The difference that he finds after seeing the same things without the glass does not amount to the falsification of what he had seen before. The higher reason and insight will not therefore falsify what he understands about the Attributes through viewing them with his ordinary reason on these lines. The case of the Anthropomorphists (*Mushabbihūn*) or the Corporealists (*Mujassimiyyūn*) will be different. If somehow or the other they progress in their approach to God their later knowledge would absolutely falsify their previous beliefs and concepts of the Attributes.[2]

Hence the conceptions formed on the basis of the principles enunciated by Walīullāh are not only safe and simple but they form a natural foundation for higher conceptions in the course of one's progress in the approach to God. The knowledge of the Attributes is, in this case, in conformity with the reality and it has a beneficial value as well. Walīullāh's way of viewing the

1. Budur, p. 104, *l.* 10.
2. Budur, p. 104, *ll.* 13-16; p. 105, *ll.* 1-3.

Attributes has again rendered all the metaphysical hair splitting discussions, about the nature of the Attributes, vain and unnecessary.[1] The Orthodox Traditionists (*al-Muḥaddithūn*) took to the doctrine of *Bilā Kayfa* ('Without How') with regard mainly to the nature of the Attributes in their fundamental aspect or from the view of their base-side (*Mabda*).[2] The Scholastic Theologians (*al-Mutakallimūn*) tried to ascertain the nature of the Attributes from their source-side or the base-side; *i.e.*, as they subsist in the Essence of God. As these parties had different points of departure, all the disputes and controversies amongst them are, according to Walīullāh, merely verbal squabbles, and the controversy becomes groundless as one goes more deeply into the matter.[3]

1. Budur, p. 197, *l.* 12.
2. Huj-I, p. 64, *l.* 6; Budur, p. 102, *l.* 16.
3. Budur, p. 102, *l.* 16.

CHAPTER XII

DETERMINISM (QADAR)

After discussing the practical basis of understanding the Attributes of God, it is necessary to describe Walīullāh's view on Determinism, *Qadar*, as it is the manifestation of God's Attributes of *Qudra*, Power and *Irāda*, Will. So far as the ordinary minds are concerned, they realise the truth of the fact that the scheme of the universe is predetermined, through their experience of frustrations of their efforts and of happenings of things contrary to their wishes and endeavours.[1] It is one of the innate ideas in the minds of ordinary people that the ultimate management of affairs is in the hands of an unseen power (*Ghayb*) who inspires them to act and directs their affairs.[2]

So far as the extraordinary minds of great seers and prophets are concerned, they apprehend the unity of the whole universe, which as such, is governed by one universal scheme (*al-Tadbīr al-Waḥdānī*), determined by God's Eternal Will and Power.[3] It is impossible that things can occur at the slightest variance with it. That which is pre-ordained must take place and that which is not so

1. Budur, p. 111, *ll.* 16-17.
2. Budur, p. 111, *l.* 15; p. 106, *l.* 6.
3. Huj-I, p. 65, *l.* 18; p. 59, *l.* 8. Budur, p. 12, *l.* 10.

destined cannot occur at all.[1] Thus the things that come into existence cannot do so unless they are incumbent and essential.[2] It is not possible for those that are not so essential and incumbent, to come into existence.[3]

The *universal scheme* is realised through *Sunnat Allāh* the determined system of God's mode of doing things of which the system of evolution is only a part.[4] Things evolve from one stage to another stage.[5] So do the different phases of the universe, which are distinguished in its different stages, during the course of its evolution.[6] Here it is not proposed to give details of Walīullāh's theory of evolution. It should, however, be noted that the *evolution* of things represents God's ways of manifestation of His eternal Will and Power and His immanence in which the working of fixed principles is manifested.[7] The emergence of new forms and the transformation of original states into other ones comes about only when the things have attained potentiality (*Qābiliyyat*) and capacity (*Isti'dād*) or semblance (*Tashābuh*) for the new and emergent forms, which come into manifestation

1. Huj-I, p. 18, *l.* 23; p. 65, *l.* 21.
2. Budur, p. 111, *l.* 19; p. 14, *l.* 14.
3. Budur, p. 25, *ll.* 6-7.
4. Huj-I, p. 17, *ll.* 5, 16. *See* additional note on GOOD and EVIL.
5. Budur, p. 18, *ll.* 13-19. *See* additional Note on *Qadar*.
6. Budur, p. 15, *l.* 4.
7. Budur, p. 15, *l.* 6; p. 25.

owing to the emanation (*Fayḍ*) of God's Attribute *Raḥmān*[1] the Bounteous Life-providing-Principle. The things that, according to the scheme of the universe,[2] appear to the common mind to be happening day by day in the sequence of time, are all present at once in the eternal scheme which transcends time and space; though this fact is beyond our comprehension as we are what Walīullāh calls us to be '*Maḥbūsī al-Zamān*', those who are fettered in the limits of time.[3]

It is according to the "*universal scheme*"[4] that species of things differ from one another in their specific characteristics and behaviour, and that their peculiar modes of evolution, development and emergence is determined at variance with one another.[5] A particular system of causes produces a particular effect peculiar to that system of causation. Things must pass through their natural routine or system of causes.[6] Nothing takes place at random. The system of the universe is not haphazard and chaotic and is not run by caprice. The *Sunnat Allāh*, God's modes of work, are defined and unalterable.[7] Walīullāh illustrates these ideas by quoting examples from

1. Budur. p. 23, *l.* 8; p. 18, *ll.* 14, 17, 19; pp. 139-145. Sat p. 29, *l.* 4.
2. Budur, p. 12, *ll.* 9-11, 17-18. Huj-I, p. 12, *ll.* 13, 22-24.
3. Budur, p. 26, *l.* 1.
4. Huj-I, p. 12, *ll.* 13, 22; p. 23, *l.* 25; p. 46, *l.* 7; p. 65, *l.* 18.
5. Huj-I, p. 21, *ll.* 7-17.
6. Huj-I, p. 12.
7. Huj-I, p. 17, chapter on *Sunnat Allāh*.

one's everyday life, from the organic life of the species in the vegetable kingdom, from the peculiar behaviours of animal and man as distinguished from one another, etc.[1]

The specific characteristics and laws, that govern the behaviour of different species, are the product or creation of God's Will and are determined by Him. Why He determined them that way, was God's Choice and God's Will. One cannot ask 'why'[2] as the question is unwarranted. It is useless to ask why fire is hot and why the leaves of trees are green. In the same way to ask why human nature is constituted as it is, and why its happiness is made dependent upon the natural development of its angelic aspect (*Malakiyya*), and why the development of the three impediments (*Ḥujub*)[3] and dominance of animal tendencies over angelic ones lead to the states of its unhappiness, are the questions which also, cannot be answered, except by stressing the fact that God has determined and ordained human nature to be as such.[4]

The development of human institutions, the rise and the fall of nations, the evolution of social custom, religious and cultural and spiritual traditions (*Milal*) are also subject to pre-determined and pre-ordained laws, according

1. Huj-I, pp. 20-24, Chapter on emergence of *Taklīf* from *Taqdīr* Sat, pp. 10-11.
2. Huj-I, p. 21, *l.* 6.
3. See *Malakiyya, Bahimiyya, Ḥujub* in chap. I above.
4. Huj-I, p. 20, *ll.* 25-26; p. 21.

to which the needs of humanity and human societies are fulfilled in the proeess of actualisation of the universal scheme through the system of innumerable causes to that effect. In the fulfilment of this, the coming of thinkers, sages and prophets and their guidance and precept and example serve as essential aids.[1] Through the same process the codes of laws come into being, which become binding upon human societies for the purpose of attaining the state of happiness *Sa'āda*. Thus religious and social laws of societies are a natural offshoot of the predetermined universal scheme of the universe.[2]

The existence of the *code of law* entails responsibility (*Taklīf*), towards it;[3] disobedience of the law does not only result in the loss of the benefit inherent in obedience to natural law,[4] and in the suffering of the direct consequences of the disregard of the law, which produces a natural state of unhappiness, but also in social discord and many related psychical, physical and metaphysical consequences.[5] Connected with the question of responsibility (*Taklīf*) is Waliullāh's view of human

1. Taf-I, pp. 237-240.
2. Taf-I, pp. 10-11. '*Tashri' Tatimma-i-Taqdīr Ast*', also *see Izālat al-Khafa*, pp. 258-259.
3. Huj-I, p. 24, *l.* 3.
4. Huj-I, p. 25. *ll.* 17. 18.
5. Huj-I, p. 52, *ll.* 22-23, p. 31, *l.* 2, pp. 24-25

free will and man's freedom to choose between two or more alternatives.

Free Will.

There is no doubt that man feels that he has a free will to choose one of many alternative courses at his disposal. Though he seems to choose one particular course and discard the rest with freedom and without any external coercion or compulsion, yet in reality he has *no freedom* of will in making a particular choice.[1] His choice is natural and essential consequence of a series of causes which lead the mind to decide on a particular course.[2] Neither the series of causes that effect the particular choice nor the faculty of choice itself are subject to the control of man.[3] They all are determined and a created by God. As man cannot alter his own constitution or deprive himself of the faculty of will and consciousness of choice, so also he cannot choose a course different from what the circumstances and conditions have formulated for him in accordance with what has been determined by the eternal scheme. It is only in the phenomenal world and in relation to man's mind and the people around him that the presence of choice between two alternatives is felt.[4] In reference to these,

1. Huj-I, p. 167, *ll.* 16-25; p. 67, *ll.* 2-6.
2. Budur, p. 106, *ll.* 1-4.
3. Taf-I, p. 99, vide example of the boatman and his work.
4. Huj-I, p. 67, *ll.* 23-24.

choice of each of the alternatives appears to be possible; and man seems to choose one of the alternatives out of his free choice.[1] This is true only in the lower order of the universe or in the situation of man's phenomenal environment. So far as the eternal scheme and higher order (*al-Niẓām al-Fauqānī*) are concerned, man's course is fixed and he cannot act a jot differently from what has been determined in the Higher Order (*al-Niẓām al-Fauqānī*).[2] Walīullāh illustrates this by the example of the act of picking up a pen. He says that, so far as the person who picks up the pen is concerned, it is obvious that he may or may not pick it up, as in the man's phenomenal situation the occurrence and non-occurrence of things are both likely; but there is a higher level in which all the things that are to occur, are made necessary and incumbent. Unless things are necessary at the higher level they cannot possibly happen in the phenomenal world.[3]

In spite of the fact that man's external as well as internal conditions are predetermined, his nature is such that, unlike other animals, he acts with a feeling of spontaneity, exutling within himself over the idea that he is free to do what he wills.[4] It is also in his nature

1. Huj-I, p. 67, *ll.* 16. 23-24. Budur, p. 105, *l.* 16.
2. *See* additional note on *Qadar*.
3. Huj-I, p. 67, *ll.* 16-24.
4. Huj-I, p. 68, *l.* 12.

that he absorbs the effects of his conscious actions, so to say, through the 'throat' (*Bal'ūm*) of his choice (*Ikhtiyār*).[1] The things that he does with the consciousness of choice and will, leave a perpetual trace on his disposition, resulting into his bliss or unhappiness.[2] Such is the human disposition and its natural susceptibilities. It is by the eternal law that man's qualities and characteristics are designed and determined. It is definitely fixed that certain things are agreeable to his nature and certain other things are disagreeable and disastrous to its nature. It is specially so when he does things consciously exercising his will which produces effect on his disposition. Naturally, therefore, within the limits man feels his freedom, he should endeavour to choose an agreeable course and avoid a disagreeable one and thus try to save himself from disastrous consequences.

According to Walīullāh, the belief in *Qadar* (God's Determining Will) does not inculcate pessimistic outlook of fatalism; on the contrary it urges the believer to work in accordance with God's natural ways, and the principles that govern the universe.[3] This belief serves as as an aid to

1. Huj-I, p. 22, *l.* 27.
2. *See* Chapt. I, Development of Disposition.
3. Huj-I, p. 55, *ll.* 22-23. As everything in the Universe works according to the unaltered law the question of injustice that gave basis to the doctrine of *al-'Adl wal-Tauḥid* of the Mu'tazilites does not arise.

one's spiritual progress only when it is accompanied with a conviction that God's Will alone is the determining power.[1] It is this kind of belief that is reckoned by Walīullāh as one of the major constituents of human righteousness and natural good (*birr*) that leads to the state of happiness, Sa'ādat.[2]

1. Huj-I, p. 65, *ll.* 19-20.
2. Huj-I, p. 65, *l.* 17. *See* Chap. XIII, *'Ibāda*—Worship.

CHAPTER XIII

WORSHIP ('IBADAT)

Before turning to Walīullāh's theological conception of the belief of *Tauḥīd* (monotheism) and of *Shirk*, (Polytheism), it is essential that his idea of worship should be clearly stated, since this, as will be seen, forms one of the main grounds of distinction between the conceptions of *Tauḥīd* and of *Shirk*.

The God consciousness, aided by the mental state created by the knowledge of God's Attributes and His All powerfulness and of the Universal Scheme (*Tadbīr as-Samāwāt wal-Arḍ*) with which He governs the whole of the Universe that He has created, produces a strong consciousness in one's mind about God's Greatness, Glory, Benevolence, Sublimation, Exaltation and other praise-worthy qualities.[1] With the development of this consciousness there simultaneously comes into being a corresponding natural psychic state of love blended with admiration, reverence, adoration and humility in relation to God.[3]

It should, however, be noted that an essential characteristic of genuine God consciousness is that it is accompanied by a strong awareness of the supernaturalness

1. Huj-I. p. 59. *l.* 10; p. 61, *l.* 22. Budur, p. 116, *ll.* 8-12.
2. Budur, p. 116, *ll.* 2-5.

of God's Essence, His powers and qualities, along with a conviction of the insignificance of the phenomenal world (*Nāsūt*) and everything in it including human beings, their essence, their qualities and powers, which can stand no comparison with those of God.[1] The consciousness of the supernaturalness (*Taqaddus*) and the tremendousness of God's love-inspiring, awe-infusing and adorable Attributes, due to their character of infinitude, produce a state of the *utmost* love, adoration and humility of which the mind is capable. No other object that is not supernatural, though many praiseworthy qualities it may possess, can, however, evoke a similar state of *utmost* love, adoration and humility.[2]

1. Budur, p. 123, *ll.* 10-11. Supernatural—*al-Muta'āl.* Huj-I, p. 60, *ll.* 11-12. Budur, p. 122, *l.* 10. Waliullah explains the characteristics of supernatural qualities of God's power and Attributes. The actions of men produce certain things only in accordance with the system of cause and effect whereas God is independent of that system as He has Himself produced the system of cause and effect itself, without the aid of such system. Being independent of any help in creating things without needing the usual course of getting help from chain of causes and being thus able to create, He may produce things instantaneously out of nothing or so to speak without any precedent cause. Human beings cannot do this. Thus characteristic of God's Attribute of *Khalq*, creation, is supernatural. His Attributes of *'Ilm*, knowledge, *Sama'*, hearing, *Ru'ya*, seeing, etc. are also supernatural and do not depend upon any aid from the phenomena of causation. Huj-I, p.60, *ll.* 13-21. Budur, p. 122, *l.* 18.
2. Budur, p. 122, *l.* 11.

It is this state of the UTMOST[1] in love, humility and adoration that the object of *supernatural* essence and supernatural qualities and powers can evoke in one's mind, which, in Walīullāh's view, constitutes the *psychic state of Worship.*[2] Any state of love, admiration, reverence and humbleness that falls short of the criterion of that '*utmost*' does not constitute worship and comes, according to him, under the categories of natural feelings towards one's fellow-beings and other objects in the world. The love, respect and humbleness felt for one's parents, teachers or other human benefactors do not therefore constitute the psychic state of worship. These feelings for worthy creatures are natural feelings as long as a perverted sense of consciousness of the imaginary supernaturalness does not intervene and no attributes of the supernatural are erroneously assigned to the creatures.[3]

Modes or Forms of Worship.

Like any other psychic states, the genuine psychic state of worship has also concomitant modes of expression in the external behaviour of human beings. The following are some of the modes[4]:—

The Gestural Modes.[5]

The state of humility is sometimes expressed by corresponding external gestures which indicate humility

1. Note the word *Aqṣa*. Budur, p. 122, *l.* 11. Huj-I, p. 60, *l.* 4.
2. Budur, p. 117, *l.* 11.
3. Budur, p. 122, *ll.* 1-9.
4. Budur, pp. 117-121.
5. Budur, p. 117, *l.* 19; p. 118, *ll.* 1-13.

and the humbleness of the person who adopts them in order to pay homage to and express adoration for the object adored and worshipped. These gestural forms generally consist of bowing, bending, kneeling, prostration, touching the ground with the forehead, etc. These gestures are, therefore, included in practical forms of worship or in its rituals.

The Verbal Mode.[1]

Certain verbal expressions indicate the state of worshipping mind. Such expressions speak about the greatness of the object worshipped—its glory, its praises, Holiness, and sometimes the utterances implore its forgiveness, help and kindness etc., and take the form of prayer.

Physical Suffering and Sacrifice.[2]

In order to show steadfastness in love and sincerity, for the object worshipped, people do not shrink from undergoing physical discomfort and loss of physical pleasure. This takes the form of fasting and at times of complete self-denial of physical pleasures, in various forms of asceticism and practices of penance.

Charity and Sacrifice of Wealth.[3]

In order to express an inner state of love, humbleness, sincerity people sometimes make sacrifices from

1. Budur, pp. 118-119, *ll.* 14-19, 1-9.
2. Budur, pp. 119-120, *ll.* 9-10, 1-5.
3. Budur, p. 120, *ll.* 6-11.

their property, wealth, and from other objects that they love dearly, in order to evoke the favours of the object worshipped.

Pilgrimage[1]

To make pilgrimage to a place, or to an object known for a historic event relating to the object worshipped is also a form of giving expression to one's worshipful state of mind.

Vows, Pledges, Oaths, and Reading of Scriptures[2]

These also are forms of worship which express one's fidelity, and reverence for the beloved object which is worshipped. The reading of the scriptures giving the account of the praiseworthy qualities and attributes of the Holy, and listening to oracles is also according to natural tendency of the worshipping mind.

The categories mentioned above are the natural modes of worship that have invariably been adopted by humanity from time immemorial to give vent to inner state of the worshipful mind.[3] These natural modes of worship are originally meant to express their concomitant psychic states. According to the principle of psychological interactionism, like the rest of the external forms of behaviour, they also eventually lead to the awakening,

1. Budur, p. 120, *ll.* 12-19.
2. Budur, p. 121, *ll.* 4-11.
3. Budur, p. 117, *ll.* 17-18; p. 121, *ll.* 12-13.

and the strengthening or the developing of their corresponding psychic states constituting worshipful state in the minds in which the same are dormant, weak or undeveloped.[1]

Social and Ethical Ends.

It should, however, be remembered that these modes not only have a strong relation with the psychic state of worship, but they also make considerable contributions to the fulfilment of social and other ethical ends and exert a tremendous influence over the culture and general outlook of people, as is clear from the study of the principles of normal and higher ethics of Waliullāh.

1. See Interactionism in Chapt. I.

CHAPTER XIV

TAUHID (Unity)

According to Waliullāh, the term *Tauḥīd* generally signifies the following four ideas and beliefs.[1] (*a*) That the Essential Being (*al-Wājib al-Wujūd*) is only One Who is the Only God, and the existence of the universe ultimately depends upon that singular Essential Being. (*b*) That the creation of the whole of the Universe is by the One, and the Only God. (*c*) That the management (*Tadbīr*) of all the affairs of all the creation and the working of all the schemes of the universe is done exclusively by the One, and the Only God. (*d*) That no one else other than the One and the Only God is worthy of worshipping.

Out of these four significances of *Tauḥīd* it is only the last two that represent the natural state of those minds which evolve naturally without any adverse effect of the impediments.[2] The realisation about God's exclusive authority over every affair in the universe, strengthened with the presence of the innate God consciousness with a right sort of knowledge of His Attributes, gives rise to the worshipful state of the mind exclusively in relation to Him alone. In that state of realisation and in the consequential psychic state of worship there exists a natural

1. Huj-I, p. 59, *ll.* 5-9.
2. See *Tasbīḥ* and *Ḥamd* and *Sa'āda* Chapt. X.

relationship (*al-Rabṭ al-Ṭabi'ī*) according to Walīullāh, the former leading to the latter.[1]

Those people who lack in the right sort of consciousness about God, are first in need of creating a mental content[2] conducive to the right consciousness. That mental content consists, according to Walīullāh, of the concept and conviction that no one other than God is worthy of their worship.[3] This mental conception creates a state which is again stimulated by the consciousness and conviction of the fact that He Alone has authority over the management of the affairs of the world and of the universe, and that the bounties and beneficences that one enjoys in this life, and that life and death and every thing else is in His power exclusively.[4] This state of worship in relation to God alone is called *al-Tauḥīd fil-'Ibāda* (the state of unity in the attitude of worship, directed to the worship of God alone). Of this attitude the belief in God's exclusive authority in the management of the affairs of the universe (*Mudabbir al-Samāwāt wal-Ard*) is an essential constituent as has already been stated.[5]

It is the attitude of *Tauḥīd fil-'Ibāda* that supplies the essential basis for Human Righteousness and Natural

1. Huj-I, p. 59, *l.* 9; p. 61, *l.* 22; p. 62, *l.* 8; p. 63, *l.* 12.
2. (*i.e. al-Tabīr al-'Ilmī*) Huj-I, p. 59, *l.* 1. *See* Development of Disposition, Chapt. I.
3. Huj-I, p. 67, *l.* 10; p. 59, *l.* 9.
4. Budur, p. 116, *ll.* 3-4.
5. Huj-I, p. 62, *ll.* 5, 6.

Good (*Birr*)[1] that leads to the state of Happiness (*Sa'ādah*). Those who lack the correct God consciousness and have not yet attained the natural states of the rightly developed specific nature characterised by God consciousness, have essentially to *endeavour* to adopt such forms of mental concepts (*al-Tabīr al-'Ilmi*) that conform to the attitude of *Tauhid fil-'Ibāda*. This method, would naturally lead to the actual formation of the psychic state of *Tauḥīd fil-'Ibāda* in which the worshipful attitude is directed towards God exclusively.[2]

So far as the first two conceptions of *Tauḥīd* and their details are concerned, they have little practical value for the ordinary mind. In Walīullāh's theologico-metaphysical thought, we come across the statement that the whole of the universe (*al-Shakhṣ al-Akbar*) has its source in God, the Ultimate Reality (*Ḥaqīqat-al-Quṣwa*). The Ultimate Reality is, he asserts, the Largest Unity (*al-Waḥadat al-Kubra*), the Ultimate Being (*al-Wujūd al-Aqṣa*), and the ultimate cause in which not only the series of succession of causes of things terminate, but upon which also all things are directly dependent for their existence and subsistence.[3] It is so vast and boundless that the human mind cannot conceive it. The time-honoured *rationalistic* discussions about the Ultimate Reality are in vain.[4] The

1. Huj-I, p. 58, *l.* 29.
2. *See* Development of Disposition, Chapt. I.
3. Budur, pp. 10-12.
4. Budur, p. 102, *ll.* 1-3, 16-17.

rationalistic argumentation has no practical utility of creating the requisite effects or reactions in the mind that lead to the development of the feelings of love, adoration, etc., which constitute the worshipful state, the essential accessory to the genuine God consciousness.[1] A person may have a rational conviction about God as the Ultimate cause and as the Only Essential Being, yet he may not have developed the worshipful state in his mind in relation to God, owing to the lack in his consciousness about His authority and power in the management of the affairs of the whole of the universe. That is why polytheists (*Mushrikūn*), have been reminded in the Holy Quran over and over again that God Alone is *Mudabbir*,[2] the Being Who has exclusive control over the management of all matters in the heavens and on the earth. On the testimony of the Quran, Waliullāh points out that the belief and conviction about God as the Creator or the Ultimate Cause, as some of the polytheists also believed, is not sufficient unless this belief is accompanied with the conviction that He Alone is the Master of the whole management of all the universe, to such an extent that the conviction has been capable of creating the corresponding worshipful attitude directed towards Him exclusively.[3]

1. Budur, p. 116, *ll.* 15-16.
2. Huj-I, p. 59, *l.* 13.
3. Huj-I, p. 59, *ll.* 13-21.

Pathology of Polytheism (Shirk)

The essence of what is understood in the terminology of the Quran as *al-Ishrāk billah* (the psychic state of conceiving partners of God), consists in an attitude *contrary* to that of *Tauḥid fil-'Ibāda* the attitude of worship of God Alone) as discussed above. The worshipful attitude of the mind directed towards any object other than God, therefore constitutes what is considered as *Shirk* (the state of Association of Partners with God) according to the teachings of the Quran.[1]

Tauḥid is, as we know, one of the fundamental principles of Human Righteousness and Natural Good. The concept of *Tauḥid*, as described above, is the product of the natural attitude of the human mind, in relation to God. In the case of the majority of human beings who lack that attitude, this concept creates a mental state conducive to the eventual development of the same natural attitude in relation to God.[2] The attitude that constitutes *Shirk*, being opposed to this, is therefore highly detrimental to the natural attainment and progress of the specific disposition or the specific nature of man.[3] The attitude of *Shirk* and the concepts connected with it, are therefore the marks of the actual or the potential perversion of or defect in the specific nature of those

1. Huj-I, p. 62, *l.* 5; p. 61, *l.* 28.
2. *See* "Interactionism" and "Development of Disposition" in Chapt. I.
3. Taf-I, p. 205, *ll.* 3-5.

human beings who hold the concepts or attitude of <u>Shirk</u>. Walīullāh ranks the attitude of <u>Shirk</u> amongst the psychic and spiritual diseases of humanity and considers it "the most lingering of the diseases, the victims of whose evil effects have been found in all the nations of Humanity".[1] Those whose minds suffer from this unnatural psychic state or psychic disease, could therefore be considered as pathological cases from that point of view.

From the analysis of Walīullāh's discussion of pathology of *Shirk*, it becomes clear that every category of *Shirk* is in one way or the other caused by the mind's state of ignorance or its impediment of wrong instruction *Ḥijāb Su'al-Ma'rifa.*[2] But the source of the diversity of the forms of *Shirk* lies in the variety of the states of the dispositions which snow the symptoms of the disease. The worst types of the sufferers are those whose minds become incapable of the worshipful attitude towards God because of their incompatibility to realise the Greatness and Glory and Supremacy (*Jalāl*) of God and His power,[3] the realisation of which is an essential ingredient of the worshipful attitude and the state of the *utmost* humility and wonderment.[4] Such people may be divided into two categories.

1. Budur, p. 121, *l.* 16. Huj-I, p. 61. *l.* 10.
2. *See* Chapter on Types of Shirk. Huj-I, pp. 61-63; also Budur, pp. 122-127.
3. Huj-I, p. 61. *ll.* 10-11.
4. Huj-I, p. 61, *l.* 21; p. 62, *l.* 8. Also see the significance of *Tauḥīd* above.

To one of othe categories belong those people who, on account of some deficiency in their nature, are incapable of possessing the real and genuine worshipful attitude to any object whatsoever. Their minds are capable only of ordinary submission, love or at the most of a partial attitude of worship. Being impeded by ignorance about the Greatness and Glory of God their defective minds are attracted to objects other than God, and bestow their attitude of submission, or feelings of love and admiration in the highest degree of which they are capable upon objects other than God. It is not necessary that the objects that evoke such feelings should be tangible or exterior to, or, outside themselves. To such people, their own selves, their personal motives and selfish desires, in most cases, become the objects of their *utmost* submission, love and admiration, and hence the objects of their worship.[1] The gods of such persons are therefore their own selves, their desires and motives or the tangible objects concerned and they deliberately and wilfully submit to these objects of their love in contradiction to the clear commandments of God and innate dictates of the natural inner consciousness. At times they may even be moved to fury at hearing the Quranic God's commandments against what they desire and approve in their own hearts.[2]

1. Huj-I, p. 77, *ll.* 15-16. Budur, p. 127, *l.* 15.
2. Budur, p. 127, *ll.* 11-15.

To the other category belong those people whose dispositions are not so deficient in possession of the complete worshipful state of the mind. But owing to the loss of God consciousness or of the consciousness of His Greatness and Glory (*Jalāl*) they satisfy the urges of the worshipful state of their minds by worshipping other objects that evoke their feelings of worship.[1]

The Materialist (*Dahri*) and the *Kāfir* "the infidel" show the symptoms of the people of this category. The loss of God consciousness of the materialist is accompanied by an agnostic attitude about God's existence,[2] whereas that of the *kāfir* is sustained by a deliberate and definite tendency contrary to God consciousness.[3] Those who become engrossed in the nature-worship, the worship of the fire (*e.g. Majūs*) or that of the stars (*e.g. Ṣābi'iyūn*) they also develop the same character of the loss of God consciousness or of the loss of the consciousness of His Greatness and Glory as it is in the case of the *kāfir*, the infidel.[4]

In addition to the categories discussed above there are types of people whose minds are in a way God conscious and aware of the Greatness and Glory (*Jalāl*) of God, and are also capable of the worshipful

1. Budur, p. 123, *l.* 13. Huj-I, p. 61, *ll.* 10-11.
2. Huj-I, p. 68, *l.* 25; p. 69, *l.* 2; p. 79, *ll.* 19-27.
3. Huj-I, p. 80, *l.* 3; p. 117, *ll.* 18-20. Budur, p. 157, *ll.* 8-11.
4. Budur, p. 123, *ll.* 15-16. Huj-I, p. 59, *ll.* 10-13.

state; but owing to the impediment of ignorance and wrong instruction (*Ḥiājb Sū'al-Ma'rifa*) they develop a worshipful attitude towards other objects which, also according to their supposition are in possession of and partners in the divine nature.[1] This mistaken consciousness leads to attributing supernatural quality or qualities to objects other than God and evolving a worshipful attitude towards those objects. This leads to the divided attitude of worship (*Shirk*) and eventually to perversion or distortion of the natural state of the mind as it has already been discussed above.[2] The same may ultimately lead to the complete loss of God consciouness, or of the consciousness of His Greatness and Glory and thus reduce the mind to the level of the mind belonging to the persons of the categories discussed above.[3]

Those who belong to these types of people are given to hero worship, saint worship, worship of prophets or to the worship of the souls of these or their tombs or idols.[4] The institutions and traditions of such people are based upon the assumptions of diverse ideas and conceptions, such as the partnership of the object of their worship with God in Godhood or in the management

1. Huj-I, p. 61, *ll.* 24-25. Budur, p. 123, *ll.* 17-19.
2. Budur, p. 123, *ll.* 6-7, 10-12.
3. Cf. Budur, p. 124, *ll.* 16-17.
4. Budur, p. 98, *l.* 13; p. 124, *ll.* 1-5. Huj-I, p. 59, Taf-I, p. 63, *ll.* 17-[illegible]

(*Tadbīr*) of the affairs of the universe; the incarnation of God in the person who is the object of their worship; the possession of the power of mediation, *Shafā'ah* by persons worshipped, as lesser gods, between the worshippers and the Greatest God higher in rank than the lesser gods.[1]

Amongst these types of people, Shah Waliullāh reckons those of the Christians who believe in the incarnation of God in the Christ and in the Christ's supernatural essence, and also those transgressors from amongst the people, who, in name, profess Islam, but contrary to their professed religion, they follow in the footsteps of the Jews and the Christians in their polytheistic ideas and are given to the saint worship and to the worship of the tombs and the graves of their saints.[2]

Code of Shari'ah

After the analysis of the pathology of *Shirk*, a reference may be made to the Muslim code of the law of *Shari'ah* to put checks on practices of *Shirk*. The principle underlying the codification of this law is the same as in the case of the codification of every other law.[3] The safety and preservation of people from the actual and *potential* dangers of the pathology of *Shirk* is the main object of the codification of law relating to *Shirk*.

1. Huj-I, p. 51, *ll.* 61-62.
2. Budur, p. 124, *ll.* 5-6; pp. 125-127. *See* Additional Note No. 3.
3. *See* Additional Note No. 4.

Hence all the usual forms and modes of behaviour that are presumably concomitants (*Maẓānn*) of the psychic state of *Shirk*, are banned and prohibited by the law of *Shari'a* irrespective of the psychical aspect of the problem.[1] It is for this reason that the practice of all the forms of worship, the gestural, the verbal and the sacrificial, are prohibited in relation to any object other than God, even though they may be practised without the presence of the psychic state of the worshipful mind.[2]

1. Huj-I, p. 6, *ll.* 14-15.
2. Huj-I, p. 61, *ll.* 17, 19; p. 62, *ll.* 1-3; p. 63.

CHAPTER XV

ESCHATOLOGY

The discussions of Walīullāh in the support of the eschatological statements given in the Quran and the Traditions of the Prophet, belong properly to the realm of Metaphysico-psychological System constituting a part of his philosophy of religion in general. The Eschatological descriptions have no direct relation to the so-called theology which deals with belief in God and with the nature of His Attributes and His Essence, and still less with the practical theology dealing with the basis of God consciousness among common people, and with their practical knowledge of His attributes which is the subject matter of this part of the book.

It is, however, proposed to give a brief outline of the foundations of Walīullāh's arguments in support of Eschatological beliefs, as belief in life's continuity to the stages hereafter, is in his view, one of the most important articles of Faith and Religion.[1] Contrary to his view about the metaphysical aspects of the theology relating to God and His essence, Walīullāh holds that a belief in the *literal* truth of the eschatological statements is essential and that they are not to be interpreted allegorically.[2]

1. Huj-I, p. 9, *ll.* 13-19; p. 10, *l.* 15.
2. Huj-I, p. 8, *ll.* 24-26; p. 9, *ll.* 18, 20-21; p. 14, *ll.* 10-29. Also *see* the chapters on the events of Resurrection. Huj-I, pp. 35-37. Budur, pp. 149-150.

His eschatological views are based upon his idea of the soul and his conception of human nature and its psychology, particularly its higher psychology and on the meaning of the life and the death.[1]

The idea of *cycle of life* is the basis underlying the account of the various stages of experience after death. It is in the *return process* that the soul passes through various stages of *Barzakh* (the intermediary stage and of *Hashr* (Resurrection) during which the experiences of the *Qabr* (the grave) and after that those of the *Mīzān* (Balance), *Ḥisāb* (the Accounting), *Ḥaudh* (Pool), *Sirāt* (the Way), *Suḥuf* (the Scrolls), *Ru'yat* (the Vision of God), etc., take place.[2]

The representations of these phenomena in particular forms are explained by Walīullāh on the basis of his psychological views of psychic states and their representations in mental images. The analogy of dreams is one of the methods that he uses to explain the literal significance of the eschatological experiences.[3] He compares the life after death with a dream and calls it a dream which is never interrupted by the wakening.[4] Prophecy is an original source of information about the eschatological matters as the prophets are able to perceive the relationship between a particular action and its

1. Huj-I, pp. 33-36. Budur, pp. 139, 145.
2. Sat., pp. 17-19. Taf-I, pp. 253-256.
3. Taf-I, pp. 246-253. Huj-I, p. 34, *ll.* 6-12.
4. Budur, p. 148, *ll.* 8-11. Huj-I, p. 34, *ll.* 25-27.

psychic influence on the mind, resulting in a particular concomitant image and representation in the life outside the plane of the physical life.[1]

It is not possible to pursue here a detailed discussion of Walīullāh's methods of substantiation and proof of eschatological matters. This would involve not only a more profound analysis of his normal psychology and higher and supernormal psychology, but also an examination of his ontology and metaphysics. Without the appropriate background supplied by these sciences, it is not possible to acquire a proper idea of the classifications of persons in their lives after death and of the faculties of those who are gifted with the qualities of prophethood and their capacities of comprehension of the realities of the life after death and their ways and modes of expression about those realities in their every day language spoken by the people amongst whom they live.[2] Walīullāh's conception of the terms like *Jazā*, *Sazā*, *Thawāb*, *'Iqāb*, *'Azāb*, God's *Sukht*, and *Radā*, etc., can properly be understood only when they are placed against the general background of his philosophical thought, including his views about the language of people and the way in which the prophets and seers make use of it. The phenomena of *Mīzān*, the weighing of the deeds

1. Budur, pp. 165-166. *al-Ṭabīb al-Ilahī*. p. 173. *ll.* 12-16. Taf-I, pp. 203-215.
2. Taf-I, pp. 111-113.

in the balance, and of the appearance of angels in the grave in comforting or appealing forms are the phenomena of the mind which cannot conceive things except in the tangible forms or of those who are *al-Nāim al-Ṭaba'* of slumbering dispositions. For this reason, the details of eschatology as discussed by Walīullāh are postponed for the time being till their background is discussed in a proper manner in a separate treatise.

Practical Importance of Eschatology or Concepts of the Life After Death.

In the end a few words may be said about the importance of the knowledge of and the belief in the life after death.

The importance of the belief in the life hereafter lies in that it provides the individual human being with a definite purpose of life and enables him to endeavour for the betterment of his present life and look forward to a pleasant state in the life hereafter.[1]

The knowledge of the eschatological details does not only satisfy the quest of the mind, rectify its perspective about life in general and contribute to what Walīullāh calls the balance of the specific disposition (*I'tidāl-i-Nau'*), but it also induces the mind to good and beneficial behaviour and discourages it from that behaviour which is eventually harmful.[2]

1. Budur, p. 152, *l.* 1. *Hubb-al-Ākhira*. Huj-I, p. 34, *l.* 12; p. 36, *ll.* 26-27.
2. Huj-I, p. 55, *ll.* 22, 25-28; p. 23, *ll.* 5, 22; p. 68; *ll.* 17-23. Sat. p. 11, *l.* 14, p. 12, *l.* 1.

Being based upon the concept of the life that is absolutely different from the physical life with which the individual is so much acquainted, the belief and consciousness of another kind of life after death opens to the mind a vast vista of its progress and development in regions that transcend the physical existence. The belief in God and in the vision of Him has a profound basis in the case of such a mind to progress to high levels.[1]

The person, who like the materialist (*Dahrī*) denies the possibility of the life after death, and does not conceive of the likelihood of an existence beyond the physical existence, cannot have, according to Walīullāh, the urge for higher progress and for advancement beyond the narrow field of his senses. Thus, such a person is barred from the realisation of higher ends and from the attainment of the degrees of progress and development essential for the state of "Real Happiness" (*Sa'āda*).[2] In addition to this loss, he is bound to suffer from what Walīullāh calls "the state of terrific perplexity and pain when after the physical death, he is disillusioned after he enters the threshold of his other life".[3]

1. Huj-I, p. 79, *ll.* 20-22.
2. Huj-I, p. 77, *ll.* 17-23; p. 79, *ll.* 19-27. *See* "Happiness" Chapt. I.
3. Huj-I, p. 80, *ll.* 1-2. Budur, pp. 151-152.